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INTRODUCTION
Judicial deference to federal legislation affecting Indians is a
theme that has persisted throughout the two-hundred-year history of
American Indian law. The Supreme Court has sustained nearly every
piece of federal legislation it has considered directly regulating Indian
tribes, whether challenged as being beyond federal power or within that
power but violating individual rights.' This judicial deference often has
been justified by invoking federal plenary power to regulate Indian af-
fairs and the political question doctrine's requirement of deference to
the political branches. Indeed, not until 1977 did the Court explicitly
repudiate use of the political question doctrine to bar equal protection
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1 In only one case did the Court invalidate a congressional law as violating Indian
property rights, but it was careful to distinguish earlier cases by stressing that the
rights at issue were individual and not tribal property rights. Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665, 671, 678 (1912); see infra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
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challenges to federal legislation regulating Indian affairs.2
The judiciary's frequent invocation of federal plenary power over
Indian affairs is curious since the Constitution does not explicitly grant
the federal government a general power to regulate Indian affairs. One
suspects, therefore, that, as in other areas of constitutional law, the
terms "plenary power"' and "political question ' 4 are not so much jus-
tifications for decisional outcomes as they are restatements of the
Court's intent to defer to the other branches of government and, con-
comitantly, to abdicate any role in defining the unique status of Indian
tribes in our constitutional system or accommodating their legitimate
claims of tribal sovereignty and preservation of property.
The unique nature of Indian tribes in our federal system helps to
explain this deference. Through almost two hundred years of constitu-
tional adjudication, the courts have labored to decipher the Constitu-
tion's exquisite tensions allocating power between the federal and state
governments and between governmental power and individual rights.
Yet, when the issue of Indian tribal sovereignty is placed within this
matrix, none of the Constitution's familiar power allocation rules seem
to fit. First of all, Indian tribes are not merely private associations.'
a Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (citing
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)).
a The term "plenary power" has been used to describe several distinct concepts.
Engdahl has synthesized three, Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Prop-
erty, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 283, 363-66 (1976): first, plenary meaning exclusive power, as,
for example, the exclusive power of Congress to spend federal money, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 1; second, plenary meaning an exercise of power capable of preempting state
law, as, for example, Congress's commerce power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; third,
plenary meaning unlimited power. This final category includes two subgroups: (a)
power unlimited by other textual provisions of the Constitution; and (b) power unlim-
ited as to the objectives Congress might pursue. An example of the latter is the use of
the taxing power to deter conduct Congress deems inimical to the public welfare, but
which it cannot prohibit directly. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953) (federal tax on bookmakers upheld).
In Indian law, the term plenary power has been used with each of these connota-
tions. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (Marshall,
C.J.) (federal law is exclusive and preemptive of state law); see also Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903) (congressional plenary authority over Indians
is political and not subject to judicial control). Contra, Delaware Tribal Business
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (congressional plenary power over Indian affairs
does not mean that due process challenge is not justiciable). As to the category of un-
limited power, if a general power over Indian affairs exists, any legislation relating to
Indians would be permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567,
572 (1840) (congressional policy decisions dealing with Indians are not open to ques-
tion by the judiciary); see also FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 211 (R. Strickland & C. Wilkinson eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
HANDBOOK].
" See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Henkin, Is There a "Po-
litical Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 606, 622 (1976).
' "Indian tribes within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private, volun-
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They elect political officers who enact civil and criminal laws adminis-
tered by tribal courts, and they hold title to tribal land. In short, they
assert a measure of political sovereignty over the persons and property
within the boundaries of their reservations.'
In a constitutional sense, however, Indian tribes are strange sover-
eigns. Unlike foreign countries, dealt with at arms length by the federal
government, Indian tribes are subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the
federal government: they govern within the territorial borders of the
United States, and their members are United States citizens. Yet, In-
dian tribes are "domestic dependent nations, ' 7 and not states of the
Union able to claim rights against the central government through the
traditions and constitutional structures supporting federalism.'
At the same time Indian tribes do not have a full property interest
in their lands; federal power to govern tribes has been translated into
federal ownership of an interest in tribal lands, with a concomitant in-
crease in federal power to confiscate that land.'
How then, do Indian tribes and tribal claims fit within our consti-
tutional framework? In particular, what constitutional arguments are
available to an Indian tribe seeking to limit the exercise of federal
power encroaching on the tribe's political sovereignty or its property
interests? How has judicial deference to Congress impeded the develop-
ment of constitutional protection of tribal rights? These questions are
the subjects of the present Article.
Because extraordinary deference to congressional power over Indi-
ans is closely related to the courts' failure to protect Indian tribal
rights, this Article begins by tracing the history of federal power over
Indians, with special focus on the development of the Plenary Power
Doctrine. History reveals that the original reasons for the doctrine are
no longer applicable. While the doctrine has been narrowed in recent
cases, the courts continue their truncated role, invoking plenary power,
or its equivalent, and deferring to Congress to accommodate the com-
peting interests affected by legislation. The music has stopped, but the
melody lingers on.
tary organizations' . . . ." United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
1 See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribe's inher-
ent sovereignty upheld exercise of tribal power to impose oil and gas severance tax on
non-Indian lessees). For a recent review of the sources of and limitations upon tribal
sovereignty, see 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 229-57.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-18 (1831).
8 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (state sover-
eignty can operate as a limitation on federal commerce power); cf. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (federal mining act did not
interfere with states' traditional governmental function).
' See infra text accompanying notes 58-80 & 122-28.
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Undue deference to congressional power over Indians only par-
tially explains the consistent failure of tribal claims against the govern-
ment. A second cause is the unusual nature of those claims-especially
claims to preserve tribal sovereignty and property. Again, primarily be-
cause of the unique nature of Indian tribes, these claims do not fit
neatly into the Constitution's guarantee of due process of law, and its
equal protection component.
Upon closer examination, however, the unique features of Indian
tribes suggest constitutional limits on government actions affecting tri-
bal rights. First, some have argued that when confronted with the ques-
tion of dealing with Indians the framers opted to respect tribal sover-
eignty by vesting power to deal with Indian tribes in the federal
government alone, and limiting that power to legislation dealing with
commerce with Indian tribes."0 Beyond that historical and textual argu-
ment, the same constitutional traditions and doctrines that accord strict
judicial scrutiny to legislative actions interfering substantially with fun-
damental rights may apply to laws affecting tribal property and sover-
eignty rights. While such tribal rights at first seem outside the main-
stream values shared by Americans, respect for tribal rights simply
involves acceptance both of cultural diversity and the morality of prom-
ise keeping-values deeply rooted in this society. Similarly, the protec-
tion afforded certain classes, such as racial and ethnic minorities dis-
criminated against in the political process, should extend to the
appropriate entity for evaluating Indian political power, the individual
tribe. The second portion of this Article will, thus, focus on fifth
amendment limitations on federal power to regulate tribal sovereignty
and property rights.
In addition to these broad doctrinal arguments this analysis also
turns to a detailed examination of relatively recent cases suggesting an
alternative basis for heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation affecting
Indians." Several issues will be addressed: first, whether the Court in
recent cases has formulated a "substantive limitation" on congressional
power over Indian affairs; second, if such a limitation exists, its nature
and scope; and third, the variables conditioning the application of this
limitation, especially regarding tribal political sovereignty and property
interests. The Article concludes that the courts can and should apply an
intermediate standard of scrutiny in reviewing the exercise of federal
power encroaching on these interests.
10 See infra notes 228-47 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 249-92 and accompanying text.
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I. OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO
REGULATE INDIAN AFFAIRS
The mystique of plenary power has pervaded federal regulation of
Indian affairs from the beginning.1" While the Articles of Confedera-
tion contained a general power over Indian affairs,1" the Constitution
enumerates only one power specific to these affairs, the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce . with the Indian tribes."u4 The Plenary Power
Doctrine, a fixture of American Indian law since John Marshall pro-
vided its first justification in 1832,15 can be traced not only to this com-
merce power but also to the treaty, war, and other foreign affairs pow-
ers,1 6 as well as the property power. 17 Each has been characterized,
historically, as vesting Congress (or the President) with almost unlim-
ited power in contexts not involving Indians.18
12 Federal plenary power over Indians is regarded as a major doctrine in Indian
law today. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT
106-07 (1977) [hereinafter cited as POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT]; R.
BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 112-
34 (1980); 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 207-12.
IS "The United States ... shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power
of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the States provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be
not infringed or violated." U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1777). This
language, designed to strike a compromise between state and federal interests by grant-
ing states control over assimilated Indians within their borders while giving the new
government supremacy in dealing with Indian tribes, produced constant federal-state
friction during the period of government under the Articles. See Clinton & Hotopp,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The
Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17, 23-28 (1980). See generally
F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 28-31 (1962)
(background on article IX of the Articles of Confederation).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-62 (1832).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (treaty); id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16 (congressional war
powers); id. art. II, § 2 (presidential war powers). The Court has stated that foreign
affairs powers are inherent in national sovereignty, and not granted by the Constitu-
tion. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See
generally Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 918-22 (1959) (development of foreign
affairs power).
17 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (property clause).
18 See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) ("The reasons that pre-
clude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and natu-
ralization.") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972) (congressional "plenary authority" over aliens); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (war powers justified interning Japanese during
World War II); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(broad foreign affairs powers of President and Congress); United States v. Gratiot, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840) (article IV property power "without limitation"); see
also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890) (treaty power is unlimited with
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A. The Treaty Era: Foreign Affairs
and Indian Commerce (1776-1871)
The absence of a general power over Indian affairs in the Consti-
tution is not surprising to students of history, for at the time the Con-
stitution was drafted, the framers regarded Indian tribes as sovereign
nations, albeit nations that would soon either move West, assimilate, or
become extinct.19 Thus, the same powers that sufficed to give the fed-
eral government a free rein in the international arena were viewed as
sufficient to enable the new government to deal adequately with the
Indian tribes.
In formulating federal policy toward Indian tribes in the early
years of the Constitution, President Washington and Secretary of War
Knox followed the policy promulgated by the British Crown-though
not always followed by individual colonies 2 -- of dealing with Indian
tribes as sovereign nations. Their principal reason was practical: earlier
attempts by individual colonies and some states under the Articles of
Confederation to assert power over Indian tribes, especially power to
seize tribal lands, had caused conflicts. According to one historian,
"[t]he country, precariously perched among the sovereign nations of the
world, could not stand the expense and strain of a long drawn-out In-
dian war."2
Washington and Knox advocated a policy of respect for existing
treaty promises. In addition they recommended that a series of new
treaties be negotiated for the purpose of acquiring Indian land by con-
sent in an orderly fashion; the treaties would contain promises to pro-
tect Indian tribes and tribal land from white incursions in exchange for
the land cessions.22 This policy of dealing with Indian tribes as nations
capable of executing treaties continued until 187102
respect to the objectives Congress might pursue: "[I]t is not perceived that there is any
limit to the questions which can be adjusted [by treaty] touching any matter which is
properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country"); Henkin, supra note 16, at
919-30 (congressional foreign affairs power); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 5-16 (1978) (Court defers unduly in individual rights cases to congres-
sional power in the area of foreign affairs).
10 See, e.g., R. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 134-45 (1978); F.
PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 213-27; S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 32-43
(1973).
2 For a history of the contradictions in Indian policy during the colonial period,
see Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 13, at 19-29; Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 846, 850-57 (1980).
21 F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 44; see also A. WALLACE, THE DEATH AND
REBIRTH OF THE SENECA 159-62 (1969) (Indian battles resulting in high United
States casualties).
22 F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 44-49.
23 In that year, the House of Representatives attached a rider to the Indian appro-
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The treaty powers of Congress and the executive were sufficient to
carry out this early policy. In addition to ratifying treaties, Congress
also affected Indian affairs by means of the Trade and Intercourse Acts,
first enacted in 1790.24 These laws originally were designed to effectu-
ate treaty promises of protection by imposing sanctions on individuals
and states who had infringed on Indian land or dealt with Indians in
violation of treaties.25
The judiciary further solidified the analogy of Indian affairs to
foreign affairs. In Worcester v. Georgia,26 Chief Justice John Marshall
upheld the supremacy of federal over state power regarding Indian
tribes, an issue that threatened to split the nation apart at that time,
but which has never seriously been open to question since then.27
priations act stating that no more treaties were to be made with Indians. Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1976)). The effect of
this rider was to serve notice on the Senate and the President that the House would
enforce its desire for more participation in Indian affairs by refusing to appropriate any
money to finance treaty promises. Although Congress began governing Indians by legis-
lation, it is important to note that the end of the treaty era did not end all consensual
relations between the government and Indian tribes, especially with regard to land ces-
sions. The executive negotiated agreements regarding land cessions, which were then
sent to both houses of Congress for ratification. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at
127-28.
24 Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976)). Particularly important was a provision, still in
force today, voiding any sales of land by "any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indi-
ans" without the consent of the United States. Id. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3,
at 109-11 & nn. 387-96. This law provides the basis for the recent claims by Indian
tribes living in the original 13 states that sales of their land to the states without federal
consent are void. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525
(2d Cir. 1983); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). See
generally Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 13; O'Toole & Tureen, State Power and the
Passamaquoddy Tribe: "A Gross National Hypocrisy?," 23 ME. L. REV. 1 (1971). For
a comprehensive history of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, see F. PRUCHA, supra note
13.
25 See F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 44-49. These laws were not controversial
exercises of congressional power. Any doubt regarding congressional ability to rely on
the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cI. 18, to execute treaties
would have been quieted by the commerce clause's commitment of commerce with the
Indian tribes to Congress.
26 31 U.S.. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Georgia had attempted to assert jurisdiction and
ownership rights over the gold-rich lands of the Cherokee Nation. Invalidating the
Georgia law, the Court held that the Constitution assigned to the federal government
exclusive power to deal with Indians. Consequently the Court concluded that the exclu-
sivity of federal power alone would bar any state law, and that federal laws as well as
treaties preempted state laws. Id. at 561-62.
27 See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). The major exception is the issue of off-reservation fishing
rights in Washington state, called "[one of the most significant state-federal conflicts
since the Civil War." D. GFTCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 618 (1979). For a succinct history of this dis-
pute, see Fishing in Western Washington-A Treaty Right, a Clash of Cultures, in
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST FOR SUR-
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Chief Justice Marshall premised much of his eloquent defense of
federal power on his view of the Indian tribes as sovereign nations
whose rights of self-government predated the Constitution and whose
dealings with the United States were governed by principles of interna-
tional as well as constitutional law.28 Consequently, he found ample
authority in the Constitution for federal power: "[The Constitution]
confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties,
and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all
that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with Indians."2
Although the Court .in Worcester recognized that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereignty rights, the decision was really a defense of
federal over state power, not a defense of Indian tribal sovereignty-the
tribe was not even a party to the suit. Indeed, by relying on federal
foreign relations power to free tribal sovereignty from state control,
Worcester subjugated that sovereignty to the will of Congress and set
the stage for a tradition of deference to Congress in Indian affairs anal-
ogous to that deference accorded Congress (or the President) in foreign
affairs.30
One legacy of Worcester, then, is that courts applied to Indian af-
fairs doctrines peculiar to the federal foreign affairs power without nec-
essarily distinguishing the special status of Indian tribes as domestic
rather than foreign nations. For instance, under the last-in-time rule,
Congress can abrogate a treaty with a foreign country, merely by pass-
ing a later statute conflicting with it."1 Early on, this doctrine was ap-
plied to treaties with Indians; 2 moreover, courts continue to apply the
doctrine today when Indian tribes are no longer regarded as foreign
nations. 3
VIVAL 61-100 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT].
" The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights .... The
constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be
made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their
rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 See supra note 18.
3' E.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
" The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) (treaties with In-
dian tribes have "no higher sanctity" than treaties with foreign nations).
11 See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 623 F.2d 159, 181 (Ct. CI.
1980) (statute permitting Secretary of Interior to pay out shares of tribal funds to indi-
viduals abrogated treaty promise that payment for land sale be held in tribal trust
fund); see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (statutes opening
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Another example of the uncritical borrowing of foreign affairs doc-
trines was the frequent invocation of the political question doctrine,"'
relatively common in foreign affairs, 5 as a justification for failing to
question congressional power in Indian cases," even those raising indi-
vidual rights concerns.3 7 For instance, although the. integrity of tribal
sovereignty was protected from state incursions in Worcester, the fed-
eral government later forced the Cherokee Nation to march to Indian
territory by negotiating a treaty with a minority faction of the tribe.3"
parts of treaty reservation to settlers disestablished reservation); cf. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing Rosebud
Sioux in holding statute opening up treaty reservation did not disestablish reservation).
In Rosebud Sioux the Court held that the decisive factor in determining abrogation of a
treaty was a clearly expressed congressional intent. 430 U.S. at 586; see also Conlfeder-
ated Salish, 665 F.2d at 954-60. The courts are divided as to whether this intent must
be explicitly expressed on the face of the later statute or whether it may be discovered
from the surrounding circumstances. Compare United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453
(8th Cir. 1974) (face of the act did not demonstrate intent to abrogate) with United
States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.) (surrounding circumstances indicated con-
gressional intent to abrogate), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). For a thorough dis-
cussion of this controversy, see Comment, Statutory Construction-Wildlife Protection
Versus Indian Treaty Hunting Rights, 57 WASH. L. REv. 225 (1981); see also Wilkin-
son & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 601 (1975).
"I E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Whether or not the political question
doctrine actually exists is the subject of a great deal of controversy. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 18, §§ 3-16, at 71-79 (summarizing the doctrine and competing views). Neverthe-
less, its invocation by a court, even in a case in which the court actually reaches the
merits, is an almost certain indication that the party challenging political power is go-
ing to lose the case.
" See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring) (political question doctrine barred review of presidential authority to abrogate
Panama Canal Treaty); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948) (holding that presidential orders concerning international air routes
are "political not judicial"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (upholding presidential authority to declare arms embargo punishable by crimi-
nal sanctions); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (power over
foreign relations "vested in the political departments of the government"); see also
Henkin, supra note 4 (despite language regarding political questions in foreign affairs
cases discussed, the political question doctrine was not necessary to the decisions).
" See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 347 (1941) ("The manner, method and time of such extinguishment [of aboriginal
Indian title] raise political, not justiciable, issues."); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517,
525 (1877) ("[A]ction towards Indians with respect to their lands is a question of gov-
ernmental policy . . ").
" See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955) (In-
dians not entitled to compensation under fifth amendment for taking of timber by
United States from aboriginal lands. The "power of Congress is supreme."); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (political question doctrine barred review
of tribal due process claim).
11 Treaty with the Cherokees at New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478. The
pressures from state and public officials created two factions among the Cherokee Na-
tion, the Treaty Party, comprising the elite mixed bloods, and the Ross faction, sup-
19841
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Despite the immediate protest of nearly all of the Cherokee people to
the President and to Congress, removal was ordered.39 Judicial re-
course would have been unavailing: the political question doctrine
would have barred the courts from questioning the procedures leading
up to the treaty.
40
Although courts analogized Indian nations to foreign nations in
finding congressional power to deal with them, it is important to note
that the Court did not view Indian tribes as possessing all the attributes
of sovereignty of a foreign nation. In the first Cherokee Case, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,4' the Court held that Indian nations were not for-
eign states for the purpose of invoking the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction.42 The Court reasoned that the Cherokee Nation was "a
distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its
own affairs, and governing itself. . ,,"" Nevertheless, the nation was
neither a state of the union nor a foreign state, but a "domestic depen-
dent nation" incapable of conducting foreign relations with countries
other than the United States. Instead "[t]heir relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
'44
In sum, from the beginning Indian tribes were in a truly anoma-
lous position. Congress and the President viewed them as separate na-
tions in some respects. Furthermore, individual Indians were regarded
porters of Chief John Ross. Ross, who had the support of most of the Cherokee people,
was incarcerated while the Treaty Party representatives negotiated the treaty. The
treaty, ratified at New Echota, the capital of the Cherokee Nation, by only 20 persons,
ceded all the tribal land in Georgia in exchange for 7,000,000 acres of land in Indian
Territory. French, The Death of a Nation, 4 AM. IND. J. 2, 3-4 (1978). For a descrip-
tion of the treaty, see 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 84.
39 A petition protesting the treaty signed by nearly 16,000 of the 17,000 members
of the Cherokee people was presented to Congress. G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL
269 (new ed. 1953). Over 4,000 out of 16,000 Cherokees died in the camps where they
awaited removal and along the Trail of Tears, as the route to Indian Territory came to
be called. Id. at 294-312; see also G. FOREMAN, THE LAST TREK OF THE INDIANS
(1946). For a political history of the removal legislation, see generally F. PRUCHA,
supra note 13, at 238-49.
40 Cf Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903) (Court refused to
address merits of claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and failure to secure consent of
three-fourths of tribe as required by treaty).
41 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
42 Id. at 16-17. The tribe argued that, as a foreign nation suing a state, it came
within the article III grant of federal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Since the
state was a defendant, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction. Id. § 3. For
an analysis of the contemporary legal community's reaction to the Cherokee Nation's
claim and the role of William Wirt, the tribe's attorney, see Burke, supra note 27.
According to Burke, the tribe might have sought Supreme Court jurisdiction because
Justice Johnson, who would have heard the case had they filed it in Circuit Court, was
not favorable to their claim. Id. at 512.
43 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
44 Id. at 17.
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as domestic subjects, more akin to aliens than citizens,4 until Congress
granted them universal citizenship in 1924.46 The judicial deference
traditionally accorded the political branches of the federal government
in conducting foreign affairs and dealing with aliens attached to federal
regulation of Indian affairs. As domestic dependent nations, Indian
tribes possessed sovereignty, but could not invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Indeed, the broad language in Cherokee Nation about
the peculiar status of Indian tribes, created doubt that tribes had stand-
ing to sue in federal court, a matter that was subject to some question
for many years.47 In short, the integrity of tribal sovereignty rested pre-
cariously on the whim of Congress owing, in the early years, to the
Court's extraordinary deference to the political branches' exercise of the
foreign affairs power in their dealings with the Indians.
B. The End of the Treaty Era (1865-1871)
In the years preceding the Civil War, especially during the 1830's
to the 1850's, Congress had sought to remove the Eastern Indian tribes
West of the Mississippi,48 but as settlers began opening up the West,
continued removal began to be viewed as impossible.49 After the Civil
War and the pacification of the last tribes of the plains, 50 a movement
began to assimilate Indians into American culture, by force if neces-
sary. A policy of treating Indian tribes as separate nations with power
over their own people on their own land was seen as antithetical to this
new policy.51
Divergent groups coalesced for very different reasons behind this
41 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) (Indian born in United States and
living apart from his tribe not a citizen under fourteenth amendment; Congress must by
treaty or statute confer citizenship); see also Thayer, Report of the Law Committee, in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE IN-
DIAN" 1880-1900, at 172-73 (F. Prucha ed. 1973) (1888 report by then Dean of
Harvard Law School on the legal status of Indians); Pancoast, The Indian Before the
Law, in id. 155, 158 (1884 study).
46 Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) (1982)).
47 See Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 13, at 46 & n.141; see also text accompany-
ing notes 179-81.
41 See generally 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 74-92 (removal treaties); G.
FOREMAN, THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES (1934) (adjustment after removal until the
Civil War); F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 213-49 (background of removal); id. at 250-
73 (formation of Indian country).
4' See, e.g., R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 165; S. TYLER, supra note 19,
at 62-65, 70-75.
50 By the 1880's many Indian tribes lived inside the boundaries of the states or
territories that were on their way to statehood. See S. TYLER, supra note 19, at 70, 99,
104.
" See generally R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 166-75.
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assimilationist policy. Some regarded Indians as barbarians who had to
be civilized for their own security and the security of those living near
them. It was believed that if Indians were citizens, individually owning
small tracts of land, they would come under the civilizing effect of the
life of a farmer or a rancher and abandon their nomadic and barbaric
habits. Large portions of surplus reservation land could then be sold to
settlers, who were clamoring for it. In addition, promises that reserva-
tion land would never be within the limits of a state would become
meaningless with the end of the reservations; thus individual ownership
would remove this barrier to statehood for the remaining territories.52
Other advocates of assimilation, members of the "Friends of the Indi-
ans" movement, were moved by more benign motives.5" They argued
that only by becoming citizens, voters, and individual landowners
would Indians be able to protect themselves and their land from the
settlers and the federal government's dishonorable practice of "breaking
• . . several hundred treaties, concluded at different times during the
last 100 years . .. .- "
The House of Representatives ushered in the new "Era of Allot-
ment and Assimilation," when it decreed in a rider to the Appropria-
tions Act of 1871 that henceforth "[n]o Indian nation or tribe within
the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty."55 The legislators were motivated by the belief
that Indian affairs should no longer be a matter of foreign affairs now
that the last remaining Indian tribes of a warlike nature had been
subdued.5"
Thus, the treatymaking era came to an end. Indian law became
more a matter of domestic law, with Indians regarded as subjects to be
governed, rather than foreign nationals.
57
52 See Prucha, Introduction, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra
note 45, at 6-7; Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal
Problems, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 18 (1976).
" See generally AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 45 (ex-
cerpts from the writings of the Friends of the Indians).
" H. JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR 26 (1881 & photo. reprint 1965).
Ms. Jackson's indictment of federal policy sparked the reform movement.
"' Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(1976)).
"8 The House had been excluded from policy making by the President and Senate,
its role limited to appropriating money to satisfy treaties. The House had no power to
take away the President and Senate's treaty powers, of course, but the rider gave notice
that no further appropriations would be made to fulfill any new treaty obligations. See
supra note 23; see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1975) (history of
1871 rider and its effect on later agreements with Indian tribes).
57 As one indication of this change in attitude, in 1845 supervisory and appellate
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C. The Plenary Power Era (1877-1930's)
1. Bases for the Plenary Power Doctrine
With the end of the treatymaking era came statutes designed to
implement the new assimilationist policies. Many of these statutes
could not be viewed as either effectuating treaty promises or regulating
trade. Thus the Court was forced to develop new rationales to justify
federal actions concerning Indians.
In Johnson v. McIntosh,58 Chief Justice Marshall stated that the
federal government had some sort of ownership interest in Indian land.
In the first Cherokee Case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,59 discussed
above,6 ° the Chief Justice had compared the federal government's rela-
tionship to Indian tribes to that of a guardian to its ward."1 Both John-
son and the Cherokee Cases were concerned with upholding federal
supremacy in Indian affairs over states and individuals. The federal
goal was to obtain cessions of land and to ensure peace with the tribes
by promises of protection from outsiders meddling with Indian land or
sovereignty. 2 From these two concepts-property interest and guardi-
anship-the Court in the late nineteenth century gradually developed a
guardianship power over Indian tribes, which it frankly acknowledged
to be extraconstitutional6 3
a. Genesis of Plenary Power: The Doctrine of Discovery
The notion that the federal government had a property interest of
some sort in Indian land provided the central analytical element for the
guardianship power. Thus, to understand the guardianship power as-
serted by the federal government, it is necessary briefly to trace the
history of the Doctrine of Discovery, the source of the property interest.
Johnson v. McIntosh," decided in 1823, was the first major case di-
rectly concerning the validity of Indian property interests to reach the
Court.65 Drawing inspiration from international law regarding the soy-
powers over the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were removed from the Secretary of
War and given to the Secretary of the Interior. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 5, 9
Stat. 395.
8 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
59 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
60 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
61 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
62 See F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 44; cf. Worcester, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 555.
See infra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
64 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
65 In an earlier case, Chief Justice Marshall sidestepped the issue of validity of
Indian property interests by stating that Indian property interest "which is certainly to
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ereign rights of the nations that discovered the New World, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall held that by virtue of discovering a nation inhabited by
non-Europeans, the discovering nations (and America as their succes-
sor) obtained a property interest, described as "ultimate title," to that
discovered land.66 According to Chief Justice Marshall: "[D]iscovery
gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority,
it was made, against all other European governments, which title might
be consummated by possession. ' 1"7 This title gave the government the
preemptive right to purchase Indian land or confiscate it after a war.
The Indians, on the other hand, remained "the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it.""8
Until the sovereign exercised its preemptive right to extinguish Indian
title, the Indians' right to the land was sacrosanct. Thus a purchaser
from the Indians could not obtain a fee simple absolute title without
obtaining the government's interest as well.
The Doctrine of Discovery protected federal, individual, and tribal
interests. Federal power to control acquisition of new land was su-
preme. Individuals tracing title to past grants had their title confirmed,
although if Indians still inhabited the land, extinguishment of the In-
dian title was necessary to perfect their interests. Finally, tribal rights
to aboriginal land were confirmed and protected to some extent.6 9
Although the Doctrine of Discovery was a concept designed in
part to protect Indian rights to land as well as to protect the principle
be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be
absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee" on the part of the state of Georgia, one of the
original 13 States. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810).
11 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585.
67 Id. at 573.
68 Id. at 574.
69 See Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 48-49 (1947); accord
Barsh & Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Water-
ways Before and After Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627, 635-36
(1981); Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the
United States, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 637, 644-45 (1978). See generally Henderson,
Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75 (1977).
The Doctrine of Discovery was a compromise of competing interests. If the Court
held that the Indians had a fee simple title and thus could sell their land to anyone, two
results would occur, both unfortunate from the standpoint of the government. First,
many landowners traced their title back to land grants from Britain, France, and the
federal government made while Indian tribes still occupied the soil. Thus, such a deci-
sion would unsettle the existing land titles resting on these past grants. Second, permit-
ting private sales would destroy the federal government's ability to control the disposi-
tion of newly acquired land outside the 13 original states. On the other hand, to hold
that Indians had no legal right to their land would have violated the many treaties and
proclamations promising to protect their property rights. Such a result might have
stripped future treaty negotiations of their credibility and increased the danger of In-
dian wars.
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of federal exclusivity in dealing with Indians regarding their land, later
judicial misinterpretations of the doctrine are in large part responsible
for arguments in favor of virtually unreviewable federal power over
Indian lands. These arguments were prevalent in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries and are still present to some extent in
Indian law today.
While the early decisions of the Marshall Court viewed the gov-
ernment's property interest in land as a preemptive right to purchase,
or a sort of glorified option to buy the land, subsequent decisions de-
nominated the government's interest as a title interest and the tribal
interest as a possessory one.70 The more the government's interest was
characterized as an ownership interest, the more it became possible to
regard the ownership of land alone as giving the government power to
govern Indians. For example, an 1846 decision, United States v. Rog-
ers,71 upheld, by reference to the government's ownership of the tribal
land in question, a provision of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834
regulating criminal conduct on Indian land by Indians and non-Indi-
70 It has been stated that in Johnson the Court held that the United States ac-
quired fee simple absolute title to Indian land, e.g., 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at
209. Wording in the opinion supports this interpretation. Compare, e.g., 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 548, 592 (describing United States interest as absolute dominion, ultimate
title, and seisin) with, e.g., id. at 587, 603 (describing Indian interest as possessory).
The actual holding inJohnson, however, established only a lesser interest: the exclusive
right to acquire Indian property by purchase or conquest. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585,
587, 592. In Worcester, the Court stated the government's interest did not enable it to
give a clear title to a government grantee; such grants were "blank paper, so far as the
rights of the natives were concerned." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546. Again, the
government's only right was a "pre-emptive privilege," id. at 544; "the exclusive right
of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell," id. at 545. Such a limited
right is not compatible with the notion of a fee simple interest in the government. In
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835), decided only twelve years
after Worcester, the Court characterized the United States interest as an ultimate fee
subject to a right of possession in the Indians to take effect only upon abandonment of
the land by Indians or cession to the United States. See Berman, supra note 69, at 655,
666-67; Henderson, supra note 69, at 90-91.
Nevertheless, in recent years, the Court has interpreted these early cases as stand-
ing for the proposition that the United States gained a fee simple absolute title, leaving
Indian tribes with no rights in their lands enforceable against the government, unless
granted affirmatively by statute or treaty. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348
U.S. 272 (1955). For an analysis of Tee-Hit-Ton and its effect on modern Indian law,
see Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1215 (1980); see also infra text accompanying notes 299-314.
7 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (construing Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4
Stat. 729, 733 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976)) ("That so much of the laws
of the United States as provides for the punishment of crimes committed within any
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in force in
the Indian country: Provided, The same shall not extend to crimes committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian."). For the legislative history
and description of the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, see 1982 HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 115-17.
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ans.72 Although generally interpreted as relying on the property clause
as a source of power,7 3 the Rogers opinion is less important for its hold-
ing than for the broad language employed by the Court regarding the
relationship of the Doctrine of Discovery to federal power to govern
Indians. For instance, the Court referred to the Doctrine of Discovery
as negating any ownership interest Indian tribes might have in their
lands and subjecting the tribes to the political authority of the United
States. 4
This was essentially a misinterpretation of the doctrine. As dis-
cussed previously, the original concept of a discoverer's rights was far
narrower, and did not include the right to govern internal affairs of
Indian tribes.75 Moreover, whatever interest in ordinary reservation
land the United States might have acquired through discovery, the
United States had no such ownership interest in the Cherokee land in-
volved in Rogers, because the tribe had obtained a United States patent
granting a fee simple title to their land.7 ' Nevertheless, the Court took
72 Trade and Intercourse Act of 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (repealed 1834).
7' The Court did not cite the property clause but stressed that the crime had been
committed "within the territorial limits of the United States ... and not within the
limits of one of the states." 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. The property clause of article IV
grants to Congress the right "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This language has been interpreted as granting Congress
general jurisdiction over property located within the territories, but not property located
within the borders of a state. See Engdahl, supra note 3, at 291-96.
As early as 1810 Chief Justice Marshall held that the property clause granted
Congress broad power over the territories until they were ready for statehood: "The
power of governing and of legislating for a territory is the inevitable consequence of the
right to acquire and to hold territory." Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336
(1810); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819) ("Yet all
admit the constitutionality of a territorial government. . . ."). Later cases continued to
uphold this power as inherent in sovereignty, plenary, and virtually "without limita-
tions." See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (recog-
nizing a general right of sovereignty "which exists in the government, or in virtue of
[the article IV property clause]"); see also United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
526, 537 (1840) (article IV vests power in Congress "without limitation"). See gener-
ally Engdahl, supra note 3 (describing extent of article I and article IV property
powers).
The property clause was relied on explicitly in some Indian law cases of the early
twentieth century-especially those regarding liquor prohibitions. See Hallowell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 317, 324 (1911) (property clause gives power to prohibit liquor
on land held in trust); accord United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909).
The Court never developed the property clause as a principle basis of congressional
power, relying instead on the much broader guardianship power.
74 See 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572.
75 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
71 Although the treaty referred to a patent in fee simple, Treaty with the Cher-
okees at New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, art. II, 7 Stat. 439, 441, the patent when issued
contained a proviso that if the tribe ever abandoned the land or became extinct, title
would revert to the United States. See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 246
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the occasion to characterize federal power as derived from its power
over all Indian land and noted that the political question doctrine
barred any inquiry into the justice of the government's exercising ulti-
mate sovereignty over Indians."
In addition, the Court's opinion undercut considerably the view of
federal power and Indian sovereignty of the Cherokee Cases.7 8 The
Court gave short shrift to the argument that the provision of the Trade
and Intercourse Act at issue should be read in light of treaty promises
to protect tribal self-government.79 Significantly, the Court for the first
time indicated that federal power over Indian tribes need not be tied to
treatymaking and execution, or regulation of commerce between Indi-
ans and outsiders.
Finally, Rogers is also important because the Court forthrightly
accepted federal Indian legislation as being permissibly race-based.
Rogers argued that the tribe had legally adopted him, thus bringing
him within the law's exception for crimes committed by one Indian
against another. The Court replied that the tribe's action in adopting
Rogers could not change his race. The statutory exception applied only
to members of the Indian race: "It does not speak of members of a
tribe, but of the race generally-of the family of Indians . . .,.
In sum, the analysis in Rogers became almost a paradigm of the
judicial attitude toward Indian claims: emphasis on federal power cou-
pled with references to the political question doctrine and disregard for
both tribal sovereignty and individual rights.
(1872). Thus, the tribe did not actually receive a fee simple absolute title. Compare
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 656 (1890) ("fee simple")
(dicta) with Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 250 (1872) ("fee simple subject to
condition subsequent").
7 45 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 572.
8 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text; see also, Clinton, Development
of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARiz. L.
REV. 951, 977-78 (1975) (Rogers undercut concept of Indian tribal sovereignty devel-
oped in Worcester).
79 In the Treaty with the Cherokees at New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, art. V, 7 Stat.
478, 442, the United States had promised the Cherokee Nation to protect its right "to
make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the govern-
ment and protection of the persons and property within their own country." Id. In
return, the Cherokee Nation promised that its laws would not conflict with the Consti-
tution or federal laws "regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians." Id. The
Court in Rogers found that the statute did not infringe on the treaty right of self-
government, because the provision in question was part of a Trade and Intercourse Act.
45 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 573.
0 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
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b. Inherent Sovereignty and the Guardianship Role
In 1883, in Ex parte Crow Dog,81 the Supreme Court overturned
the conviction of a Sioux for the murder of another Sioux on the Sioux
reservation. The facts of this case, characterized by the Court as an
example of "red man's revenge," '82 reinforced the prejudices of those
who saw Indians as barbaric83 and no doubt fueled the arguments for
rapid assimilation.
In response to the decision, Congress moved quickly in enacting
the first of many pieces of assimilationist legislation, the Major Crimes
Act."4 The law made federal offenses of seven major crimes if commit-
ted by Indians against Indians in Indian country, whether or not
within the boundaries of any state.85
In 1886, the Court decided a challenge to the Major Crimes Act
brought by a member of the Hoopa tribe charged with murdering an-
other Indian on Hoopa land within the state of California. The Court
acknowledged that the case, United States v. Kagama,s6 presented two
questions regarding federal power: whether Congress had the power to
enact laws governing crimes committed by one Indian against another
upon an Indian reservation and whether the law infringed upon state
sovereignty. 87 The Court quickly disposed of the first question by re-
81 109 U.S. 556 (1883). At issue in Crow Dog was the same Trade and Inter-
course Act provision upheld in Rogers. The statute, applying federal criminal law to
non-Indians in Indian Country, expressly excepted crimes committed by Indians
against Indians in Indian Country. See supra note 71.
The murder was a well-publicized one. When the Sioux Nation required only that
the murderer support the victim's dependent relatives, the white community was out-
raged. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 236. Crow Dog was subsequently ar-
rested and convicted in the territorial court of Arkansas. The Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction, in the first case since Worcester to uphold tribal treaty rights. In
reality, however, the Supreme Court merely upheld what it took to be the clear con-
gressional intent expressed in the Trade and Intercourse Act against an argument that
the statute had been repealed by implication. Though congressional power was not
challenged, the Court indicated in dicta that congressional power within the borders of
the states was limited to the powers to regulate commerce and effectuate treaties. 109
U.S. at 562.
82 109 U.S. at 571.
" See Pancoast, The Indian Before the Law, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIANS, supra note 45, at 159-64 (criticism of lawless state on Indian reservations).
Pancoast's indictment of the treaty policy of promising to protect Indian self-govern-
ment was probably inspired in part by Crow Dog; he quoted from the opinion without
citing it, perhaps because he regarded it as so notorious. See id. at 159 (quoting 109
U.S. at 568-69).
" Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1976)).
85 Id.
86 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
87 Id. at 376-78.
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casting it as a facet of the second. According to the Court, Indian tribes
had limited authority over "internal and social relations"8 8 because
they were "semi-independent." 9 Nevertheless, they were not nations,
and had not been considered sovereigns since the Cherokee Cases.9" Any
doubt about their sovereign status had been resolved by the 1871 statute
outlawing treaties with Indian tribes-thenceforth Congress had deter-
mined "to govern them by acts of Congress."9" Moreover, the Constitu-
tion did not recognize Indian sovereignty; in fact the Constitution only
recognized two sovereigns-the states and the federal government. The
Court reasoned that since Indians were "within the geographical lim-
its" of the United States, they must submit to one of these overriding
sovereignties.92 The question thus became to which they must submit.
Having thus virtually established that any rights of Indian nations
to self-government could be abrogated by a higher sovereignty, the
Court went on to establish that the federal government, and not the
states, had this ultimate authority. In seeking to justify this assertion of
federal power, however, the Court had, through its earlier decisions,
painted itself into a corner. In the first place, congressional power to
regulate activities within the territories could not be invoked, because
the land was within the state of California.93 Nor could the power to
regulate Indian commerce be used, since at that time, the Court re-
quired a direct nexus with commerce to sustain federal laws regulating
interstate and Indian commerce.94 The power to enact a criminal code
applicable within the states, although fairly well-established today, was
beyond the grant of power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes in
1885.'5 Finally, the congressional power to effectuate treaties with In-
"" Id. at 382.
81 Id. at 381.
90 Id. at 381-82.
91 Id. at 382.
92 Id. at 379.
93 Compare, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (con-
gressional power over Florida territory upheld based on article IV) with Benner v.
Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850) (territorial courts lack power over exclusive fed-
eral cases after statehood).
91 Like the interstate commerce clause, the Indian commerce clause was given a
restrictive reading at this period, the Court requiring some sort of commercial nexus.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) and United
States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 939 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495) (Indian com-
merce clause limited to commercial intercourse) with, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (commerce clause does not reach the manufacturing of sugar).
" [W]e think it would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a
system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations,
which . . . established punishments for the common-law crimes . ..
without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was au-
thorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian
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dian tribes was similarly inapplicable, since no treaty was involvedY
Acknowledging that no existing constitutional provision granted
Congress this right to govern Indian affairs, the Court found it to be
inherent first by analogy to early decisions regarding the power to reg-
ulate activities within the territories.9 7 Drawing support from cases up-
holding congressional power to govern territories before statehood and
language in United States v. Rogers relying on these same authorities,
the Court in Kagama stated that the power over territories derived
"from the ownership of the country in which the Territories are.""8
The Court quoted an earlier opinion by Chief Justice Marshall regard-
ing territorial government: "the right to govern may be the inevitable
consequence of the right to acquire territory." 9 By parity of reasoning
the Court found inevitable the right to govern activities of reservation
Indians whether within or without state boundaries. The Doctrine of
Discovery gave the United States "ultimate title" over Indian land
wherever located and the exclusive right to acquire that land. Thus the
federal government owned the country in which the Indian tribes lived
and this ownership interest in turn vested the government with the
right to govern them.100
Finally, the Court relied on the history of federal supremacy over
the states in Indian affairs and the historic, protective role the govern-
ment played toward Indians:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
tribes.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
., The Hoopa tribe was one of the 119 California tribes or bands whose treaties
had never been ratified by the Senate. See generally Goodrich, The Legal Status of the
California Indian, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 95-96 (1926) (California Indians surren-
dered aboriginal title to most of the state in 18 treaties in return for 7,500,000 acres,
which they never received).
"' In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, for example, Chief Justice Marshall had inti-
mated that this power would exist even in the absence of article IV, because a contrary
result would create a jurisdictional vacuum. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
98 118 U.S. at 380.
99 Id. (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)).
1O 118 U.S. at 381-82. Having established federal power to legislate, the Court
devoted the rest of its opinion to an analysis of the impact of this legislation on state
sovereignty, holding that the Major Crimes Act did not abrogate state sovereignty to
any alarming extent. Id. at 383-85. The law did not make criminal any activity the
states regarded as legal. Moreover, states still had power to enforce their laws against
non-Indians on Indian reservations.
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people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helpless-
ness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power.10 1
Thus, the Court upheld federal power over Indians for practical
reasons. "It must exist in that government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
' 10 2
At first glance the practical solution seems a happy one. The states
had proven themselves to be the greatest enemies of the Indian tribes,
and the federal government had insisted on the exclusive right to deal
with the tribes since the founding of the republic. Moreover, the practi-
cal solution did no violence to the allocation of powers between nation
and states in the Constitution.0 3 Although the Court might have taken
greater care to demonstrate that the continued power to legislate re-
garding Indian affairs was a necessary inference from the history and
the text of the Constitution, still the narrow result of Kagama-the
supremacy of federal over state power-was a just one.
Yet the Court in Kagama failed to consider tribal rights. Consent
of the governed had been a cardinal principle of the founders. Never-
theless, that Indians were not citizens and could not vote did not seem
relevant to the Court. Once again, by concentrating on justifying fed-
eral power the Court reinforced earlier precedents abdicating its role in
accommodating the legitimate but competing interests raised by the fed-
eral government's interference with tribal rights. Such accommodation
was left to the political arena-an arena from which Indians were
excluded.
Kagama and its nineteenth century precedents reflect a laissez-
faire judicial attitude toward federal regulation of Indian affairs more
than a prescription concerning the proper balance of the interests at
stake. It is unnecessary at this late date to argue that such a deferential
101 Id. at 383-84.
102 Id. at 384-85.
103 The framers intended the federal government to have exclusive authority to
deal with the Indians, partly because of the great need for a uniform policy to prevent
Indian wars. They hardly can be faulted for not foreseeing the end of the treaty era or
the day when no West would exist for the further removal of Indian tribes. Thus, the
Indian commerce clause and the other general powers in the Constitution would have
seemed to the framers "all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with
the Indians." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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attitude was inappropriate in nineteenth century jurisprudence, when
nonintervention in the cause of individual liberties was a hallmark of
judicial policy. 04 What is important, however, is the tenaciousness of
the deferential attitude, manifested in the Court's subsequent reliance
on Kagama well into the twentieth century. These developments are
considered next.
2. From Aliens to Noncitizen Subjects:
The Exercise of Plenary Power
From the time of Kagama until well into the twentieth century,
policymakers denied tribal Indians the basic freedoms accorded other
Americans, on the theory that their relation to the United States was
"ian anomalous one and of a complex character."10 5 Although nomi-
nally protected by the individual rights provisions of the Constitution
like other noncitizens,106 during this period Indians and Indian tribes
in fact could not vindicate their rights in the courts. While the four-
teenth amendment had been held to guarantee all persons equal access
to the state courts, irrespective of their race,1 7 Elk v. Wilkens °8 and
subsequent cases cast considerable doubt on whether the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause extended to Indians."°9 Moreover,
104 See, e.g., Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890) (upholding
law breaking up Mormon Church and providing for seizure of Church property); Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451-52 (1857) (fundamental property rights of slave
owners); cf. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) (the formal-
istic "rules" approach of the late nineteenth century was in part a reaction to free-
wheeling instrumentalist opinions like Dred Scott).
105 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381.
"08 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (fifth and sixth
amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (fourteenth amendment).
These cases concerned Chinese aliens and not Indians. The extent to which the four-
teenth amendment applied to bar discrimination by states against Indians is not at all
clear.
107 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
108 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
109 In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), a case involving a
Chinese person claiming citizenship by birth in the United States, the Court reaffirmed
the holding in Elk that tribal Indians were not citizens by birth because they were not
subject to United States jurisdiction. Id. at 680-82 (dictum). More important, however,
is the Court's comparison of the meaning of the phrases "subject to the jurisdiction" of
the United States in the first sentence of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment and
"within its jurisdiction" in the equal protection clause's injunction against the state
denials "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV. The Court held that the two clauses had the same meaning.
Thus, an alien could not be subject to United States jurisdiction and not be within state
jurisdiction, nor within state jurisdiction and not simultaneously subject to United
States jurisdiction. 169 U.S. at 687. At the very least, such reasoning must have raised
doubts about the equal protection rights of tribal Indians: in Elk the Court had held
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the 1866 Civil Rights Act guarantee that "citizens . . .shall have the
same right . . . to sue, be parties, and give evidence" ' explicitly ex-
cluded Indians from citizenship. Even when access to the courts was
granted, lack of familiarity with state law and procedures, state laws
excluding tlhem from juries and declaring them incompetent as wit-
nesses, and state juries' anti-Indian prejudice were powerful disincen-
tives to suit in state courts."'
Access to federal courts was also problematic. First, being neither
citizens nor true aliens, individual Indians and Indian tribes could not
sue in federal court on nonfederal questions.11 Although Indian tribes
and individuals bringing class actions on behalf of tribes"'3 did raise
federal questions in federal courts, their status as wards of the govern-
ment sometimes confused the issue of tribal and individual standing to
sue.
1 14
The most serious obstacle in federal court, however, was the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.11 5 The federal statute creating the Court
of Claims in 1863 specifically excepted claims arising out of treaty obli-
tribal Indians were not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" within the
meaning of section 1. 112 U.S. at 102. Thus, tribal Indians might not have been within
state jurisdiction for the purposes of equal protection. Perhaps the lack of any Indian
challenge to state discriminatory laws during this period reflected a belief that no such
claim could be successfully made.
110 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (superseded 1940).
"Il See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 645-51; Clinton & Hotopp, supra note
13, at 46-47. For criticisms of Indians' legal disabilities made during the plenary power
era, see Harsha, Law for the Indians, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS,
supra note 45, at 149, 152 (1882 article) and Pancoast, The Indian Before the Law, in
id. at 155, 158 (1884 article).
11" See, e.g., Karrahoo v. Adams, 14 F. Cas. 134 (C.C.D. Kan. 1870) (No. 7,614)
(Indians are not foreign citizens (relying on Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831)), therefore, federal court has no jurisdiction over ejectment action
brought by an Indian against a non-Indian); see also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL INDIAN LAW 372 (1942); cf. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892) (tribal
Indians are not citizens capable of suing as such in federal courts) (dictum).
.. See, e.g., Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1919) (tribal
suit); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (class action); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (tribal suit); cf. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 366 (1856) (individual Indian sued to protect tribal property rights in state
court).
114 Although the weight of authority supports individual standing to sue in federal
court, see F. COHEN, supra note 112, at 372-73, the Court in 1912 intimated that
absent congressional permission, Indian owners of allotted land had no standing to sue
on their own behalf to protect their land. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413,
438-44 (1912). See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
I' Compare, e.g., Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 486 (1925) and Naganab v.
Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473, 476 (1906) (sovereign immunity barred suits raising due pro-
cess and breach of trust claims against the Secretary of Interior arising out of cession of
timber lands in trust) with, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 2, 29
(1886) (jurisdictional statute permitted suit).
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gations from the new court's jurisdiction over claims for money dam-
ages against the United States."' This exception was interpreted as
including claims raising constitutional issues." Thus, tribes whose'
land had been taken in violation of a treaty had to lobby Congress for
legislation granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims and waiving
sovereign immunity for the particular claims.1 8
Although tribes could seek injunctive relief in district court, for
constitutional violations by federal officials, this remedy also proved
elusive when the federal government was the defendant, for the Court
often invoked the political question doctrine in declining to address the
merits of these claims.' 9 When the merits were addressed, the Court,
by feats of analytical legerdemain, alternately invoked the seemingly
incompatible semisovereign status of Indian tribes and the guardian-
ward relationship of Kagama as rationales for allowing the exercise of
plenary power to deny tribal or individual rights.
Undoubtedly, racial and cultural prejudice played no small role in
federal actions toward Indians during this period. The reported justifi-
cations for these federal actions rested on the guardianship theory of
United States v. Kagama, cited frequently in the cases of that era. 2°
Yet one key to the Court's finding of a congressional guardianship
power over Indians was its view of their racial and cultural inferiority.
Repeatedly, the decisions of that era invoked this inferiority in terms
that would be intolerable in a judicial opinion today. In a recent article,
a commentator canvassed the cases of this era and reported a high in-
stance of such derogatory language:
The undisguised contempt for the native culture was
unrelieved by an open-minded assessment in any of the prin-
cipal cases studied. Rather, the Indians were described as
semi-barbarous, savage, primitive, degraded, and ignorant.
He Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
117 See Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for Its Breach? The Sad Saga of United
States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REv. 447, 461-62 n.108 (1981).
11" See F. COHEN, supra note 112, at 373-78; see also Cohen, Indian Claims, in
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 264 (L. Cohen ed. 1960); Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims
Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 511, 512 (1966).
9 See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (injunction
against allotment of tribal land in violation of treaty denied); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) (injunction against leasing of mineral rights with-
out consent of the tribe denied; exercise of congressional power purely "political and
administrative" and not open to question); cf. Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S.
110 (1919) (attempted allotment of fee simple tribal land; political question doctrine
inapplicable since agency action was not authorized by Congress).
120 See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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The relationship between the federal government and the In-
dian was frequently termed as one between a superior and
inferior. The white race was called more intelligent and
highly developed. There was no question but that a higher
civilization was thought to be justly replacing that of a pass-
ing race whose time was over and whose existence could no
longer be justified. The very weakness of the Indians in re-
sisting the tide seemed to be one of their greatest moral
shortcomings, but not as serious as the Indian communal tra-
dition. To the white observer, the lack of proprietary interest
generally displayed by tribal members was repulsive and
backward. Removing the "herd" instinct was deemed by
some to be the key to civilizing the Indian.121
The ethnocentric outlook of the times may well have tainted the Court's
view of the legitimacy of Indian rights claims and may explain, if not
excuse, some of the more egregious violations of tribal and individual
fundamental rights detailed below.
a. Tribal Rights to Property
Forced allotment of Indian lands and assimilation of Indians into
the dominant culture became the primary policy of the federal govern-
ment during the years following Kagama.122 Tribal land was subdi-
vided, some apportioned to individuals with no compensation to the
tribe, and the rest sold to non-Indian settlers, 23 often at far less than
fair market value.1 24 The Court aided this process, holding that the
121 Carter, Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship over
American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 197, 227
(1976) (citations omitted); see also Note, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary
Power over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
117 (1982).
122 See, e.g., Monson v. Simonson, 231 U.S. 341, 345 (1913) (dictum); United
States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 (1903) (dictum); see also R. BERKHOFER, JR.,
supra note 19, at 166-75; S. TYLER, supra note 19, at 95-124.
123 Although allotment had been accomplished by consent, or at least a show of
consent, before the plenary power era, during the height of the allotment fever, Con-
gress enacted statutes permitting allotment without tribal consent. See, e.g., Act of June
17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52 (requiring allotment and opening reservation to settlement), dis-
cussed in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 494-506 (1973). For descriptions of methods
of allotment used, see 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 129-37; F. COHEN, supra
note 112, at 427-28.
124 See, e.g., Creek Nation v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 591 (1942) (no clear and
convincing evidence of fraud or gross mistake; therefore, no recovery for tribe protesting
appraisals made pursuant to 1901 agreement which were at most one-half of the price
of the same parcels sold at public auction one year later), aff'd, 318 U.S. 629 (1943);
cf. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 623 F.2d 159 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (consideration
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plenary power of Congress, derived from the Indians' "condition of de-
pendency," '125 somehow converted Indian property, even fee simple
property, into quasi-public land "subject to the administrative control
of the government. " 26 This authority permitted Congress, acting
through the Secretary of the Interior, to lease, sell, or allot any tribal
land without tribal consent, even in violation of solemn treaty
promises. 27 The money gained by these ventures was placed in trust
funds managed by the government and disbursed as the government
believed wisest, often for the purpose of assimilating and civilizing the
Indians.1 2" For example, tribal trust money was often spent to pay mis-
paid by the United States to the tribe for surplus land which the United States later
sold to settlers was unconscionable, because the United States paid $600,000 for land
worth $1,337,381.50).
125 Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899).
128 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902). The Cherokee Na-
tion held patents granting the tribe a fee simple interest in tribal property. See supra
note 76. Nevertheless, the Court upheld congressional power to lease Cherokee land
without consent, as exercised in the Curtis Act of 1898. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517,
30 Stat. 495. A few months before Hitchcock was decided, the Cherokee Nation had
formally consented to the provisions of the Curtis Act, including the provisions regard-
ing leasing challenged in the Hitchcock case. The tribe probably acquiesced in the Cur-
tis Act because it had no other choice. In Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899), the Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Curtis Act even though the
issues in that case were not affected by that act, stating: "The lands and moneys of
these tribes are public lands and public moneys . . . ." Id. at 488.
Pueblo land was also fee simple land. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S.
432, 440 (1926). Nevertheless, guardianship power was extended to this land. In
Candelaria, the Court held that the Nonintercourse Act, discussed supra notes 24-25
and accompanying text, imposed restrictions against alienation on all Indian tribes, and
thus on all tribal land, including fee simple land. Furthermore, the Court held that this
restriction on alienation created a guardianship over all Indian lands, giving the gov-
ernment powers regarding the land, including standing to sue on behalf of the Pueblos
to quiet title, at issue in the Candelaria case. 271 U.S. at 440-44. Although stated in
the context of a decision upholding federal power to help the Pueblos, this reasoning
permitted extension of all congressional guardianship powers to the Pueblos. Cf. United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913) (guardianship power permits statute
outlawing sale of liquor to Pueblos) ("United States as a superior and civilized nation
[has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities . . ").
12' See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (forced allotment in
violation of treaty); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (leasing); cf.
Morrison v. Fall, 290 F. 306 (D.C. Cir. 1923), affd sub nom. Morrison v. Work, 266
U.S. 481 (1925) (Tribe ceded timber land in trust to government to sell and hold pro-
ceeds in trust for tribe. The government later granted 600,000 acres of the land to the
State of Minnesota for a forest preserve without compensating the tribe. The court
dismissed the claim because the state, an indispensable party, had not been joined. The
court dismissed the tribe's other claims regarding handling of the timber land because
sovereign immunity had not been waived.). See generally 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note
3, at 516.
128 General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976)) (Congress could appropriate trust money derived
from sale of surplus lands for civilizing the Indians).
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sionaries to educate Indian children in the ways of white society and
Christianity-without consulting the tribe.129  Furthermore, money
promised the tribe as an entity in treaties could be paid to members per
capita, thus drastically diminishing the tribe's resources.130
The Court supported these federal actions by eschewing any role
in accommodating the competing interests at stake. In Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock,""' which has been called "the Indians' Dred Scott deci-
sion,"' the Court sustained an allotment act against a twofold chal-
lenge: first, that the allotment process violated a treaty barring allot-
ment without the consent of three-fourths of the adult male tribal
members; second, that the statute enacted to effectuate the illegal treaty
violated due process of law. 3' The Court dismissed the tribe's treaty
claim, ruling that the last-in-time rule permitted congressional abroga-
tion of treaties."" As to the tribe's fifth amendment claim, the Court
explicitly adopted the reasoning of Kagama.13 5 Congress had decided in
1871 to govern Indians by statute and its actions were not justiciable:
"Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been ex-
ercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always
129 The widespread practice of paying religious institutions to educate Indian chil-
dren had caused great controversy. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 78-79
(1908); see also R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 149-51. In Quick Bear, the
Court upheld payment to a religious institution of tribal trust money from a fund es-
tablished for education of Indian children against a claim that the practice violated a
federal statute prohibiting expenditure of public money for sectarian schools. Members
of the tribe had brought a class action to protest the payments, which were supported
by other members of the tribe. Thus, no tribal rights were argued in the case. The
Court reasoned that the statute did not apply to the funds, because tribal trust money is
not public money, but private money, "or at least is dealt with by the government as if
it belonged to them, as morally it does." Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added).
The Court in Quick Bear may have been influenced by the fact that 212 members of
the tribe had petitioned for the money to be paid to the mission school. Id. at 70 n.1
(answer of government to complaint). The Court stressed the rights of individual Indi-
ans "to use their own money to educate their children in the schools of their own
choice." Id. at 81. Only a few years before Quick Bear, however, the Court had stated
unequivocally: "The lands and moneys of these tribes are public lands and public mon-
eys, and are not held in individual ownership . . . ." Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899). Thus, the very status of Indian property and money shifted
depending on the Court's vision of the federal policy to be furthered in a given case.
13" See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2523, 34 Stat. 1221 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 119, 121 (1976) (authorizing Secretary of Interior to pay individual Indi-
ans a pro rata share of tribal or trust funds)), discussed in Yankton Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 623 F.2d 159, 180-81 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See generally F. COHEN, supra
note 112, at 341 & n.615.
131 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
133 Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols,
J., concurring), affd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
113 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561.
134 Id. at 566.
135 Id. at 567 (quoting Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-85).
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been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government."1 6
Kagama and Lone Wolf became the linchpins of the plenary
power doctrine. Congressional power over property, justified as a
guardian's power, seemed subject to no judicial limitations. Apart from
Lone Wolf and a few other cases,' Indians abandoned the attempt to
restrain federal action. Instead, tribes used what resources they had to
persuade Congress to pass statutes permitting them to sue for compen-
sation for land that was taken."8'
b. Tribal Rights to Political Autonomy
The legacy of Kagama dominated Indian sovereignty issues, and
citation of Kagama frequently signaled judicial deference to Con-
gress." 9 Chief Justice John Marshall had regarded Indian tribes as
possessing a "right of self-government"' 4 ° and having a protectorate re-
lationship with the federal government, like "that of a nation claiming
and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not . . . submitting
as subjects to the laws of a master."' 4 Nevertheless, in Kagama, the
Court interpreted the 1871 statute ending the practice of making trea-
ties with Indian tribes' 2 as establishing the premise that the federal
government intended "to govern [Indian tribes] by acts of Congress."' 43
Thus, the Court upheld federal power to take from Indian tribes juris-
diction over crimes among Indians, the first major federal inroad into
tribal internal affairs.' 4 4 The court subsequently invoked the Kagama
136 Id. at 565.
137 See Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473 (1906) (sovereign immunity barred
suit); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (leasing powers upheld);
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (grant of railroad
right of way without tribal consent upheld).
138 See generally Wilkinson, supra note 118, at 513-18 (history of difficulties
pressing claims under special jurisdictional acts).
1'9 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (quoting Kagama
in upholding congressional power to regulate introduction of liquor into Indian land);
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485-86 (1899) (quoting Kagarna in up-
holding congressional power to determine tribal membership). The Court even relied
on Kagama and plenary power when much narrower grounds existed to justify federal
actions. See, e.g., Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423 (1907) (plenary power invoked
despite existence of tribal consent); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co., 135
U.S. 641, 655 (1890) (Kagama quoted in a case upholding congressional power to take
Indian land for a public use upon payment of compensation).
140 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832).
141 Id. at 555.
142 See supra note 23.
143 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
114 See Clinton, supra note 78, at 962-65. According to Professor Clinton, the
Federal Major Crimes Act conflicted not only with "the spirit of almost every treaty
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guardianship power and the political question doctrine as justifying ju-
dicial nonintervention when Congress abrogated tribal self-government
rights.145 Tribes largely shunned litigation as a strategy to protect their
political sovereignty interests after these early judicial defeats. 146
Having obtained such a judicial seal of approval for the exercise of
its power, Congress proceeded to treat the previously semi-independent
Indian tribes as subject peoples. 147 The dissolution of tribal governing
structures was a cardinal aim of the Allotment Period.1 48 For instance,
in 1906, Congress denied the legislatures of the Five Civilized Tribes
the right to meet more than thirty days per year, and their legislative
action was made subject to veto by the President of the United
States. 49 Legislative intervention even extended to federal power over
negotiated during the treaty period but was also in plain conflict with the treaty provi-
sions by which the United States had guaranteed certain tribes, including the Five
Civilized Tribes, exclusive power to govern intratribal matters and to punish intratribal
crimes." Id. at 965 n.76.
145 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (quoting Kagama
in upholding imposition of liquor prohibition in Pueblo Indians); United States v.
Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909) (invoking political question doctrine in applying
Major Crimes Act to Indian who had become a United States and state citizen upon
receiving allotted land within a reservation); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
294, 308 (1902) (invoking political question doctrine in upholding Curtis Act provi-
sions permitting leasing without tribal consent); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445, 485 (1899) (invoking political question doctrine and quoting Kagama in uphold-
ing congressional power to determine membership in tribe).
14' See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
147 Frequently the Court referred to the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and tribal Indians and Indian tribes as "that between a superior and inferior,
whereby the latter is placed under the care and control of the former." Choctaw Nation
v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886), quoted in, e.g., United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432, 443 (1903). See generally R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 166-75.
148 See, e.g., 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 131 & n.39; S. TYLER, supra
note 19, at 95-96 (quoting Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners for
1888). Many cases of that era referred to the policy of dissolving tribal structures. See,
e.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 596 (1916) (allotment of Sioux land under
General Allotment Act of 1887); Goat v. United States, 224 U.S. 458, 464 (1912)
(Seminole allotment); Mullen v. United States, 224 U.S. 448, 451 (1912) (Choctaw
allotment).
149 Five Tribes Act of 1906, ch. 1876, § 28, 34 Stat. 137, 148. The Five Civilized
Tribes living in Indian Territory had been excluded from earlier allotment legislation,
but a congressional commission known as the Dawes Commission, headed by former
Senator Dawes who had introduced the General Allotment Act of 1887, recommended
these remaining tribes be broken up. See Dawes, The Indians of the Indian Territory,
in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 45, at 317. Senator Dawes
spoke openly of the fine coal reserves on Indian land which "must be worked by white
men who understand the business," id. at 323, and of the needs of the 300,000 whites
who then lived in Indian territory occupied by only 50,000 Indians, id. at 324-25.
For a comprehensive review of the attempted dismantling of the Five Civilized
Tribes, and in particular of the legislation affecting Creek tribal government, see Harjo
v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1118-34 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nor. Harjo v. An-
drus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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tribal money. Statutes provided that money due to tribes from tribal
assets could be appropriated at the discretion of Congress.'50 The Sec-
retary of the Interior's power over disbursement of Indian money"5'
enabled him to manipulate the tribe with a concomitant weakening ef-
fect on tribal sovereignty. Moreover, Congress, not the tribes, had the
ultimate authority to determine who was a tribal member for purposes
of distributing property, annuities, and trust money, 152 and how that
money was spent.15 Finally, Congress even authorized the consolida-
tion of tribes with no ethnological ties" 4-even some who were ancient
enemies.155
As one commentator has noted, by these and other measures, "the
Indian Agent and his staff were 'the government' for most tribes from
the cessation of treaty-making to the 1930's."'15' While the courts did
not explicitly endorse every erosion of tribal political sovereignty occur-
ring during this time, they certainly shared responsibility for it, because
Kagama and its progeny had eviscerated any litigation strategy to pro-
tect tribal sovereignty rights.
c. Individual Citizenship and Voting Rights
Judicial abandonment of Indians was not limited to rights asserted
by tribes. The Court also treated individual Indians as constitutional
castaways. For instance, according to Kagama, Indians were within the
geographical limits of the United States and thus subject to whatever
laws Congress deemed appropriate. 157 A year and a half before
Kagama, however, the Court had held in Elk v. Wilkins5 8 that Indians
were not citizens, thereby upholding a state's denial of the right to vote
to an Indian who had severed relations with his tribe and become a
lawful resident of the state. Over the dissent of the first Mr. Justice
Harlan, the Court reasoned that, although the petitioner was born in
150 For a collection of these statutes, see F. COHEN, supra note 112, at 341.
151 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 138-39.
155 "The power of Congress over the matter of citizenship in these Indian tribes
was plenary, and it could adopt any reasonable means to ascertain who were entitled to
its privileges." Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423 (1907) (construing Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899)). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 112, at
341.
151 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
15 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5-6.
155 See, e.g., Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, § 12, 30 Stat. 62, 93, 94 (authorizing
occupancy of Shoshone land by Arapahos, long-time foes of the Shoshone Tribe), dis-
cussed in Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 489 (1937). See generally
1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 6-7.
15 T. TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN CITIZENS 17 (1972).
157 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381.
S112 U.S. 94 (1884).
[Vol. 132:195
FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIANS
the United States, he was not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United
States for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, 59 because all In-
dians "owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes, and were not
part of the people of the United States."'1 60 Indians might be subject to
United States jurisdiction in some respects, but the fourteenth amend-
ment required more: they must be "completely subject to [United
States] political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate
allegiance.
'"161
While the Court in Elk reaffirmed salutary principles of tribal
sovereignty, it undermined individual rights, because Indians, even
those who had assimilated, could not become citizens of the United
States without permission of Congress." 2 Many other noncitizen aliens
who owed direct allegiance to another nation had a choice Indians
never had: they could go home and remain subject to the sole jurisdic-
tion of the country of their birth. Indians, on the other hand, were alien
subjects of a federal power they had not chosen and could not escape.
Eventually those who favored the assimilationist policy because of
concerns for Indian well-being urged successfully that Indians who re-
ceived allotments be made United States citizens.16s The grant of citi-
'59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.").
160 112 U.S. at 99.
161 Id. at 102. The Court bolstered this conclusion by referring to provisions ex-
cluding "Indians not taxed" in both the article I and the fourteenth amendment appor-
tionment clauses as providing further textual authority that Indians were "never
deemed citizens." Id. at 100, 102. According to the Court, since Indians were not taxed,
they formed "no part of the people entitled to representation." Id. at 103. Today, In-
dian tribes and tribal Indians are immune from state taxes on "Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation
• . . absent congressional consent." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,
148 (1973) (dictum) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973)). Nevertheless they are subject to federal taxes and to state taxes for activities
taking place off-reservation and for certain activities on-reservation involving Indians
and non-Indians. Compare, e.g., id. (state gross receipts tax on ski resort operated on
federal land off-reservation permissible) with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brack-
er, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state motor carrier license and use-fuel tax imposed on non-
Indian company employed by tribe to aid in tribal logging operation impermissible
because preempted by federal regulations embodying the policy of preserving profits
from logging industry for tribe). The phrase "Indians not taxed" has no relevance to-
day, because Indians are now citizens who vote, pay taxes, and are counted for appor-
tionment purposes. See generally 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 389.
162 See Elk, 112 U.S. at 100.
161 The General Allotment Act provided that Indians receiving allotments under
any treaty or statute would become citizens, General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, §
6, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976)). The act also
declared Indians living separate and apart and "adopting the habits of civilized life" to
be citizens. Id. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 112, at 154; Pancoast, The Indian
Before the Law, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 45, at 158-66
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zenship permitted Indians to take part in the political process. Never-
theless, those Indians whose lands escaped allotment remained
noncitizen subjects.
Even after the bestowal of citizenship on all Indians,'" Congress
continued to legislate pervasively on Indian matters. The Court sup-
ported this exercise of power, holding that conferral of citizenship did
not end the guardian-ward relationship."6 5 Moreover, the Court held
that an individual Indian had no power to terminate the guardian-ward
relationship unilaterally: "It rests with Congress to determine the time
and extent of emancipation." 6
d. Individual Rights
Legislation of this era curtailed individual Indian property rights
by placing restraints on the alienation of allotted land,1 7 including fee
simple allotted land. 68 The right of Indians to make contracts affecting
(advocating citizenship).
'" Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982)).
16 See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 232 (1923); United States v.
Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909); Mosier v. United States, 198 F. 54, 57 (8th
Cir. 1912).
186 United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452, 459 (1917); see also United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (quoting Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S.
286, 315 (1911)).
167 The General Allotment Act imposed a restriction on alienation of land allotted
under its provisions until the issuance of a patent in fee after 25 years. General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388-89 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
348 (1976)), construed in, e.g., Monson v. Simonson, 231 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1913); see
also The Indian Homestead Act of 1884, ch. 180, § 1, 23 Stat. 76, 96 (imposing a
restriction on alienation for 25 years) (repealed 1976). The restrictions on alienation
were frequently extended by executive order, as permitted by the General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 389 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348
(1976)), construed in United States v. Reynolds, 250 U.S. 104 (1919), and the Act of
June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 326 (permitting such extension for all land allotted under
treaties or statutes), construed in United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 189-91
(1930). Leasing allotted land without approval was also barred by various laws. See,
e.g., The Osage Allotment Act of 1906, ch. 3572, § 7, 34 Stat. 545, construed in La-
Motte v. United States, 254 U.S. 570, 575-77 (1921); Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 119, §
26, 41 Stat. 1248 (authorizing the Secretary to lease allotted Quapaw land for mining),
construed in Whitebird v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 28 F.2d 200, 204 (N.D. Okla.
1928).
16e Most tribal land was allotted by means of so-called "trust patents," with the
United States government as legal owner and the individual Indian as a beneficial own-
er. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 436 (1903). As legal owner, the govern-
ment had great powers, while the Indian owner could do no more than occupy and
cultivate the land. See, e.g., id. at 437; see also supra note 167. The Five Civilized
Tribes, unlike most other tribes, had a fee simple interest in their land. See supra note
76 (Cherokee land). When most land was allotted, the allottees were held to have prop-
erty rights protected by the fifth amendment due process clause, at least when they
received their patent in exchange for giving up their claims to tribal property. See
[Vol. 132:195
FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIANS
trust property16" and to dispose of trust property was conditioned on
approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 17 0 Furthermore, individual
Indian beneficiaries of congressional allotment schemes could not rely
on the congressional largess bestowed on them. Statutes granting indi-
viduals property rights in the most explicit language were overturned
by later statutes enlarging the class of beneficiaries and even, when
congressional policy favoring tribal self-government resurfaced in the
1930's, giving the land back to the tribe.
17 1
First amendment rights, too, were curtailed drastically. Indian re-
ligions were banned upon threat of criminal prosecution in the Courts
of Indian Offenses set up by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.' Children
were forced to attend schools to receive rations promised in return for
land cessions.178 Moreover, the children were denied the right to speak
their own language at the boarding schools. They were educated only
in English and then only about American values.174 This coerced edu-
Choate v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 667, 672-74 (1912) (tax exemption on Choctaw and
Chickasaw fee simple allotted land is a property right). Nevertheless, this land was also
subject to restrictions on alienation by the Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 22, 34 Stat.
137, 145, forbidding alienation of all allotted lands of members of the Five Civilized
Tribes without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. See Brader v. James, 246
U.S. 88 (1918) (upholding restriction as applied to alienation of Choctaw fee simple
allotment after expiration of restriction in original fee patent); Tiger v. Western Invest-
ment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 316 (1911) (upholding the same law's extension of restriction
on alienation during term of original restriction).
169 See, e.g., LaMotte v. United States, 254 U.S. 570 (1921) (leasing allotted
land); Taylor v. Tayrien, 51 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1931) (Congress made individual
rights of Osage Indians to share in oil and gas revenues nontransferable); see also F.
COHEN, supra note 112, at 164.
170 F. COHEN, supra note 112, at 203-04. The Court has reviewed the Secretary
of Interior's approval power over wills under the Administrative Procedure Act. See,
e.g., Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 609-10 (1970) (statute vesting Secretary of
Interior with power to disapprove wills of allotted land does not give Secretary power
to "revoke or rewrite a will that reflects a rational testamentary scheme").
171 See Act of July 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-424, § 3, 82 Stat. 424, construed in
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976) as altering the North-
ern Cheyenne Allotment Act, ch. 459, § 3, 44 Stat. 690, 691 (1926) by cancelling the
distribution of mineral rights scheduled by the original act; Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch.
1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137, amended by Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 341-
42, construed in Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912) as altering act of July 1, 1902,
ch. 1375, § 31, 32 Stat. 716, 721, by increasing the number of Indians who could
qualify for land to be granted under the original act.
171 See R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 141; see also L. KELLY, THE AS-
SAULT ON ASSIMILATION: JOHN COLLIER AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLICY RE-
FORM 300-48 (1983) (history of attempts to suppress Indian religious practices, includ-
ing dances).
17' Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254, 256, described in United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 383 n.14 (1980).
174 See Atkins, The English Language in Indian Schools, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 45, at 197. For a rationalization of the methods of the
Carlisle Indian School, where students were not permitted to speak their native lan-
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cation in Indian boarding schools continued even after the Supreme
Court recognized the fundamental right of non-Indian families to over-
see the education of their children by sending them to private schools or
to schools where foreign languages were taught."7 5
Finally, individual Indians were subjected to liquor laws, whether
or not they had severed tribal relations and whether or not they were
on a reservation.
1 7 6
In modern times, the Supreme Court has apparently repudiated
both the ethnocentric overtones of the doctrine of plenary power and
the doctrine itself, at least as far as the doctrine suggests it has an ex-
tra-constitutional source or is a power unlimited by other constitutional
provisions. Nevertheless, the concept of plenary power continues to in-
fluence contemporary Indian law by conditioning the courts to defer to
congressional power over Indian affairs. These developments are con-
sidered next.
D. The Modern View of Congressional Power over Indians: The
Development of a More Restrictive View of the Guardian-Ward
Relationship (1930's to Present)
As demonstrated above, barriers to access to the judicial system for
Indian tribes and judicial deference to Congress, coupled with indiffer-
ence to tribal and individual rights on the rare occasions Indians were
allowed into court, marked the plenary power era, which lasted at least
until the 1930's. In the 1930's and 1940's Congress repudiated the al-
lotment and assimilation policy, which had come under much criticism,
and adopted a policy of protecting tribal cultures and encouraging tri-
bal self-government.17 7 This shift in policy undoubtedly affected the
guage, see Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in id. at 260.
"I Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon law requiring chil-
dren to attend public schools violated due process clause); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (Nebraska law forbidding the teaching of German language violated due
process clause).
178 See, e.g., Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317 (1911) (upholding prosecu-
tion for violation of law against selling liquor to an Indian or Indian allottee). These
liquor laws were explicitly racial. In Hallowell, for instance, despite the fact defendant
had been active in county and state governments as judge, county attorney, county as-
sessor, and director of a public school district, he was still subject to the law because of
his status as an Indian. See id. at 320, 324. As the Eighth Circuit stated in a 1912 case:
"The word 'Indian' (in the statute) describes a person of Indian blood. The word 'citi-
zen' describes a political status." Mosier v. United States, 198 F. 54, 57 (8th Cir. 1912)
(citizenship did not remove an Indian from coverage of liquor laws applicable to
Indians).
177 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 144-52. For a history of John Collier's
role in this era, see L. KELLY, supra note 172.
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Court, as demonstrated by an increased receptivity to Indian claims.17 8
First, both Congress and the judiciary opened the doors to the
courthouses for Indians long denied ready access to the courts. For in-
stance, the Court finally clarified the murky question of whether tribal
Indians had standing to sue in federal court absent a congressional
grant. During the allotment era, the Court had upheld the power of the
executive to bring suit on behalf of Indian wards. In a broadly worded
opinion, the Court had intimated that Indians not only could have no
say in the litigation, but might also have no right to sue on their own
behalf once the United States had undertaken their representation.""
In 1943, the Court entertained a suit brought under a statute expressly
permitting an aggrieved tribe to seek appellate review of a determina-
tion of the value of land taken by railroads. The Court held that the
statute gave the tribe the right to sue, but added that Indian tribes also
have "a general legal right" to bring lawsuits.' Finally, in 1968, the
Court made plain that an individual Indian's status as a ward of the
United States did not preclude him from bringing suit on his own
behalf."'
More important, Congress, by enacting the Indian Claims Com-
mission Act of 1946,82 finally removed the barrier of sovereign immu-
nity to money claims against the government that had hindered tribes
in the eighty-three years since the Court of Claims was created. Within
five years, tribes filed more than five times as many claims against the
government as they had during the entire sixty-five previous years.'88
Finally, the 1976 passage of an amendment to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, waiving sovereign immunity for claims based on that stat-
ute, enabled Indians and Indian tribes to seek review of wrongful
agency actions.'"
As more Indian claims reached the judiciary, the Court began to
narrow the Plenary Power Doctrine and repudiated the notion that
Congress's plenary power could prevent the courts from reaching the
178 See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
117 Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-46 (1912); cf. Cherokee Nation
v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 652 (1890) (law permitted suit by tribe).
180 Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 629, 640 (1943).
181 Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 370-71 (1968) (construing
Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912), as implying that standing to sue
existed).
182 Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976)).
183 Wilkinson, supra note 118, at 512.
184 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1982)). For a discussion of pitfalls in suing the federal government, see Newton,
Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CAT-. U.L. REv.
635 (1982).
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merits of specific constitutional claims by Indian tribes. It did so in
United States v. Creek Nation,185 a case presenting a textbook example
of a fifth amendment taking. There, the government confiscated tribal
fee simple absolute land by means of a survey wrongly denominating
tribal land as a portion of land ceded in a treaty. When the government
argued that the Plenary Power Doctrine immunized it from liability,
the Court held that congressional power was not unlimited:
[Plenary authority over Indians] did not enable the United
States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate
them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an
obligation to render, just compensation for them; for that
"would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of
confiscation."' 8 6
The Creek Nation case, however is not as significant a turning
point as it might at first appear. In Creek Nation, Congress had per-
mitted the tribe to press a fifth amendment taking claim by enacting
special jurisdictional laws. 8 Thus, the Court's receptivity to the claim
may have been enhanced by its knowledge that both houses of Congress
were cognizant that the tribe had been wronged.
Concurrently, the Court began to rely on specific provisions of the
Constitution in place of inherent authority as the source of congres-
sional power over Indians. The process was a gradual one. For in-
stance, in 1958, the Court had referred to the Indian commerce clause
as a major source of power over Indians in a case involving the licens-
ing of traders on an Indian reservation. 88 Even in a case with such a
close commercial nexus, however, the Court still relied on Congress's
guardianship power as the second major source of power, derived from
"the necessity of giving uniform protection to a dependent people."189
By 1965, the Court relied solely on the Indian commerce clause in
holding that a federal law regulating trading activities on Indian reser-
vations preempted state taxation of those activities.18 Since the 1960's,
the Court has looked increasingly to enumerated powers, especially the
power to effectuate treaties,191 the Indian commerce clause, 192 or
185 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
188 Id. at 110 (quoting Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919)).
187 Act of May 24, 1924, ch. 181, 43 Stat. 139, amended by Joint Resolution of
May 19, 1926, ch. 341, 44 Stat. 568; Joint Resolution of Feb. 19, 1929, ch. 268, 45
Stat. 1229 (extending deadline for suits).
18 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
189 Id. at 219 n.4.
190 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 n.18
(1965).
191 See, e.g., Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1968).
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both. 19 3 Moreover, the Court repudiated the notion that Congress's ple-
nary power was extraconstitutional, ruling rather that it was "drawn
both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself."1
Recently, two of the strands from the post-New Deal case law just
discussed have come together: the search for specific textual support in
the Constitution for federal power over Indian affairs, and the Court's
greater willingness to reach the merits of tribal constitutional claims. In
1977, in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,1 95 the Court
adjudicated an equal protection challenge to the distribution of judg-
ment funds by the Secretary of the Interior. The Court noted that
power over tribal property, while plenary, is "rooted in the Constitu-
tion," ' and may be challenged when it infringes constitutional rights.
Moreover, the Court served notice that the political question doctrine,
which had been invoked often in the past, had no place in cases raising
individual rights guarantees:
The statement in Lone Wolf. . .that the power of Congress
"has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government,"
however pertinent to the question then before the Court of
congressional power to abrogate treaties ... has not de-
terred this Court, particularly in this day, from scrutinizing
Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 97
By 1980, the Court had dismissed the political question doctrine: "[it]
has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was expressly laid
to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks .... 18
The Court's ruling that federal power over Indian affairs was ex-
plicitly and implicitly rooted in the Constitution, and that the Plenary
Power Doctrine would no longer bar the Court from reaching the mer-
its of constitutional claims raised by Indian tribes, clearly was a major
breakthrough. Nevertheless, the contours of this expanded role had to
be more fully defined.
During this process of narrowing the Plenary Power Doctrine, the
192 See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 652-53 (1978).
193 See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7
(1973).
19, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
195 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
196 Id. at 83.
197 Id. at 84 (emphasis added) (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
565 (1903)).
198 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980).
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Court also began to redefine its source-the guardian-ward relation-
ship. Although the guardian-ward' relationship of Kagama was the ba-
sis for the power to impose federal criminal laws on tribal Indians,
Kagama itself and other allotment era cases also referred to duties to-
ward Indians imposed on the government by the guardian-ward rela-
tionship.1 9 These decisions treated the duties as self-imposed moral ob-
ligations, not legally enforceable.200 Nevertheless, in cases in which
Congress had waived sovereign immunity, the judiciary began to im-
pose duties on the government, akin to those imposed on ordinary fidu-
ciaries, to manage Indian money and land responsibly. 0 1 Indian breach
of trust cases proliferated, and many were successful. Courts rendered
specific relief or assessed money damages for breaches of a trustee's
duties of care and loyalty in a number of cases involving mismanage-
ment of money or natural resources.2"2 The result is that, in modern-
day Indian law, the trust relationship, although not constitutionally
1 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
200 See, e.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 ("a moral obligation rested upon Con-
gress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf");
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (extinguishment of title: "It is to be
presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by such considera-
tions of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant
and dependent race.").
These obligations were held legally enforceable in situations arising from a breach
of treaty or agreement. While the Court used contract language in some of these cases,
e.g., Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), it used trust terminology in holding the
government had breached agreements in other cases, e.g., United States v. Mille Lac
Chippewas, 229 U.S. 498, 509 (1913) (breach of agreement was a breach of trust,
wrongfully disposing of tribal property).
The Court also employed the trust relationship to interpret treaties and statutes
favorably toward Indians. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28
(1886) (treaties) (trust relationship "recognizes . . . such an interpretation of their acts
and promises as justice and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by the
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection"); see also Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) (liberal construction of statutes when the government is deal-
ing with the Indians).
201 See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (pay-
ment of money required to be paid per capita by treaty to tribal officers known to be
corrupt violated "moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust"); Me-
nominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10 (1944) (mismanagement of
tribal trust funds).
202 See, e.g., Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (money damages for gross negligence by Secretary of Interior in managing tribal
property); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M.
1979) (declaration that Secretary of Interior breached trust in supervising oil and gas
leases); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (money damages and specific relief for Secretary's mismanagement of
tribal trust funds); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1973) (declaration that Secretary breached fiduciary duty in mismanagement of tribal
water).
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based and thus not enforceable against Congress,"' is a source of en-
forceable rights against the executive branch and has become a major
weapon in the arsenal of Indian rights."0 4
Perhaps the success of breach of trust claims has obscured the fact
that the Plenary Power Doctrine has not been expunged completely
from Indian law. Tribes wishing to impose fiduciary duties on the gov-
ernment did not challenge the government's power to manage and con-
trol Indian resources, but argued that the power carried duties along
with it. Moreover, with the taming of the doctrine in recent years, most
commentators have come to regard "plenary power" as referring only
to the notion that the existing, fairly sketchy references to sources of
power over Indians in the Constitution are to be read broadly, much as
are the references to foreign affairs, and thus as giving the federal gov-
ernment primary power over Indian affairs. According to the Hand-
book of Federal Indian Law:
The teaching of modern cases is that acts of Congress affect-
ing Indians are subject to judicial review, and that although
congressional power is broad, ordinary constitutional protec-
tions may be invoked by Indians in the relationship with the
federal government. Thus, while the courts refer on occasion
to the "plenary power" of Congress over Indians, the term is
not synonymous with "absolute" or "total." Rather, the
phrase appears to be used as a summary of the congressional
powers over Indians. °5
Nevertheless, vestiges of the judicial attitude of nonintervention de-
veloped and nurtured in the plenary power era remain, especially in
the areas of tribal sovereignty and property rights where the Court con-
tinues to rely on an inherent Indian affairs power of almost unlimited
scope. For instance, the Court characterizes tribal sovereignty as ex-
isting "only at the sufferance of Congress,"206 which has "plenary au-
thority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-govern-
ment. '20 7 As to property, the Court continues to recognize Congress's
"paramount power over the property of the Indians."208 Moreover, the
203 Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(Congress immune from breach of trust claims), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
204 See Chambers,Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to In-
dians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); see also 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 220-
21 (trust doctrine "is one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law").
205 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 219.
206 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
207 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
20 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980) (quoting Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)).
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Court quite frankly explains that this power is derived "by virtue of
[Congress's] superior position over the tribes"2 ' or even "the conquer-
ors' will" 210-the kind of might-makes-right argument that resonates of
nineteenth century Indian law jurisprudence. The following is a partial
list of the congressional actions receiving the Court's sanction in mod-
ern times, often in decisions citing the major cases of the plenary power
era. The court has upheld congressional power to reduce the bounda-
ries of a reservation without tribal consent or compensation,2 ' thereby
reducing, for all practical purposes, a tribe's power to govern.2 2 In
addition the Court has upheld power to divest a tribe of all criminal ,21
civil, or regulatory jurisdiction;2 4 to abrogate treaties;2 5 and to subject
tribal laws and constitutions to federal approval. 1 As to tribal prop-
erty rights, congressional power remains as sweeping as it was during
the plenary power era. Congress may require the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to approve land sales and leases by tribes,217 and contracts obligat-
209 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 155 n.21 (1982).
210 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955).
211 See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (quoting
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566, 568 (1903)); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 204 (1975) (dicta); see also 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 214-15.
21I See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 630-33 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (effect of reservation disestablishment on tribal self-government); Wil-
kinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Ternination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139,
153-54 (1977).
218 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978) (citing
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846)) (tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers implicitly divested because of tribes' dependent status); see also
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (dicta).
"14 See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979). See generally Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 212
(termination policy of the 1950's and its effect on tribal sovereignty).
215 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 382, 383 n.14 (1980);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977).
"16 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976), per-
mits tribes to adopt a constitution, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior. Id. § 476. The reported decisions do not reveal that any tribe has ever challenged
this IRA provision. The Supreme Court apparently finds the provision unobjectionable.
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (upholding tribal tax
while stressing that the tax had secretarial approval). For a criticism of the IRA, see
Barsh, Another Look at Reorganization: When Will Tribes Have a Choice?, INDIAN
TRUTH, Oct. 1982, at 4.
21" The restriction on alienation of tribal land, first enacted in 1790, is still in
effect today. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976); see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County
of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (claim based on Nonintercourse Act states a federal
claim). In addition, tribes have no power to lease their land without secretarial ap-
proval. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1976). This provision and its implementing regulations have
recently been read as preventing cancellation of a lease without approval because of
concerns that increased power over leasing, while it might result in "enhancement of
tribal power," would also increase the "risk of improvidence." Yavapai-Prescott Indian
Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ing money held by the federal government but owed to the tribe.2 18
Congress may abrogate without liability future interests in Indian lands
granted by earlier statutes, 1 and may enlarge or decrease the class of
beneficiaries of tribal trust funds or lands. 2 Congress may take one
kind of tribal property, aboriginal Indian property, without paying
compensation; 22' it may, without consent, dispose of recognized-title tri-
bal property under the guise of management and sell it at less than fair
market value without liability, as long as the tribe receives some pro-
ceeds.222 According to some observers, it may even extinguish legal land
claims of Indian tribes by retroactively extinguishing both title to the
land and any claims based on that title.223
Obviously, these exercises of federal power raise individual and
tribal rights concerns, which will be discussed in the next section. The
conclusion is clear. Despite the Court's repudiation of the political
question doctrine, it has been unable to shake a two-hundred-year his-
tory of deference to congressional decisions regarding federal power
over property and sovereignty. This deference appears in the modern
cases not as a refusal to address the merits of a claim but in the refusal
to find any merit to the claim addressed. Extreme deference to Con-
gress may have been proper in the early days of this nation's history,
218 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1976).
219 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1976) (sub-
surface rights promised allottees of surface lands in 50 years returned to tribal
ownership).
221 United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 82 (1972) (per curiam) (statutory trust
fund for occupants of one portion of reservation enlarged to include occupants of the
entire reservation). Although these decisions reflect the current federal policy of encour-
aging tribal self-government, they do so without careful analysis of the rights of the
individuals. According to Justice Douglas, dissenting in Jim: "After all, Indians are
beneficiaries of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They too are people,
not sheep or cattle that can be given or denied whatever their overseer decrees." Id. at
87 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
221 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
222 Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968), rea-
soning approved in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408-09 (1980).
222 See Ancient Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2084, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982). In supporting this bill, discussed infra notes 358-64 and accompanying
text, the Solicitor of the Interior Department stated such retroactive extinguishment
would be constitutional. Statement of William H. Coldiron, Solicitor, United States
Department of the Interior, Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the
United States Senate, concerning S. 2084, "The Ancient Indian Land Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1982," on June 23, 1982 (copy on file at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review); see also AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION, INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
UNDER THE NONINTERCOURSE AcT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND NEEDS FOR
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 55-61, 85-90 (1978) (industry lobbying brief arguing that
retroactive extinguishment or transfer of aboriginal or recognized title and claims based
thereon would not constitute a taking of property within the meaning of the fifth
amendment) [hereinafter cited as INDIAN LAND CLAIMS].
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when Indians were regarded as holding allegiance to separate nations,
and Congress dealt with them as if they were foreign nations. Indian
affairs then were a branch of foreign affairs, an area in which the
Court has traditionally deferred to the political branches both during
war and peace, even though deference has meant giving less weight to
individual rights concerns.224 Moreover, in the early years, the chal-
lenger of federal power was either a state or a non-Indian individual,
threatening the supremacy of the national policy to open up the fron-
tier,225 a policy to be advanced both by controlling the amount of con-
tact between Indians and whites and by providing for the acquisition of
Indian land. Finally, an important rationale for the Plenary Power
Doctrine was the perceived racial and cultural inferiority of Indians.22
Today, however, the country has been settled, the national govern-
ment's exclusive power to regulate Indian affairs has been solidified,
Indian law has become domestic law, and Indian racial and cultural
inferiority has been repudiated. Nevertheless, the Court's continued
failure to attempt to define the extent of Congress's power over Indian
affairs has encouraged further undue assertions of that power. If con-
gressional policy were to shift again to one of forced assimilation, legis-
lators might not be blamed for thinking the Court would place no lim-
its on their actions.
II. LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL POWER: CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR TRIBAL PROPERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS
A. Precedents and Problems
Although state disenfranchisement of Indians continued into the
twentieth century,227 individual Indians now enjoy the same constitu-
224 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (revocation of passport of
former CIA agent not a prior restraint); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (deferential
scrutiny of federal legislation based on status of illegitimacy); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972) (denial of visa to Belgian Communist editor-in-chief of Socialist
newspaper upheld despite infringement on first amendment rights of professors and
students to receive information); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(national origin discrimination; deferential scrutiny of selective deportation of nonimmi-
grant alien Iranian students during hostage crisis), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980),
noted in 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467 (1980) (equal protection component of due process
is weaker for aliens than for other minorities); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion of persons of Japanese descent from the West Coast during
World War II upheld against a due process attack).
225 F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 3 (1962).
226 See Carter, supra note 121, at 197; see also Shattuck & Norgren, Political Use
of the Legal Process by Black and American Indian Minorities, 22 How. L.J. 1
(1979).
12 Cf Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962) (holding Navajo
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tional rights as other Americans. Tribal property and political sover-
eignty rights are a different matter, however. Attempts to assert consti-
tutional protection for these rights have been largely unsuccessful for
reasons discussed in the first part of this Article.
1. Doctrine of Enumerated Powers
As noted in part I, the Court has defined congressional power over
Indians in the broadest possible terms. The most analytically appealing
and historically accurate basis for protecting tribal rights would be to
limit federal power over Indian tribes, as advocated by Professor Rob-
ert Clinton. He argues that the framers intended to protect tribal sover-
eignty by vesting the power to deal with Indian tribes in the federal
government alone and limiting that power to legislation dealing with
commerce with Indian tribes.2 ' Although Clinton defines commerce
broadly to include all intercourse between non-Indians, including
states, and Indian tribes,229 he argues that such power should not be
extended to permit congressional interference with purely intratribal
matters.230
Clinton's historical research demonstrates that during the Colonial
Period the Crown consistently recognized the sovereign status of Indian
tribes. The Continental Congress maintained the same position, enter-
ing into treaties with tribes that guaranteed their legal and political
autonomy.231
From his review of the history Clinton concludes that the framers
intended both to "plac[e] the management of Indian affairs exclusively
in the hands of the federal government, and [to] guarant[ee] the Indian
tribes legal and political autonomy as sovereigns exempt from federal
Indians to be residents of the state and thus eligible to vote); Harrison v. Laveen, 67
Ariz. 337, 349, 196 P.2d 456, 463 (1948) (overruling 1928 case holding Indians to be
"persons under guardianship" and thus not eligible to vote in state elections).
228 Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Clinton, Indian Autonomy]; Clinton, Book Review, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 846
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Clinton, Book Review]. A recent commentator has taken a
similar position, arguing that legislation designed to benefit Indian tribes ought to be
permissible as an exercise of Congress's trusteeship power, but an exercise of power
adverse to Indian interests should be confined to Congress's enumerated powers and
tested accordingly. Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks
and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235 (1982).
2" Clinton, Indian Autonomy, supra note 228, at 999.
230 Id. at 999-1000.
2. Some of the former colonies, however refused to recognize tribal autonomy.
For instance, Georgia's actions started an Indian war during the Constitutional Con-
vention. Id. at 992-93; Clinton, Book Review, supra note 228, at 850-56.
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and state control over their internal affairs." '32
Although the historical record amply supports the conclusion that
the national governments of both England and the United States treated
Indian tribes as possessing an inherent sovereignty, the historical evi-
dence of the framers' intent to constitutionalize protection of Indian tri-
bal sovereignty is less clear. Nevertheless, as Ely points out in a more
general context, "the most important datum bearing on what was in-
tended is the constitutional language itself. '2 33 It can be argued that the
Constitution, in two clauses, recognizes the existence of Indian nations
as separate sovereign peoples. First, the Indian commerce clause places
Indian tribes on an equal footing with states and foreign nations by
granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."2 In-
terpreting this provision in the Cherokee Cases,235 Chief Justice Mar-
shall found that the Constitution recognized Indians as sovereign
nations, albeit "domestic dependent nations." '236 In Worcester v. Geor-
gia,237 he explained this phrase further: "The Indian nations had al-
ways been considered as distinct, independent political communities
... . [T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker
power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-govern-
ment, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.
2 3
The second relevant constitutional provision is the apportionment
clause of article 1,239 now replaced by the fourteenth amendment ap-
portionment clause.240 Both apportionment clauses explicitly exempt
"Indians not taxed" from apportionment. Clinton argues that this ex-
232 Clinton, Book Review, supra note 228, at 851.
233 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16 (1980).
234 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2385 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18-20 (1831).
238 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). In explaining the
conclusion that Indian tribes could not sue as foreign nations, Chief Justice Marshall
noted that the framers did not regard Indian tribes as foreign nations "not, we presume
because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States."
Id. at 19.
237 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
238 Id. at 559-61. Earlier in the opinion, in discussing the first treaty with the
Cherokee Nation made after the Constitution had been adopted, the Chief Justice reaf-
firmed that the treaty did not surrender tribal self-governing rights: "This relation was
that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful; not that of
individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting, as subjects, to the laws
of a master." Id. at 555.
239 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
240 Id. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.").
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clusion of Indians "from the enumeration for apportionment purposes
reflects their autonomous political status."2" 1 Thus, in 1787 and again
in 1868, policymakers recognized that Indian nations were sovereigns
exempt from ordinary laws, including taxing laws. 42 Indeed, this pro-
vision provided the key to the Court's holding in Elk v. Wilkins 24 in
1884, that Indians were not citizens. Although Supreme Court deci-
sions later permitted federal taxation of Indians,244 the exclusion re-
mains as a constitutional testimony of the separate status of Indian
tribes. This conclusion, that Indian tribes were viewed historically as
separate sovereigns, suggests the constitutional grant of power over In-
dians was intended to be limited. Thus, it could be argued that the
government may not regulate wholly internal tribal affairs relating to
tribal sovereignty.
As noted above, Clinton's argument is appealing. Nevertheless, the
attempt to remove certain activities from the reach of federal power by
carving out spheres of activity that cannot be reached by such power
has proven nearly fruitless in this century.245 At best, as Clinton him-
self acknowledges, his argument supports only "a formal limit"2 46 on
congressional power, akin to the tenuous limit the Court now imposes
on congressional actions regulating matters affecting interstate
commerce.
247
Since it is unlikely that the Court will limit the scope of federal
power over Indian tribes, some advocates have attempted to invoke spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution, such as the fifth amendment, to
protect tribal rights. Unfortunately, these efforts have been altogether
rare and largely unsuccessful. The reasons are several. First, as Clin-
241 Clinton, Book Review, supra note 228, at 857.
242 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 388-89.
243 112 U.S. 94, 99, 102 (1884). The Court denominated Indian tribes as "alien
nations, distinct political communities." Id. at 99.
2" See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 389.
248 Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (control of
minimum wage and maximum hour levels of state employees beyond the reach of fed-
eral power) with EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) (narrowing the reach of
League of Cities to its facts). For a rare case successfully employing this limitation of
power analysis, see Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935) (cancellation of
gold clauses in government bonds by Congress beyond its constitutional power). See
generally Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 513-
16 (1945). The defendants in Kagama had relied on the doctrine of enumerated pow-
ers, especially the Indian Commerce Clause, Brief for Defendants at 10, 19, United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), but to no avail.
248 Clinton, Indian Autonomy, supra note 228, at 997.
24 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Red. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (local property use); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1961) (public accommodations).
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ton's analysis suggests, and as the Court itself has acknowledged, " ' In-
dian tribal rights do not fit neatly into the framework of existing consti-
tutional interpretation or analysis. The peculiar nature of Indian
sovereignty and the special status of Indian tribal ownership of land
have contributed greatly to the problem.
Second, many tribal advocates have uncritically accepted doctrines
developed in Indian law cases that might bear reexamination in light of
the modern Court's expansion of constitutional liberties. Those advo-
cates should turn their efforts towards convincing the Court to infuse
specific constitutional guarantees, such as the due process clause, with
new meaning relevant to Indian tribes. Such provisions may become a
means of extending constitutional protection to tribal rights.
The task of constructing a constitutional framework that will pro-
tect tribal rights finds its most formidable barrier in the legacy of the
plenary power era-the long tradition of judicial analysis justifying ex-
traordinary federal power over Indian tribal property and sovereignty
and thus creating powerful precedents impeding the application of
meaningful judicial scrutiny of federal actions affecting tribal claims.
Still, while the task is difficult, it is essential. As canvassed in part
I, the entire history of Indian law has been marked by judicial defer-
ence to congressional will regarding Indian policy. That abdication by
the courts has resulted in the imposition of policies undermining Indian
identity. Tribal membership is in fact at the core of Indian personal
identity, reflecting much more than a shifting value choice or voluntary
association. Thus, part II of the Article begins the difficult, but vital
task of constructing a constitutional framework that will protect tribal
rights. The suggested framework is founded on analogies to some of the
following legal concepts: the expanded notion of property set forth in
recent procedural due process cases; the increased protection given to
contract rights; stricter scrutiny of retroactive legislation; heightened
scrutiny under the due process clause of legislation infringing on funda-
mental rights; and heightened scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of legislation discriminating on the basis of race or against dis-
crete and insular minorities. The Article discusses the application of
these concepts to Indian tribal property and sovereignty, the areas in
which congressional power is regarded as having an almost unlimited
reach.
Since extreme judicial deference to Congress-the legacy of the
plenary power era-looms as the main obstacle to an assertion of tribal
rights, any doctrinal argument will offer small comfort to Indian advo-
248 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 (1974).
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cates unless the Court can be convinced to subject legislation affecting
Indian tribal interests to some level of heightened scrutiny. A discussion
of the general justifications for that heightened scrutiny will follow.
Once that overarching argument has been presented, the Article will
consider three distinct constitutional provisions and their application to
Indian legislation: the fifth amendment takings clause, the fifth amend-
ment due process clause, and the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment.
B. Justifications for Heightened Scrutiny
Since Calder v. Bull in 1798249 it has been recognized that prop-
erty rights in general are explicitly protected b.y the Constitution.25 °
Similarly, the Constitution textually25 and structurally 25 2 protects state
sovereignty. Indian tribes, however, had no part in creating the Consti-
tution. Thus, it is hardly surprising that their property and sovereignty
rights are not explicitly protected by the Constitution.253
The arguments that follow attempt to find protection for tribal
sovereignty and property in modern constitutional doctrine.254 These
249 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("[A] law that takes property from A, and
gives it to B" would be unconstitutional).
2"50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (bars state laws "impairing the obligation of con-
tracts"); id. amend. V (due process and just compensation clauses); id. amend. XIV
(due process); see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164 (1980) (state retention of interest on money deposited into court in interpleader
actions constituted a compensable taking) ("[A] State . . . may not transform private
property into public property without compensation . . . . This is the very kind of
thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent."). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 9-1, at 456-57 (constitutional protection for set-
tled expectations).
251 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 9, cls. 5-6; art. I § 8, ci. 16; art. IV, § 3, art. V.
'25 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (a federal
law that "directly displace[s] the States' freedom to structure integral operations in ar-
eas of traditional governmental functions" is outside of Congress's commerce clause
authority).
2" Although policymakers at one time considered making Indian Territory a state
of the union governed by Indian tribes, pressure from those who desired Indian land
forced the Congress to abandon the plan. See R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at
164-65.
254 Such arguments may be viewed as calling for noninterpretive judicial review.
The word "may" is stressed because whether an analysis is interpretive or noninterpre-
tive depends on the definitions of the two terms employed. For instance, John Hart Ely
defines interpretivism as "indicating that judges deciding constitutional issues should
confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution." J. ELY, supra note 233, at 1. This definition leaves plenty of room for
analytical manipulation, as Ely admits. Id. at 12. Those who want to avoid the label of
noninterpretivism-"enforc[ing] norms that cannot be discovered within the four cor-
ners of the document," id. at 1, will justify their interpretation by arguing that the
value they advocate is "clearly implicit."
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arguments are founded on the justifications that courts have advanced
for occasionally deviating from their general practice of according con-
gressional legislative judgments a "presumption of constitutionality"
and instead applying some heightened level of scrutiny to government
actions. Such deviations are especially significant in situations in which
"'a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments"2 55 is not invoked in opposition to a law. Whatever label
may be given to such heightened scrutiny, the reasons the Court has
chosen to take an aggressive role in interpreting some constitutional
provisions are important for the theme of this Article. If it can be
demonstrated that tribal property and sovereignty rights implicate val-
ues similar to those which the Court has protected in other settings,
then the heightened scrutiny advanced to protect those values should be
adopted more readily by the Court in relation to tribal rights. Further-
more, such a demonstration would suggest that if current precedents in
Indian law conflict with values the Court has chosen to protect in other
settings, those precedents deserve serious reconsideration.
Arguments for departing from the normal deferential standard of
judicial review are important because, absent heightened scrutiny, the
Constitution requires only that legislative decisions be rational. In the
area of due process and equal protection review, for example, the Court
sustains legislation if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmen-
tal interest."5 ' The legislative means need only be tenuously related to
the legislative purpose; neither the relationship of the legislation to that
purpose nor the purpose itself need be stated in the legislation; and
when unstated, the Court will uphold the legislation if it bears even a
hypothetically rational relationship to some legitimate government
interest.
2 57
Because the judiciary has defined congressional authority over In-
dians so broadly, application of this deferential standard of review to
Indian legislation permits almost any conceivable legislative action. In
short, if the permissible statutory purpose is to manage Indian affairs,
any legislation affecting Indians, almost by definition, would be ration-
ally related to that purpose.
255 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (dictum)
(Stone, J.). Not all provisions of the first ten amendments are specific, of course. See J.
ELY, supra note 233, at 12, 32-41.
I" See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)).
"' For some of the principal discussions of deferential review, see, McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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Arguably the most controversial rationale advanced in favor of
heightened judicial review is the theory that the Court should enforce
fundamental values not explicitly stated in the Constitution..8 but de-
rived from natural law, reason, tradition, or consensus2 5 -"the tradi-
tions and cotiscience of our people. '260 In recent years, the Court has
begun to scrutinize more carefully legislation "significantly in-
terfer[ing" 2 1 with some personal rights embodied in the concept of
liberty in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. When these fundamen-
tal rights are involved, the Court requires that legislation serve at least
an important,262 and sometimes a compelling,263 articulated governmen-
tal interest by means that are "closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests.12 4 Some "tenuous relation" 265 between legislative means and
government purpose will not suffice.
Concededly, this more searching scrutiny has occurred only in
cases involving a "substantial claim of infringement on the individual's
freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation,
marriage, and family life." '66 Thus, any assertion of tribal property or
sovereignty rights immediately suggests doctrinal problems. Tribal
rights do no appear to implicate the same values as the autonomy and
privacy interests protected by the Burger Court through heightened
scrutiny of congressional action. In addition, such property and sover-
eignty rights rest nominally in the tribe as a collective entity, while
autonomy and privacy are quintessentially personal and individual
rights. A close examination of these rights asserted by tribes in the con-
text of a true understanding of the concept of a tribe indicates, however,
"0 For scholarly defenses of the right to privacy see, e.g., Perry, Noninterpretive
Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278
(1981); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957
(1979).
259 For a criticism of these sources of fundamental values, see J. ELY, supra note
233, at 48-69.
260 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
261 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (state law outlawing remar-
riage by persons who could not prove that they had no outstanding support obligations
violated the equal protection clause by denying the affected class the fundamental right
to marry).
2 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (invalidating
zoning ordinance limiting occupancy of single family dwellings to nuclear families as
violating the due process clause).
263 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (invalidating state laws re-
stricting the right to have an abortion) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
2 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
265 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977).
288 Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
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that tribal rights lie very close indeed to the individual fundamental
rights now protected by the courts, and far from the rights derived from
"shifting economic arrangements"'26 7 and afforded minimal scrutiny
protection.
At the time of discovery, the cultures of the many indigenous tribes
varied widely.268 Even today Indians do not constitute a monolithic
group. The ethnic boundaries defining group identity and functions are
essentially tribal in nature.2" 9 At the same time, tribal membership is at
the core of Indian personal identity, reflecting much more than a shift-
ing political value choice or voluntary association. The tribe is a projec-
tion of the autonomous individual Indian.2 7 ' To some extent this
unique interrelationship between tribe and individual identity is al-
ready recognized in the law: tribal membership as defined by the tribe
is often the key element in determining whether a person is an Indian
for some legal purposes.
7 1
While all tribes have undergone a certain degree of assimilation,
27 2
the importance to individual Indian selfhood of the existence of a tribal
community cannot be understated. Studies of Indians outside a tribal
structure support this view. For instance, there is evidence that even
urban Indians often form distinct Indian communities to preserve, as
much as possible, the core of a native tribal style of life.273 Thus, some
have concluded that the overwhelming majority of Indians in this coun-
try seek to remain "tribal members," whether or not their tribe is rec-
ognized by the federal government.274
Professor Laurence Tribe has argued that courts should identify
and protect certain "personhood rights.1275 According to Tribe, virtu-
ally every invasion of private personhood is also an interference with
the way in which one associates with society; concomitantly, virtually
every intrusion upon association works a displacement of fundamental
human personality.2 76 Surely this concept of personhood rights would
encompass the unique relationship of personal Indian selfhood and
tribalism. Consequently, government actions undermining tribalism
should be regarded as examples of the government dictating the kinds
287 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
268 Weatherhead, What is an Indian Tribe?, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (1980).
288 D. McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM 116 (1973).
270 Id.
271 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3.
272 See Weatherhead, supra note 268, at 20.
272 See D. McNICKLE, supra note 269, at 7.
274 See Weatherhead, supra note 268, at 21.
275 See L. TRIBE, supra note'18, §§ 15-1 to 15-21, at 886-990.
278 See id. § 15-18, at 974.
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of lives people may lead.2  Moreover, such actions would violate In-
dian selfhood in much the same way as a ban on contraceptives invades
the autonomy marriage gives a couple. 78 The point is not that these
rights of Indians are more important than those asserted by other
groups seekinig heightened judicial protection, but that the essential un-
derpinnings of the Indian personhood concept are as implicit in the
Constitution's protection of privacy and autonomy as the rights thus far
recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court.
A second rationale for heightened scrutiny, eloquently defended by
John Hart Ely,279 focuses on the Court's duty to intervene in those
cases where the political process has not worked. In his famous justifi-
cation for lenient review of commercial legislation, Justice Stone noted
that a "more searching judicial inquiry" might be appropriate for
"statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minori-
ties" because "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties."28 This "political process rationale" has become a major justifica-
tion for the development under the equal protection clause of strict
scrutiny of legislation that discriminates on the basis of racial and eth-
nic classifications.
281
Surely tribal Indians are among the most vulnerable of all racial
and cultural groups to the majoritarian process. They comprise less
than one percent of the nation's population.2 2 Tribal Indians live apart
from other Americans on reservations; most tribes are poor; they often
speak tribal languages and maintain aspects of their ancient cultures
that differ substantially from dominant American cultural values.28 ' In
addition to being small insular groups possessing alien cultures, most
tribes lack financial strength, except those fortunate enough to possess
valuable natural resources. 28 ' Moreover, contrary to conventional wis-
217 See id. § 15-4, at 897.
278 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
279 J. ELY, supra note 233, at 73-104.
280 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
21 For an eloquent defense of judicial intervention to protect minorities, see Ely,
Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451
(1978).
282 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1981) (Table 36, Resident Population, by Race
and Spanish Origin by State: 1980) (Indians, including Eskimos and Aleuts, total
1,418,000 out of a national population of 226,505,000).
283 D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 20. For a
list of tribes under state control, terminated tribes and other tribes not federally recog-
nized, see T. TAYLOR, supra note 166, app. J, at 226-32.
284 See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 4-5, 9,
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dom, the more than 200 Indian tribes2"' in the United States are di-
verse and have no real community of political interest. Accordingly, the
appropriate entity for evaluating Indian political power is not the racial
grouping "Indians" but rather the separate, often politically impotent,
individual tribes. Indian tribes are, in short, the paradigmatic example
of "discrete and insular minorities.
2 8 6
In addition, Indian tribes meet other conditions the courts tradi-
tionally have found to justify heightened judicial scrutiny under the
equal protection clause. The Court has observed that a suspect class is
one subject to a "history of purposeful unequal treatment." 2 7 As dis-
cussed in part I of this Article, Indians have been subject to such a
history. Only in the last thirty years has de jure discrimination against
Indians ceased-as recently as 1956 reservation Indians were still dis-
abled from voting in some state elections.28 8 In applying heightened
scrutiny, the Court has also looked to the existence of "unique disabili-
ties on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities.128 9 As stated above, Court opinions justifying federal
power over Indians at the height of the plenary power era were replete
with references to the dissolute habits and general inferiority of the
Indian race.219 This stereotyping has continued into recent history. As
late as 1955, the Court stated, "Every American schoolboy knows the
savage tribes of this continent were deprived" of their ancestral ranges
by force . . . .""' Such stereotyping is inaccurate. Many Indian tribes
did not wage war on the United States. Indeed, some, like the Alaskan
natives whose property rights to Alaska were denied in the same Su-
preme Court decision cited above, had welcomed settlers to their
14-15.
285 Id. at 5.
26 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also
Fetzer, Jurisdictional Decisions in Indian Law: The Importance of Extralegal Factors
in Judicial Decision Making, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 254-55 (1981) (arguing that
whenever Indians represent a minority of the population of a reservation, the court
rules against claims of tribal sovereignty).
287 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quot-
ing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
288 See Allen v. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d 490 (1956), vacated and re-
manded, 353 U.S. 932 (1957) (upholding denial of suffrage by Utah to persons resid-
ing on Indian reservations) (the Supreme Court vacated and remanded because the
Utah legislature repealed the statute while the case was on appeal); see also CIVIL
RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 36-37 (report of efforts to combat
continuing discrimination against Indians in voting rights).
28 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
290 See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also CIVIL RIGHTS COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 27, at 33-35 (continuing legacy of racism).
28' Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).
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country. 92
In conclusion, the same factors that the Court has relied on to
justify heightened scrutiny in other settings would justify the Court's
taking a more active role in evaluating challenges to congressional
power over Indian tribes. In the hope that tribal advocates will begin to
encourage an increased judicial activism, the next section turns to the
specific constitutional provisions that have been or might be used to
raise these challenges.
C. Due Process and Tribal Property Rights
1. Aboriginal Land
a. Tee-Hit-Ton and the Fifth Amendment
Cases involving the fifth amendment takings clause most clearly
illustrate the failure of the Court to offer constitutional protection to
Indian interests. The Court has frequently stated the value furthered
by the takings clause: "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee .. .was
designed to bar the government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public at large." '293 In its normal application, the fifth amendment's
proscription against government confiscation of land without compensa-
tion protects every sort of property, from land held in fee simple to
periodic tenancies and future interests. 94 Despite this proscription, in
1955, the Court held, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,2 95 that
absent a treaty or statute granting an Indian tribe the right to occupy
its ancestral land permanently, Indian aboriginal land 296 is not prop-
erty for the purposes of the takings clause requirement of payment of
just compensation.2 9 7 As a result of the rule of Tee-Hit-Ton, the native
peoples of Alaska lost their claim to most of Alaska's 272 million
2'92 See generally FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN
ALASKA, ALASKA NATIVES AND THE LAND 429-54, 535 (1968) (history of peaceful
relations between natives and settlers and native attempts to resolve disputes through
the legal process).
293 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
29 See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303 (1976) (the
rights of periodic tenants); United States v. 376.21 Acres, 240 F. Supp. 163, 165 (W.D.
Pa. 1965) (future interests); United States v. Certain Lands, 220 F. Supp. 696, 701 (D.
Me. 1963) (equitable servitudes). See generally 2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 15 5.02[1], 5.04[1]-[3], 5.06 (rev. 3d ed. 1982).
295 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
9' "Aboriginal title is a right of occupancy based on possession from time imme-
morial." Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 680 F.2d 122, 128 (Ct.
Cl.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 299 (1982)..
7 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 285.
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acres.29 The beneficiaries were the state of Alaska, its oil company
lessees and citizens, and the American public.29 '
Although written in 1955, the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion is a paradigm
of the plenary power era judicial style,300 both in its slighting reference
to the natives' cultures"0 ' and in its repeated invocations of the political
question doctrines02 as tying the hands of the judiciary. Most impor-
tant, in relying on the Doctrine of Discovery to justify the result, the
Court expanded that doctrine from a doctrine protective of aboriginal
land rights to one permitting arbitrary confiscation without payment of
compensation. In Johnson v. McIntosh,303 Chief Justice Marshall had
stated that by virtue of discovering the New World, the occupying pow-
ers gained a preemptive right to extinguish Indian title either by
purchasing all the land tribes desired to sell or by conquest.304 In
Worcester v. Georgia30 5 the Chief Justice limited extinguishment by
conquest to conquest after just wars in which the Indians had been the
aggressors.30 6 The Tee-Hit-Ton Court, nevertheless, held that the gov-
ernment had conquered all Indian tribes (including presumably the
peace-loving Tlingets of Alaska, plaintiffs in the suit).3"7 Accordingly,
the federal government gained title to all Indian land merely by virtue
of its superior ability to use force, whether or not it actually had used
force in a given case. Having acquired ownership rights to all Indian
land, the government could then grant land back to an Indian tribe,
298 See Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1371-73, 1378 (D.D.C. 1973)
(upholding Native Claims Settlement Act which extinguished the aboriginal title claims
to Alaskan lands).
299 Alaska was entitled to select slightly more than 100 million acres of land upon
becoming a state. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §§ 6(a), (b), 72 Stat. 339,
340 (1958) (set forth preceeding 48 U.S.C. § 21 (1976)). As of 1958, the state had
already leased Prudhoe Bay to oil companies for more than $900 million. See Edward-
sen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D.D.C. 1973). These leases and other oil
leases have produced so much income, $3.7 billion in revenues during fiscal 1981 alone,
for example, that the state has begun to develop schemes to distribute the money to its
citizens. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 57 (1982) (statute distributing dividends
based on residency violates equal protection clause).
300 See supra text accompanying note 80.
301 See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273, 287.
302 See id. at 280-81.
303 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
304 Id. at 587.
205 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
306 Id. at 545-47.
'0 Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279-80 (citing Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.), at 587). The Court's reliance on Johnson has been criticized. See, e.g.,
Hookey, The Gove Land Rights Case: A Judicial Dispensation for the Taking of Ab-
original Lands in Australia?, 5 FED. L. REv. 85, 101 (1972) (Tee-Hit-Ton rule was
"a surprising finding. . . made in the course of following rather than, as might have
been supposed, overruling Johnson v. McIntosh").
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giving it a vested property right, called recognized title.3 8 If, however,
Congress failed to grant a tribe title, it could later confiscate that land,
extinguishing Indian title, without payment of just compensation. 309
The Tee-Hit-Ton rule remains relevant today because many tribes
live on executive order reservations that have never been recognized by
Congress.3 0 Furthermore, some tribes with reservations established in
treaties may not have recognized title, because the treaty did not con-
tain sufficient language regarding permanency.3"'.
As a modern demonstration that tribal land claims based on ab-
original Indian title are not accorded even basic constitutional protec-
tion, Tee-Hit-Ton is a landmark decision. Yet, the case has a more fun-
damental significance. Tee-Hit-Ton reveals a judicial attitude so
committed to congressional deference that the Court was willing to en-
gage in the intellectual dishonesty of characterizing the acquisition of
Alaska as a conquest to avoid protecting tribal rights. 12 So viewed,
Tee-Hit-Ton is astonishing only because it was so predictable.
b. Due Process and Aboriginal land
Fortunately, the government has not recently adopted the policy of
terminating Indian reservations, and continues to repudiate the last
such episode, occurring the the 1950's.313 Tee-Hit-Ton's declaration
that aboriginal title is not property within the meaning of the fifth
amendment takings clause Nevertheless, Tee-Hit-Ton's declaration con-
tinues to cast a towering shadow over Indian property law. Its holding
casts doubt on the ability of tribal advocates to invoke the due process
clause to protect aboriginal land. Tribal advocates have invoked only
occasionally that clause to argue for either procedural protection
against unwarranted government action or as a substantive limitation of
308 See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 278-79 (dictum).
309 See id. at 281.
310 See Newton, supra note 70, at 1257-59.
311 See id. at 1259-64.
312 See generally id. at 1253-67 (effects of Tee-Hit-Ton).
313 Statement of President Reagan on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 98 (Jan. 24, 1983). During the termination era of the 1950's and 1960's, "ap-
proximately 109 [Indian] tribes and bands were terminated. A minimum of 1,362,155
acres and 11,466 individuals were affected." Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the
Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151 (1977). Congress did not seek
Indian tribal consent to the numerous termination statutes. Id. at 157, 179 nn.194-99.
Upon termination a tribe lost its tribal land, although proceeds from the sale were
given to the tribe. Id. at 152. Although the termination acts did not explicitly abrogate
tribal sovereignty, the lack of a land base over which to exercise authority effectively
ended tribal sovereignty. As Wilkinson and Biggs reported, "with one exception, no
terminated tribe has continued to enforce any laws after termination." Id. at 154. For a
summary of other effects of termination, see id. at 152-53.
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federal power."1 4 Since Tee-Hit-Ton was decided in 1955, however, the
definition of property has been expanded in cases raising procedural
due process challenges. These cases surely merit closer attention by tri-
bal advocates, for arguably these expansions of the concept of property
in procedural due process claims should not be considered in isolation
from the definition of property for takings; and for substantive due pro-
cess. 15 This section will argue that the expanded notion of property for
procedural due process purposes suggests that the Court must reassess
its holding in Tee-Hit-Ton: aboriginal land is property for which com-
pensation must be given after a taking by the government. Beyond that,
the expanded notion of property may be extended to the notion of prop-
erty for substantive due process purposes as well.
In brief, the Court has stated that a party claiming procedural due
process protection need not claim "actual ownership of real estate, chat-
tels, or money,"' 16 but can rely on a statutory3 17 or other "legitimate
claim of entitlement," 318 grounded in "rules or understandings that
stem from [a source] independent [of the Constitution]." ' 9 Tribes
could, thus, rely on Goldberg v. Kelly, 20 recognizing welfare as a stat-
utorily created entitlement that could not be cut off without according
the claimant procedural rights, to argue that the Nonintercourse Act
created a statutory entitlement legitimizing tribal claims to the land vis
A vis the states. Absent a repeal of the statute itself, which has not been
814 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) (Court rejected claims that Indian classifications
were suspect and that tribal sovereignty was a fundamental right); Edwardsen v. Mor-
ton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1379 (D.D.C. 1973) (retroactive extinguishment of claims
based on aboriginal title would violate the due process clause; therefore Native Claims
Settlement Act interpreted to extinguish only claims claims directly challenging title to
land).
Due process review normally is very limited, however, protecting persons only
from arbitrary governmental action. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); see also Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914) (dictum) (Congress
could not use the pretext that a few Indians were residents to legislate for an entire
state). For instance, the Court has stated that Congress may not arbitrarily label a
group of non-Indians as Indians for the purposes of bringing them within its power to
regulate Indian affairs. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (dictum).
Apart from this unlikely hypothetical situation, however, any legislation regarding tri-
bal Indians, which does not violate some other specific constitutional guarantee, would
be permissible under the minimal rationality standard of review employed by the
Court.
315 Cf Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)
(relying on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), a procedural due process
case, for a definition of property for purposes of the takings clause).
3" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
3" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (statutory welfare benefits).
318 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (de facto tenure system).
319 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
320 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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attempted, Congress must respect this property right and cannot extin-
guish title in favor of state claims.
Furthermore, by analogy to Perry v. Sindermann321 tribes might
argue that aboriginal title is property. In Perry, the Court held that a
de facto tenure system created a legitimate expectation of continued em-
ployment in a teacher fired without a hearing. 22 By parity of reason-
ing, Indian use and occupancy of aboriginal land continuing to the pre-
sent day$23 creates a de facto ownership interest qualifying as property
for due process purposes. To bolster this argument, tribes could invoke
the guardianship relationship itself and the often-repeated judicial and
executive promises3 24 to protect Indian land from further confiscation.
Uncontrovertably, a major hurdle to this argument is the Court's insis-
tence that, at least in the procedural context, property does not have an
independent constitutional basis, but must be grounded in an indepen-
dent source of state or federal law."25 Tee-Hit-Ton could be read as
establishing that the relevant body of federal law does not create any
sort of property interest in aboriginal Indian land. Under the analogy
to Goldberg and Perry, however, the holding in Tee-Hit-Ton is simply
no longer correct. Tee-Hit-Ton was decided in an era before the concept
of property was as fully developed as now. The decision therefore did
not consider the body of law and tradition mentioned above that
granted a legitimate claim of entitlement to or a de facto ownership
interest in aboriginal land. These expanded notions of property devel-
oped in procedural due process cases undercut the Court's primary ra-
tionale for denying fifth amendment protection to Indian prop-
erty-that it simply is not property.
321 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
312 Id. at 602-03; cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 n.16 (1972) (no
evidence of customary rehiring, as in Perry; therefore, nontenured teacher not entitled
to procedural due process rights).
323 A tribe that lost its aboriginal land in violation of the Nonintercourse Act 200
years ago would find it more difficult to rely on procedural due process, for such reli-
ance usually requires the deprivation of benefits "presently enjoyed" by the property
owner. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1023 (1971) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (termination of wel-
fare benefits)); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (dictum)
("The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard...
of interests . . . already acquired . . ... "); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)
(revocation of driver's license). Reliance on present enjoyment to determine availability
of procedural due process rights has been criticized. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 10-
9, at 519-20. Tribes currently possessing aboriginal property might have greater success
in claiming a statutory entitlement however. Since the Nonintercourse Act applies to
all Indian land, such an argument could have far-reaching implications.
'" For a discussion of promises made regarding tribal land, see 1982 HANDBOOK,
supra note 3, at 473-99.
31' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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Nevertheless, convincing a court that aboriginal title is property
for procedural due process purposes is only an initial step. The second
step is to argue that aboriginal title is property for substantive due pro-
cess and takings clause purposes as well. While it is difficult to locate
precisely the constitutional source of the tribal right to aboriginal prop-
erty, legal scholars have commented on the near intuitive sense of fair-
ness in the idea that courts should treat aboriginal land on which a
tribe has lived for several generations as property, and government dep-
rivation of this property as worthy of more than minimal scrutiny. In a
memorandum to Judge Gunter, appointed by President Carter to medi-
ate the now-settled claims of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Tribes
against Maine, Professor Archibald Cox argued that congressional ex-
tinguishment of aboriginal title today "would violate the guarantees of
fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause. ' '3 2 Al-
though Tee-Hit-Ton may have some significance in "technical claim[s]
to 'just compensation,' ",327 the memorandum argued, simply transfer-
ring aboriginal Indian lands to non-Indians without either compensa-
tion or any other means of improving the Indians' lot would be arbi-
trary and capricious.3 2
Professor Cox's memorandum essentially invoked substantive due
process by arguing that aboriginal property should be protected from
arbitrary governmental actions. The memorandum did not, however,
suggest a particularly high standard of judicial review of federal action
affecting aboriginal land.
To trigger this higher standard of review, advocates would have to
argue the continued possession of aboriginal property is a fundamental
tribal right. It can be argued that the Indian right to aboriginal land is
fundamental because land is the basis of all things Indian. 29 The rela-
tionship of a tribe to its land defines the tribe: its identity, its culture,
its way of life, and its methods of adaptation.330 Since tribal existence is
central to personal Indian selfhood, 3 ' the very existence of an Indian
people is largely dependent on the recognition and protection of Indian
property rights.33"
328 Memorandum from Archibald Cox to the Honorable William B. Gunter 20
(Apr. 29, 1977) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Cox Memorandum] (a portion of the memorandum is reprinted in D. GEsrCH-
Es, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 249-52).
327 Cox Memorandum, supra note 326, at 24.
338 Id. at 23-24.
... E. CAHN & D. HEARNE, OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE
AMERICA 68 (1970).
330 Id;
331 See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
332 S. STEINER, THE NEW INDIANS 277 (1968).
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Nevertheless, the importance of a right does not bridge the gap
between procedural protection and heightened judicial scrutiny of legis-
lation affecting that right. Advocates must also distinguish aboriginal
property from other property accorded only procedural protection. For
example, the decisions that the petitioners in Goldberg and Perry could
not be deprived of their welfare and university employment without
notice and an opportunity to be heard have not been held to mean that
the state could not eliminate all welfare or close the state university
unless necessary to effectuate a compelling interest. Such a result might
paralyze government, for statutorily granted or customarily earned ben-
efits, once created, could never be eliminated absent the necessity to
accomplish some overriding interest.
If Indian rights to aboriginal land were analogized to an ongoing
entitlement akin to welfare or employment, the government might have
the right to cut off those benefits altogether, even absent any compelling
purpose. The analogy is flawed, however. Aboriginal land is not rightly
to be equated with other governmental largess, to be granted or with-
held depending on the fiscal needs of the time and the shifting political
ideologies of the majority. Given the Nonintercourse Act, the repeated
promise to protect Indian property from confiscation,"'3 and the centu-
ries old history of use and occupancy, the interest in aboriginal land is
better analogized to a vested property interest. Intrusion on that interest
would be much as if the government had demanded the return of all
previous payments made to a welfare mother or prior salary paid to a
university professor.
2. Recognized Title Land
a. Recognized Title and the Takings Clause
Unlike tribes whose claims are based on aboriginal title, other
tribes possess recognized title, property granted by Congress within the
meaning of the Tee-Hit-Ton rule and thus qualifying as "property"
under the fifth amendment takings clause. Yet, even tribes holding such
title lack the full protection of the takings clause, for they are subject to
a special rule defining certain situations as not being fifth amendment
takings. Ordinarily, when the government diminishes the value of prop-
erty, the courts balance the detrimental economic effect of the regula-
tion against the public good to be furthered by the regulation to deter-
mine whether a taking has occurred. 3 ' Moreover, in 1982, the court
333 See infra note 385.
33 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
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adopted a per se rule: whenever government effects a "permanent phys-
ical occupation" of property, there is a taking without a need to bal-
ance."3 5 Despite this per se rule, whether a taking of Indian recognized
title has occurred depends on the source of the congressional power ex-
ercised. If the Court finds the government acted as a guardian of Indian
land in transmuting the land into money, even against the wishes of its
Indian tribal ward, a taking has not occurred. Rather, a taking occurs
only when the government has acted as a sovereign, taking the land in
an eminent domain sense. 36
In United States v. Sioux Nation,337 the Court reaffirmed this
principle, adopting a test for determining the source of the power exer-
cised in a given case. If the government "fairly (or in good faith) at-
tempt[ed] to provide [its] ward with property of equivalent value,"' 3
the government acted as guardian; its guardianship role then insulates
it from liability. The Supreme Court's adoption of this test in Sioux
Nation did no harm to the tribal claimant, because the Court held the
seizing of the Black Hills to be a taking.33" Nevertheless, in earlier
Court of Claims cases applying essentially the same rule stated in Sioux
Nation, the government was held to be not liable for taking Indian
reservation land against tribal consent and selling it to non-Indians
when it attempted in good faith to provide compensation to the tribe. 4°
Thus, despite the supposed demise of the Plenary Power Doctrine, the
government's position as guardian of Indian tribes can still be used to
immunize it from liability under specific constitutional guarantees. 41
(1978).
135 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 434-35
(1982).
336 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 409 n.26, 416-17
(1980); Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691-93 (Ct. Cl.
1968). See generally Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of In-
dian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 ORE. L. REV. 245 (1982).
$37 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
3," Id. at 416 (quoting Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157,
1162 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
$39 See id. at 424.
34o Compare, e.g., Klamath & Modoc Tribes v. United States, 436 F.2d 1008 (Ct.
Cl. 1971) (good faith present; Congress set up fair appraisal system and attempted to
get fair market value for the tribes) with, e.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
v. United States, 437 F.2d 458 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (good faith absent; some lands granted to
third parties without appraisal, other land opened to settlement without tribal consent,
and proceeds used for irrigation project benefiting non-Indians as well as the tribe).
341 A recent comment bases a framework for analyzing federal power on the ap-
proach used in Sioux Nation, arguing that when the government uses its guardianship
power, a court should review its action under the minimal rationality standard of re-
view, but that when the government action is adverse to Indian interests, courts should
consider imposing limitations on federal power to protect Indian rights. See Comment,
supra note 228. The author of that comment suggests criteria to be employed by a
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In sum, the fifth amendment takings clause affords less protection
for Indian land than for other land. All tribal property-aboriginal,
recognized, and even fee simple absolute title land-is held in trust by
the United States and is subject to the government's guardianship
power.34 2 When exercise of this guardianship power results in loss of
tribal land, the application of the Sioux Nation rule could deny a con-
stitutional remedy to Indian tribes. Concededly, an injured tribe may
still recover the fair market value by suing for breach of trust in the
Court of Claims. The guardianship relationship, however, the circum-
stances under which it imposes duties on the government, and its termi-
nation are not anchored in the Constitution, but are subject to the ca-
price of Congress.U3
b. Due Process and Recognized Title Land
The federal government continues to assert a guardianship power
to manage all Indian property, even recognized title property. Tribes
must thus obtain approval before spending tribal funds in certain cir-
cumstances, '3  granting rights of way, or leasing tribal land. 45 With
regard to recognized title property, it must be argued that due process
protection, like takings clause protection, should be extended to prop-
erty held under a treaty or statute, and the due process clause should be
used to challenge the government's unchecked management of tribal
land.
As an important prerequisite to this challenge, tribal advocates
must overcome the plenary power era statement that Indian property is
not private property but public property. 6 The little case law availa-
ble demonstrates that whenever the Court views Indian property as pri-
vate property, it has not hesitated to extend the Constitution's protec-
court in determining whether an action is adverse, including the obvious effect of the
statute, the opinions of the affected tribes as to the effect, whether the statute abrogates
a treaty, and whether Congress has responded to non-Indian pressures. Id. at 259-63.
Another position is that taken by the author of this Article, that Congress should not
gain the benefit of the Sioux Nation rule unless the tribe has consented to the action in
question. See Newton, supra note 336, at 264.
32 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 471-73.
, See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (existence of fiduciary rela-
tionship turns on congressional intent); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 677 F.2d
90 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (court cannot question congressional statute denying it jurisdiction
over nonconstitutional breach of trust claim). See generally Newton, Enforcing the Fed-
eral-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L. Rav. 635 (1982).
3," See 25 U.S.C. §§ 121-125 (1976).
,1 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 311-328 (1976).
3 4 See, e.g., Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 625 (1913); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902).
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tions. The most notable example is Choate v. Trapp,a47 decided at the
height of the plenary power era. In Choate the Court held that a statu-
torily created tax exemption contained in allotment patents made to
members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations was a vested right
protected by the due process clause from abrogation by a later stat-
ute. 48 A contractual analysis was central to the Court's conclusion: by
relinquishing their claims to tribal fee simple land, the tribes provided
consideration for the grant of the allotments and imposition of a tax
exemption on the allotted land. Individual Indians accepted the offer by
giving up their claims and accepting the patents. Once the patents were
delivered, the agreement became executed, and the property rights
vested. 49
The many Indian tribes who ceded land to the United States, re-
serving a portion or receiving new land in return, should argue that
their land claims must be treated as vested property rights based on
contractual agreements with the federal government.35 Such an argu-
ment could have far-reaching implications. First, confiscation of recog-
nized title property would require compensation, but Tee-Hit-Ton al-
ready established that fact. More important, although Lone Wolf
permits abrogation of sovereign responsibilities under treaties, it could
be argued that abrogating a treaty provision reserving land would im-
pair vested contractual rights in violation of the due process clause. By
analogy to the Court's recent cases interpreting the contract clause,"'
tribal advocates could argue that confiscation of tribal property should
not be permitted unless it was "both reasonable and necessary" to serve
"important purposes"352 which could not be satisfied by less drastic al-
ternatives. 5 ' The Burger Court's recent willingness to impose this
heightened standard of review'" on states' impairment of public con-
tracts ought to be imposed on the federal government's agreements with
Indian tribes as well.
In short, when reviewing government abrogation of treaty
promises and confiscation of tribal land, courts should apply more than
the minimal rationality invoked in economic rights cases. Indian tribes
- 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
348 Id. at 677-79.
349 Id. at 671-72.
350 See Clinton, Indian Autonomy, supra note 228, at 1031.
351 E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); see Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
352 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (plurality).
53 Id. at 30.
"' See Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract
Clause, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 108.
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are not businesses, but entities with ancient claims to tribal land. Their
treaties with the government are not merely business contracts, but
agreements having far deeper implications for their survival as a peo-
ple. Their tribal land is their heritage and not simply an economic unit.
Its preservation is an essential condition to preservation of tribal cul-
ture.3 55 One need not prejudge the outcome of challenges to governmen-
tal infringement on tribal property interests to conclude that the out-
come should not be determined solely in the crucible of majoritarian
politics and on the basis of analyses developed to protect only economic
endeavors. Whatever the proper accommodation in a given case, the
role of the courts should not be merely to yield to legislative will as if
the values at issue were no different than the elimination of pushcart
vending in the Vieux Carr6 of New Orleans.
56
3. Retroactive Legislation and Accrued Claims
Until now the takings clause has not proven to be an effective
shield against government interference with tribal property. Some re-
cent cases, however, suggest that tribal advocates should begin to recon-
sider the takings clause as it applies to retroactive legislation and ac-
crued claims. When legislation infringing tribal property interests
implicates other due process values which have in the past caused non-
Indian legislation to be subjected to more than minimal scrutiny, the
courts ought to apply heightened scrutiny in reviewing the Indian
legislation.
One notable example of such legislation is the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act which retroactively extinguished both aboriginal
title to Alaskan land and all claims based on aboriginal title.
57
While Congress has not recently extinguished aboriginal title, dur-
ing the Ninety-Seventh Congress a bill was introduced to extinguish
retroactively Northeast Indian tribal claims to land in New York, Con-
necticut, and South Carolina.158 These states had purchased tribal land
in violation of the Doctrine of Discovery and the Nonintercourse Act,
which prohibit alienation without consent of the United States. 59 Ac-
cordingly, the tribes alleged that these sales were void. Although the
15' See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
'56 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (regulation of pushcart
vendors being solely economic, need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest").
36 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
158 Ancient Claims Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2084, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
319 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (Nonintercourse Act); 64-68 and
accompanying text (Doctrine of Discovery).
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largest of these claims, that involving most of present-day Maine, has
been settled,360 the remainder continue to cloud the titles of landholders
in the affected areas. 6" The law would have extinguished retroactively
aboriginal title to the land and any claims accrued based on title (such
as trespass claims). 62 Although the proposed law provided for some
compensation, 63 it has been argued by the Solicitor for the Department
of the Interior, among others, that Congress has the power to extin-
guish these claims without violating the takings clause or the due pro-
cess clause.3 64
360 Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (Supp. V
1981).
361 The legislation would extinguish claims based on recognized title as well. Most
of the claims are based on aboriginal title, however. See Vollmann, A Survey of Eastern
Indian Land Claims: 1970-1979, 31 ME. L. REv. 5, 6 (1979). The largest remaining
claim is the Oneida claim. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F.
Supp. 527, 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 719 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendants liable
for rental value on the portions of 100,000 acres in central New York they used and
occupied); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 622 F.2d 624, 625-26,
625 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (history of Oneida claims based on aboriginal land). In addition,
the Oneida tribe has made a claim to six million acres in New York, arguing that state
treaties signed before the Nonintercourse Act was enacted in 1791 are void because
entered into without federal consent as required by the Doctrine of Discovery and the
Articles of Confederation. Oneida Indian Nation v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 1070
(2d Cir. 1982) (reversing lower court dissmissal, and remanding for further
proceedings).
362 S. 2084, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4(a), 4(c) (1982). Claims barred included "all
actual or theoretical claims against the United States, any State. . . or any other per-
son or entity. . . arising at the time of or subsequent to the transfer and based on any
interest in . . . such land or natural resources, including. . . claims for trespass dam-
ages, mesne profits, or claims for use and occupancy." Id. § 4(c). All claims are
"deemed extinguished as of the date of such transfer." Id.
363 The bill provided that suit for money damages in the Court of Claims be the
exclusive remedy for the claims. Id. § 6(a). Damages would have been measured by the
fair market value of the land at the date of the original transfer less any money the
tribe actually received from the states. Id. § 6(c)(1). Tribes proving they owned recog-
nized title at the date of transfer would have been entitled to 5% simple interest from
the date of transfer; those claiming aboriginal title would have been limited to 2% sim-
ple interest. Id. §§ 6(c)(2)(i)-(ii).
I" The present administration took the position that retroactive extinguishment of
aboriginal title as well as claims based on aboriginal title do not offend the Constitu-
tion. In statements made to the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, the Solicitor
for the Department of the Interior stated, "While there may be a constitutional obliga-
tion to compensate for retroactive ratification of transfers of recognized title, there is no
such requirement with respect to aboriginal title." Statement of William H. Coldiron,
.Solicitor, supra note 223, at 28. Thus, the Department of the Interior recommended
that no compensation be provided for the aboriginal land extinguished by the legisla-
tion. The Department of Justice agreed in its statement before the same committee.
The department argued against any compensation for aboriginal title: "[Tlhere is
clearly no such requirement with respect to aboriginal title. Moreover, compensation
for aboriginal title might create an irresistible legislative precedent which could prove
extremely expensive." Ancient Indian Land Claims: Hearing Before the Select Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982) (Statement of Carol E.
Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Depart-
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Retroactive legislation, action affecting preenactment rights, has,
however, traditionally been subjected to more than minimal scrutiny to
determine whether it violates due process. ' Moreover, some members
of the Court have exhibited special concern when the retroactive legis-
lation was designed to eliminate takings claims: "[A] State cannot be
permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking prop-
erty without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retro-
actively that the property it has taken never existed at all."36 In addi-
tion, the Court has, in a case predating the Lochner era, held that
retroactive legislation extinguishing accrued legal claims violates due
process.367 Because of this suspicion of retroactive legislation, a District
ment of Justice).
The American Land Title Association has prepared and circulated a lobbying
brief arguing that retroactive extinguishment of both aboriginal and recognized title is
constitutional even if no compensation is paid the affected tribes. See INDIAN LAND
CLAIMs, supra note 223, at 55-61 (aboriginal title), 85-90 (recognized title). The suc-
cess of this lobbying effort may be reflected in the similarity between language em-
ployed in the model statute provided in the American Land Title brief and the lan-
guage employed in the bill, as well as in legislation ratifying agreements settling the
Maine and Rhode Island claims. Compare id., Model Statutory Language to Clear
Titles of Indian Claims (appendix) with S.2084, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1982) and
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1723(a)(1), (b)-(c) (Supp. V 1981)
and Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act §§ 6, 13, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1705, 1712
(Supp. V 1981).
316 See Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 108, 278
F.2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960); see also Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Con-
stitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692, 697 (1960) (courts
should and do balance "the nature and strength of the public interest served by the
statute, the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the asserted preenactment
right, and the nature of the right which the statute alters."). See generally Greenblatt,
Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L. Rav. 540, 554, 561
(1956) (courts should consider the reasonableness of legislative objectives and balance
them against the asserted private right); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Con-
siderations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216, 251 (1960) (courts
should and do consider factors normally associated with substantive due process, such
as protection from irresponsibility of governmental officials and protection from punish-
ment "for choices made without knowledge of their wrongful character").
3" Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring);
see also Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922) (retroac-
tive ratification of illegally collected tolls impermissible). There is precedent, although
limited, for upholding retroactive ratification of a fifth amendment taking in Indian
law, however. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). In Shoshone
Tribe, the Supreme Court held that the United States government had ratified an ille-
gal taking of Indian land accomplished by government agents. Id. at 495. Although the
effect of this ruling was to set the date for the measure of fair market value as of the
time of the illegal action, rather than the time of the ratification, this analysis still
resulted in an imposition of liability on the government and not an abrogation of gov-
ernment liability, as would be the case in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). Furthermore, the concept of ratification of third parties' illegal
acts as a justification for retroactive legislation has been criticized. See, e.g., Greenblatt,
supra note 365, at 704.
317 Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913). Ettor involved the repeal of an
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of Columbia decision construed portions of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act as not extinguishing accrued claims in order to avoid an
interpretation that would raise the possibility of constitutional infirmi-
ties in the Act. 68
While the Supreme Court has -not directly addressed the issue of
accrued claims and the takings clause, in the Iranian Assets Case,
Dames and Moore v. Regan, 6 ' several justices recently commented in
dicta that a taking of accrued claims might subject the government to
fifth amendment takings clause liability.370 Thus, although the Su-
preme Court has held aboriginal title not to be property protected by
the takings clause, it could conceivably still find accrued claims based
on that same aboriginal title-claims for trespass and breach of trust,
for instance-to be property for purposes of the takings clause.
Despite the dictum in Dames and Moore the Court of Claims re-
cently invoked the political question doctrine in holding that the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act provision extinguishing claims based on
aboriginal title did not require compensation. Congress "made a politi-
cal decision not subject to judicial reexamination. Congress's authority
to extinguish aboriginal title without payment also authorized it with-
out payment to extinguish the trespass claims based upon that title.137 1
Not surprisingly, Tee-Hit-Ton was the primary case law the Court re-
lied on.37 2 If the Supreme Court addresses this issue again in the con-
text of the Iranian settlement, and holds accrued claims to be property
for takings clause purposes, the consequences will be great for tribes
ordinance that granted property owners a cause of action for consequential damages as
a result of street grading. The Court found a due process violation when the City, in
repealing the ordinance, applied the new law retroactively to extinguish claims accruing
before the repeal. Id. at 150, 156; cf. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932) (contract
clause invalidates retroactive legislation affecting contract rights).
'" Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1379 (D.D.C. 1973) (claims accru-
ing before the date of the Settlement Act were "vested property rights protected by the
Fifth Amendment"). Contra United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132
(9th Cir.) (Settlement Act extinguished all claims based on aboriginal title, including
trespass claims), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Inupiat Community v. United
States, 680 F.2d 122 (Ct. Cl.) (Settlement Act's extinguishing of tribal trespass claims
did not violate fifth amendment takings clause), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 299 (1982).
89 453 U.S. 654 (1981); cf. Persinger v. Islamic Republic, 51 U.S.L.W. 2243
(D.C. Cir. Oct 8, 1982) (Bork, J.) (upholding power to extinguish claim for damages
by hostages against Iran).
370 453 U.S. at 689; id. at 690 (Powell, J., concurring & dissenting in part). The
issue of accrued claims was held not ripe for review by a majority of the Court. Id. at
689.
37' Inupiat Community v. United States, 680 F.2d 122, 129 (Ct. 01.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 299 (1982).
372 Id. at 129-30.
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facing the threat of retroactive legislation that eliminates accrued
claims.
D. The Due Process Clause and Sovereignty
Arguments favoring constitutional protection for property, while
far from certain, are easier to advance than those favoring the same
degree of protection for tribal sovereignty. As demonstrated above, the
more a court is willing to view Indian property as private property, the
more willing it might be to extend constitutional protection to that
property.
Reconciling protection of tribal sovereignty with the individual
rights approach of the Bill of Rights is more challenging. Nevertheless,
it has been argued, chiefly by Barsh and Henderson, 37 3 that tribal sov-
ereignty should be protected as a fundamental political liberty. Their
argument rests on sovereignty as a retained right of the people under
the ninth amendment. 8 4 The due process clause's protection of liberty,
however, would be a more secure, even if less logical,37 5 repository for
this right. In a recent case, Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,3786 a tribe relied on the due pro-
cess clause to challenge congressional action infringing its sovereignty;
unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused to countenance the argument
and stated: "The contention that [the congressional action in question]
abridges a 'fundamental right' is also untenable. It is well-established
that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs,
may restrict the sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. 377
Nevertheless, tribal advocates should not accept this dismissal as
decisive. As discussed previously, tribes can rely on the apportionment
clauses and the Indian commerce clause to argue that Indian tribes on
tribal land have some rights of local self-government that have been
recognized by the Constitution and cannot be infringed by government,
at least not without an overriding justification.378  Yet, the sufficient
373 R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 257-69.
374 Id. at 266-67.
375 See J. ELY, supra note 233, at 34-41.
378 439 U.S. 463 (1979), discussed infra text accompanying notes 501-19.
377 439 U.S. at 501.
378 The historical evidence supporting an intention to protect Indian tribal sover-
eignty would, of course, bolster this argument. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that tribes have the power to determine membership for internal purposes, see
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); to tax their own members as well
as outsiders doing business on the reservation in certain circumstances, see, e.g., Mer-
rion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982); Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980), and to pass
local ordinances affecting internal matters, see, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.
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case for due process protection of tribal sovereignty requires more. As
Justice Powell stated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland: "Appropriate
limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines
but rather from careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' ))379
One such value is the "morality of promise-keeping. 38 0 Mr. Jus-
tice Black expressed this value most eloquently: "Great nations, like
great men, should keep their word." ' The Constitution protects this
value in the contract clause and the Court has, in the past, incorporated
this value into the law regulating Indian affairs.3"2 More fundamen-
tally, the morality of promise-keeping is "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."383 It is the foundation of the law of contracts; tort law,
too, protects promises from malicious interference. Beyond cavil, one
value "basic in our system of jurisprudence"" s is that a deal is a deal.
That this value has not always been honored in the history of
American treatment of Native tribes hardly excuses its continued viola-
tion. Although treaties with Indian tribes over the years have varied
significantly, many have promised government recognition and protec-
tion of tribal sovereignty. 85 While the last-in-time rule permits abroga-
tion of the promises made in the international arena,3 88 the need to
maintain an international reputation for keeping the nation's word and
382, 389 (1976) (tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings). See
generally 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 246-57.
Nevertheless, while recognizing the existence of tribal sovereignty, the courts con-
tinue to maintain that all self-government can be abrogated at the whim of Congress.
See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the tribes themselves
continue to concede this point, arguing instead that the particular statute at issue did
not in fact abrogate tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Crain v. First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d
532, 535 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072
(9th Cir. 1983) (argument in favor of tribal authority to cancel leases based solely on
congressional intent expressed in statutes).
37, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
so See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCEss 189 (1968).
3s1 Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
3s2 See, e.g., Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
M Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
's" In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
385 Typical is the promise to the Cherokee Nation quoted supra note 79; see also
Clinton, Indian Autonomy, supra note 228, at 1028 n.274 (removal treaties); id. at
1029 n.275 (later treaties). Professor Clinton argues that even when land cessions by
treaty did not contain such promises, the fact that the tribes would govern the reserved
land was implicit. He maintains that "[w]hile it would be difficult to trace all Indian
rights to express or implicit treaty provisions, it is nonetheless clear that federal Indian
policy today is primarily the outgrowth of treaty guarantees of territorial integrity and
tribal self-government." Id. at 1030.
as See supra text accompanying note 31.
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the availability of international forums in which the nation may have to
justify its breach of promise are powerful incentives against invoking
the last-in-time rule too frequently. Practical incentives once existed for
keeping faith with Indian tribes as well: their aid was sought in fight-
ing the British 3 87 and peaceful relations with tribes was believed essen-
tial to building this nation.88 Most of all, promises were made to in-
duce Indian tribes to give up their land. Now that Indians comprise
less than one percent of the population 3 9 and Indian tribes are "do-
mestic dependent nations" unable to avail themselves of the benefits
accorded sovereign nations by international law, these practical incen-
tives no longer function to restrain legislative action. Nevertheless, the
promises were made, and tribes may fairly and strongly advance claims
that these promises be honored. For the government to do otherwise
violates an important tenet, deeply rooted in our legal traditions, that is
designed to bond society by encouraging principled relations.
In addition, values fostering diversity in our pluralist society sup-
port tribal claims to sovereignty, for a tribe having governing powers
over its own territory can better maintain a cohesive culture. The as-
similationists recognized this link between tribal self-government and
cultural identity, viewing the destruction of tribal government as essen-
tial to their civilization scheme. By destroying tribal governing struc-
tures, the assimilationists hoped to detribalize the individual Indians,
preparing them to adopt the individualistic philosophy of that era.3 90
It is not surprising that the assimilationist era in Indian law coin-
cided with a period during which Americans accorded primacy to
Anglo-Saxon cultures and values by restricting immigration and at-
tempting to homogenize the populace. 91 While the Supreme Court val-
idated the Indian assimilationist legislation that came before it, the
Court interposed itself against attempts to homogenize other beliefs and
cultures. In the landmark cases of Pierce v. Society of Sisters392 and
Meyer v. Nebraska39 3 the Court struck down state laws forbidding ed-
387 For a history of the Northeastern tribes' role in the American Revolution, see
O'Toole & Tureen, supra note 24; see also, F. PRUCHA, supra note 13, at 26-33. As
Prucha points out, the British were more successful in obtaining Indians' allegiance.
Nevertheless, some tribes, including the Oneida and Tuscarora Nations, remained loyal
to the Colonists. For a discussion of the events leading up to the decision of the Six
Nations Confederacy to fight with the British, see A. WALLACE, supra note 21, at 125-
44.
388 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
389 See supra note 282.
380 See R. BERKHOFER, JR., supra note 19, at 170, 172.
391 Id. at 177-78.
3,2 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (successful challenges by religious and military schools to
a state law compelling public school attendance by children age 8-16).
393 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a statute that barred the teaching of foreign
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ucation in parochial schools and outlawing instruction in foreign lan-
guage in private schools. Although Pierce and Meyer were products of
the Lochner era, their enduring value is illustrated by their frequent
citation in the privacy and autonomy cases of the Warren and Burger
courts.
394
Justice McReynolds, writing for the majority in the two cases, de-
nounced state attempts to "foster a homogeneous people" 95 "by treating
children as "mere creature[s] of the State" '98 subject to state standardi-
zation. Thus, he found that the laws in question impermissibly inter-
fered with the concept of liberty protected by the due process clause.
3 97
Concededly, Indian families now have the right to educate their chil-
dren in reservation schools that impart the cultural values of the partic-
ular tribe. 98 The precise holdings of Pierce and Meyer, therefore, may
have little more to offer Indian tribes seeking to protect their sover-
eignty through the due process clause. Yet, the cases touch values more
enduring than the protection of individual rights to acquire an educa-
tion in a manner consonant with individual beliefs. As Laurence Tribe
has argued, the statutes in Pierce and Meyer were aimed at suppressing
Catholics in Oregon and Germans in Nebraska-groups unable "ade-
quately to safeguard their interests through the political processes of
their states."3 99 The Court's willingness to protect these insular groups
from forced homogenization demonstrates that values of cultural diver-
sity may be protected by the Constitution in a proper case.
Even if one accepts that the Constitution protects cultural diver-
sity, such protection need not, and cannot, be equated with a right to
self-government for all diverse groups. To argue that the concept of
liberty can be extended so far would encourage anarchy under the guise
of pluralism. When a people form a constitutional government, they
agree to relinquish some of their liberties in return for the protection
against chaos provided by an ordered government, or so the founders
believed.400 Thus, the Constitution's allocation of powers recognizes
that self-government is a precious and limited resource that must not be
unduly fragmented. 0 1
languages before eighth grade).
'" See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
396 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
s See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
3 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 694-96.
3,1 L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 15-6, at 904.
400 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (J. Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J.
Madison).
401 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
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Neither the morality of promise-keeping nor the value of cultural
diversity can create an absolute right to tribal sovereignty; nevertheless,
these values can be raised to urge the courts to scrutinize strictly any
attempt to dilute tribal sovereignty over tribal land and members. In
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,0 2 decided in 1978, the Supreme
Court gave effect to both of these values, although in the framework of
statutory, rather than constitutional interpretation. Indian tribes, being
neither states nor arms of the federal government, are not subject to the
Bill of Rights, as the Court held in 1896 in Talton v. Mayes.40 3 In
1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act 4°0 to extend basic
civil rights, in certain circumstances, to individual tribal members. The
statute was invoked in Martinez by a member of the tribe who argued
that the tribe's membership rules discriminated on the basis of gender
and ancestry by denying membership to children of female members of
the tribe who married outside the tribe while extending membership to
children of similarly situated males. The United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico denied Martinez injunctive and declar-
atory relief, holding that the tribal rule did not violate the Indian Civil
Rights Act.405 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the member-
ship criteria did violate the statute's equal protection guarantee.40 6 To
the surprise of many, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits.
Rather, by narrowly interpreting the statute, the Court held that the
Indian Civil Rights Act prescribed a rule of decision to be applied in
tribal courts,'40 but did not explicitly waive tribal sovereign immunity.
Therefore, suits could not be maintained against the tribe.08 In addi-
tion, the Court held that the law did not implicitly create a cause of
action in federal court.40 9 The law's exclusive remedy was habeas
corpus, the only remedy explicitly stated in it.
4 10
While the Court acknowledged Congress's power in Indian affairs,
it manifested an extraordinary sensitivity to tribal sovereignty stating
that:
Even in matters involving commercial and domestic relations,
we have recognized that "subject[ing] a dispute arising on
the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other
402 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
403 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
4- 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
405 Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
406 Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
407 436 U.S. at 65.
40 Id. at 59.
409 Id. at 59, 72.
410 Id. at 66-67 (construing 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976)).
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than the one they have established for themselves," may "un-
dermine the authority of the tribal cour[t] . . . and hence
. . . infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
selves." A fortiori, resolution in a foreign forum of intra-
tribal disputes of a more "public" character, such as the one
in this case, cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's
ability to maintain authority.411
Accordingly, the Court interpreted the statute narrowly to accord "a
proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary au-
thority of Congress in this area. "412 Furthermore, in examining con-
gressional intent, the Court stressed that Congress, in order to protect
the "unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal govern-
ments,' 143 had deliberately chosen not to extend every provision of the
Bill of Rights to tribes.
Sensitivity to cultural diversity and acknowledgement of tribes as
"separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution ' 41 4 should impel the
Court to accommodate the values of tribal sovereignty and federal
power in cases in which Congress has not shown the sensitivity the
Court lauded in Martinez. Nevertheless, the language supporting tribal
sovereignty in Martinez was adumbrated by constant references to ple-
nary power and the Court's limited role. For instance, at the end of the
decision, the Court stated, with a citation to Lone Wolf. "As we have
repeatedly emphasized, Congress' authority over Indian matters is ex-
traordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjusting relations be-
tween and among tribes and their members correspondingly
restrained.' ' 5
Tribal advocates must assert constitutional protections of tribal
sovereignty and not concede plenary power. Invocations of Lone Wolf
are a simplistic solution to the complex problem of accommodating tri-
bal sovereignty and federal power. Reliance on Lone Wolf in the Marti-
nez dicta may seem harmless. Yet, as Mr. Justice Jackson stated, in
another context, referring to judicial opinions which validate the princi-
ple of racial discrimination, "The principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.'
416
411 Id. at 59-60 (citations omitted).
412 Id. at 60.
413 Id. at 62-63.
414 Id. at 56.
415 Id. at 72 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)).
416 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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As stated above, while due process arguments can and should be
made, courts may not be receptive.41 7 The Burger Court's protection of
fundamental values has been limited to privacy, autonomy, and recently
to equality. Moreover, the values protected by the Burger Court have
been values widely shared by a majority of Americans," 8 and the
Court's reasoning has frequently relied on appeals to tradition and con-
sensus.4 9 The value of tribal sovereignty cannot be validated in this
same fashion. If the tradition appealed to is the abstract one of local
self-government, the answer is that the Constitution already protects
local self-government by protecting state sovereignty. If the value
sought to be protected is tribal sovereignty per se, neither tradition nor
consensus of the majority of Americans supports maintenance of gov-
erning entities separate from the system of governance established by
the Constitution. Only when other deeply rooted values that "underlie
our society" '42 and are shown to be basic to our system of jurispru-
dence are brought to bear can the sufficient case for due process protec-
tion of tribal sovereignty be made. The morality of promise-keeping
and the values of cultural diversity explicated by the historical record of
lawful tribal possession of sovereignty prior to the Constitution begin
that sufficient case. By assiduously attempting to dismantle the loaded
gun of Lone Wolf, Indian tribes may begin to safeguard their sover-
eignty from erosion should "any authority. . . bring forward a plausi-
ble claim of an urgent need [to eliminate it]."
'4 21
E. Equal Protection Component of Due Process
In contrast to due process, there is a growing body of case law
regarding equal protection for Indians and Indian tribes. It will be dis-
cussed and analyzed in the next section of this Article. First, however,
it will be useful to summarize briefly the framework of equal protec-
tion analysis, to demonstrate how tribal claims may qualify for the
heightened judicial scrutiny available within that framework, and to
uncover some hurdles Indian tribes may face when seeking to advance
equal protection claims.
The framework of equal protection analysis is at once simple and
417 Cf Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 500 (interest in tribal self-government
not a fundamental right).
418 See, e.g., Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 12 (1978).
41 See id. at 39-52.
420 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503 (Powell, J.) (quoting Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 501 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
"21 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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complex. The Court has stated repeatedly that the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment due process clause applies to the
federal government with the same force as the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause applies to the states.422 Moreover, as with due
process claims, a tribe pressing an equal protection claim must attempt
to invoke more than the minimal rationality standard appropriate to
review of business 423 and certain social welfare 24 legislation. Other-
wise, it is highly likely that the Court will simply defer to congressional
action.425 Equal protection analysis, beyond minimal judicial review,
provides two options: strict scrutiny, or a less rigid, intermediate stan-
dard of review. The former, first developed to provide heightened judi-
cial scrutiny to discriminatory legislation based on suspect classifica-
tions, requires that those legislative classifications be subjected to the
,22 "'Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 75 n.1 (1977) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)); cf. Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (suggesting greater deference to federal
legislation than to state legislation affecting aliens because of the "paramount federal
power over immigration and naturalization").
423 See, e.g., Lincoln Fed..Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) (A court can generally assume "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary com-
mercial transactions . . . rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and ex-
perience of the legislators.").
424 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1970) (unsuccessful
challenge to maximum grant under AFDC program as discriminating against large
families).
421 The Court's minimal scrutiny of equal protection claims has been as lenient as
its scrutiny of due process claims, demonstrating the same willingness to hypothesize
both about the permissible ends of the legislation and the relationship the legislative
classification bears to those ends. "Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitution-
ally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for
action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no
grounds can be conceived to justify them." McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). Recently, however, certain Justices have evidenced a willing-
ness to put some "bite" into equal protection review by requiring the state to articulate
a purpose. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), the Court struck
down a state mandatory time limit for consideration of employment discrimination
complaints as violating procedural due process. Justice Blackmun, the author of the
majority opinion, also submitted a separate opinion joined by three other Justices, stat-
ing his belief that the statute violated the equal protection clause as well, because the
time limit classification had "so speculative and attenuated a connection to its goal as to
amount to arbitrary action." Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J.). In addition, Justice Powell, in
another separate opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist agreed that the challenged law
violated equal protection. Id. at 444 (Powell, J.). See generally Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Tenn-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) (Gunther proposes
an equal protection model requiring the Court to focus on the articulated purpose of
statutes as well as to require a "genuine difference in terms of the state's objective
between the group within the classification and those without." Id. at 47.).
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most rigid scrutiny428 and be necessary to achieve a compelling or over-
riding governmental interest. 27 Intermediate scrutiny, applied when
legislative classifications are not "suspect" but affect a disfavored class,
requires that legislation bear a close and substantial relationship to an
important governmental interest.
428
At the outset it must be recognized that an obvious hurdle, though
one not yet addressed by the Court in the context of Indian tribal
claims invoking the equal protection clause, is the applicability of strict
scrutiny to collectives of racial minorities-Indian tribes-as opposed to
the individual minority members comprising the tribe. From one per-
spective this is a novel constitutional issue since racial classification
cases normally focus on discrimination against individuals. Yet associa-
tions are persons within the meaning of both the fourteenth and fifth
amendment due process clauses,' 24 and the Court has recognized ex-
plicitly that associations can assert both property and liberty inter-
ests. 430 NAACP v. Button,'43 1 perhaps, best demonstrates the Court's
willingness to address the racially discriminatory implications of legis-
lation directed at associations. In Button, the Court held invalid the
application of a ban on the solicitation of legal business to the activities
of the NAACP. The Court stated: "We cannot close our eyes to the
fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered the
intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant white
community of Virginia; litigation asserted by the NAACP has been bit-
426 E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
427 See id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating state
ban on interracial marriages).
428 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (plurality) (invalidating exemption
of females between 18 and 21 years of age from ban on selling 3.2% beer to males
under the age of 21); see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (majority opin-
ion applying Craig test to invalidate federal welfare regulation providing benefits to
children of unemployed fathers but not unemployed mothers); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny applied to discrimination against undocu-
mented aliens); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny
applied to discrimination based on illegitimacy).
429 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (association of contractors and a
private firm challenged federal statute as violating equal protection); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (business corporation raised equal protection attack
against state regulation); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)
(business corporation raised equal protection attack against state regulation).
40 First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978) (corporations can
assert first amendment rights); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978) (business corporation can assert contract clause rights); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. 429 U.S. 1347 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (business organiza-
tion asserted privacy interests); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895) (tax on business income violative of U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9).
431 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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terly fought. '43 2 While the statute at issue arguably had a discrimina-
tory purpose, as it was part "of the general plan of massive resistance
to the integration of schools,"4 3 the Court did not reach the equal pro-
tection issue, deciding the case instead on free speech grounds.4 4 Ac-
cordingly, Button cannot stand as unequivocal precedent for the propo-
sition that discriminatory legislation against an association will receive
strict scrutiny because the discrimination is aimed at discrete and insu-
lar minorities. Still, in 1980 the Court permitted associations of con-
struction contractors and individual businesses to raise a reverse racial
discrimination challenge to a federal law as violating the equal protec-
tion component of due process and accorded their claims more than
minimal scrutiny.435 In Button, the Court was unwilling to "close [its]
eyes" to the climate of "intense resentment and opposition of the politi-
cally dominant white community" that surrounded the NAACP's con-
stitutional attack. Similarly, there is no principled reason why, when
Indian tribes raise equal protection challenges to legislation, the Court
should close its eyes to the history of racial prejudice to which Indians
have been subjected. The inherent value of heightened judicial scrutiny
is that it may lead to restructuring or striking down legislative out-
comes tainted by "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.
436
That value is honored no less when Indian tribes, rather than individ-
ual Indians, raise the spectre of prejudice.
The following section discusses the case law involving equal pro-
tection claims raised to challenge legislation affecting Indians. The
analysis advanced will often depend on a reading of cases that goes
beyond the express language of the opinions and will attempt to extra-
polate from more subtle clues given by the Court. Unfortunately, the
Court, while at first intimating the possibility of a higher standard of
review for equal protection claims, especially those claims that disad-
vantage Indians, has gradually foreclosed many of the options left avail-
able in earlier opinions. The task of advocating a higher standard of
review is, however, not futile. It is still possible to distinguish many of
432 Id. at 435.
433 Id. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring).
434 Id. at 444-45.
4" Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). There was no opinion of a major-
ity of the Court. Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices White and Powell,
adopted no explicit standard of review, although it clearly imposed more than a mere
rationality requirement on the legislation. Id. at 484-92. In a separate opinion, Justice
Powell reiterated his belief that such programs require strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at
496. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun reiterated their belief that intermedi-
ate scrutiny should be applied to such legislation. Id. at 519.
48 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dic-
tum); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 16-13, at 1012.
[Vol. 132:195
FEDERAL POWER OVER INDIANS
the cases in a manner that would permit the Court, could it so be con-
vinced, to take a more active role in scrutinizing legislation affecting
Indians.
1. Mancari and the "Tied Rationally" Standard of Review
In Morton v. Mancari,4"7 decided by the Supreme Court in 1974,
the Court appeared to fashion a standard of review of legislation affect-
ing Indians that had the potential to function as a limit on the govern-
ment's guardianship power.
Mancari was decided at the height of the controversy over the con-
stitutionality of state and federal programs designed to give preferences
to racial minorities. The Supreme Court unanimously held that a Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employment preference benefiting Indians
did not violate the fifth amendment guarantee of equal protection. The
Court upheld the preference because of the "unique legal status of In-
dian tribes."4 8
This result at first seems surprising, for in the past the Court had
treated racial classifications as nearly per se unconstitutional." 9 The
decision in Mancari, however, sidestepped the issue of racial classifica-
tion. The Court held that the classification at issue was not a racial one
because only those Indians belonging to federally recognized tribes
could claim the benefit.440 Indians whose tribes had been terminated or
who had severed their tribal association could not claim the
437 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
411 Id. at 551. In upholding the directive and the statute on which it was based,
the Court frankly acknowledged that "literally every piece of legislation dealing with
Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, single
out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations."
Id. at 552.
,13 The singling out of a race is "a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to ... race prejudice." Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880). Consequently, the Court applies strict scrutiny to
racial classifications. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. When Mancari
was decided, many thought that racial classifications conferring benefits rather than
curtailing civil rights would be subject to equally rigid scrutiny. Since then, however,
the Court has upheld at least one racial classification conferring benefits on historically
disadvantaged minorities, although members of the Court continue to differ on the stan-
dards of review to be employed in such cases. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 492 (1980) (Burger, C.J., White & Powell, JJ.) (10% minority set-aside of fed-
eral funds for local public works project would pass constitutional muster under either
strict scrutiny or intermediate standard of review) with id. at 486 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (strict scrutiny is applicable standard) and id. at 519 (Marshall, Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (intermediate standard of review is appli-
cable standard). Contra id. at 523 (Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (strict scru-
tiny requires a holding that the statute is unconstitutional); id. at 552-54 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (statute unconstitutional).
440 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 & n.24.
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preference.
4411
Perhaps recognizing the racially discriminatory effect of the BIA
preference, the Court evaluated whether the BIA action was motivated
by a racially discriminatory motive.442 The Court first examined the
articulated purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized
the BIA preference, and concluded that it was designed to foster tribal
self-government by permitting Indian tribes to reorganize their tribal
governing structures as a first step to gaining control of their own af-
fairs.443 In light of this congressional purpose, the Court determined
that the intent of the employment preference was nonracial. Rather, it
was "reasonably and directly related" to "further[ing] the cause of In-
dian self-government. '444 The Court concluded: "[A]s long as the spe-
cial treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligations toward the Indian, such legislative judgments will
not be disturbed.1
445
Mancari broke important ground in Indian law. For the first time
in the modern era, the Court attempted to fit Indian legislative classifi-
cations within the equal protection framework. First, the Court an-
nounced in dicta that Indian classifications are not inherently suspect,
but permissible because the Constitution "singles Indians out as a
proper subject for separate legislation."'446 The main justification for
permitting such classifications, however, was that they apply, for the
most part, to tribal Indians, and are "political rather than racial in
441 This aspect of the Court's analysis can be criticized as disingenuous. The di-
rective at issue in Mancari required a minimum blood quantum of one-fourth Indian
blood in addition to membership in a federally recognized tribe. Consequently, an In-
dian whose federally recognized tribe required less than one-fourth blood quantum for
membership could not take advantage of the directive solely because of his race. See
POLICY REVIEW CoMMIssION FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 108-09 (a few tribes
permit anyone descended from a tribal member to be enrolled, irrespective of blood
quantum). A year later, a tribal member who did not meet the directive's blood quan-
tum requirement challenged the directive. The government conceded that the Indian
Reorganization Act's definition of Indian as "all persons of Indian descent who are
members of any recognized Indian tribe," 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976), controlled over the
directive's requirement of minimum blood quantum. Apparently the case was unre-
ported. Whiting v. United States, Civ. No. 75-3007 (D.S.D. 1975), discussed in POL-
ICY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 108-09.
442 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (showing of discriminatory
purpose necessary to invoke strict scrutiny of a facially neutral statute).
443 417 U.S. at 554.
44' Id. Stressing that a blanket preference for Indians in all branches of the civil
service would raise more serious constitutional questions, the Court noted that the pref-
erence applied only to the BIA and that staffing the BIA with tribal members would
tend to make the agency "more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups." Id.
445 Id. at 555.
446 Id. at 552.
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nature,'447 involving "quasi-sovereign tribal entities." 448s The Court has
often repeated this latter point, and it remains a key factor in the justi-
fication for less than strict scrutiny of legislation regarding Indians.
Second, although the Court used the phrase "tied rationally," the
analysis in the opinion suggests that the Court actually applied more
than minimal rationality scrutiny to the directive. For example, rather
than simply assuming some hypothetical purpose, the Court first deter-
mined that Congress had the power to enact the Indian Reorganization
Act and then isolated the articulated legislative purpose of the portion
of the statute authorizing the BIA preference. The Court then found a
close fit between the articulated statutory purpose and the means cho-
sen to effectuate that purpose, pointing out that the preference applied
only to the BIA, the agency charged with managing Indian affairs, in-
stead of all federal agencies.449
In sum, Mancari can be said to have at least intimated a height-
ened level of scrutiny for legislation benefiting tribal Indians.4 5° This
scrutiny appeared to be triggered by the Court's determination that
Congress undertook the preference policy as an exercise of its guardian-
ship responsibilities. Having left Indians "'an uneducated, helpless,
and dependent people,'" Congress "'[o]f necessity . ..assumed the
duty of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all
that was required to perform that obligation.'"451 Whereas Kagama
had held this guardianship authority to be extraconstitutional, in Man-
carl the Court stated it was "explicitly and implicitly [derived] from the
Constitution itself."
'452
Some saw Mancari as the Court's signal that it would in the fu-
ture "tame" the Plenary Power Doctrine of Kagama by viewing it as
derived from guardianship duties and thus possibly limited to congres-
sional actions benefiting Indians. 5 3 Under this analysis, congressional
action detrimental to Indian tribes could not be sustained unless it were
based on some other enumerated power. Having reestablished the con-
stitutional basis of congressional power over Indian affairs, the Court
in Mancari may have been signaling an intent to assert its role as ulti-
441 Id. at 553 n.24.
44S Id. at 554.
449 Id.
450 See Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WAH. L. REV.
587, 599 (1979) ("something more rigorous than minimal scrutiny").
451 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552 (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318
U.S. 705, 715 (1943)).
452 417 U.S. at 551-52.
413 See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 221; see also Johnson & Crystal, supra
note 450, at 626-27.
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mate arbiter of the Constitution, both to define the extent of the amor-
phous Indian affairs powers and to require a close fit between statutory
means and an express legislative purpose.
2. Mancari's Progeny
a. Challenges by Individuals
Mancari raised the possibility of a more active judicial role. Cases
subsequent to Mancari have unfortunately ignored many of the signals
of judicial activism in the Mancari decision and have cut back on the
promise of that decision. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes,'" the next case to raise an equal protection challenge, also in-
volved a claim on behalf of non-Indians, in this case a claim that fed-
eral tax immunities for Indians are impermissible racial classifications.
Without actually applying the Mancari test to the facts, the Court
merely asserted that Mancari compelled the conclusion that the immu-
nity was constitutional. 5 5 The Court's failure to apply the Mancari
test in Moe did not necessarily signal a retreat from Mancari, but
merely reflected the Court's belief that the fit between tax immunities
and Congress's unique obligation was so obvious, that explanation was
unnecessary.4 8
What is curious about Moe is that, as interpreted by the district
court, the tax immunity applied to all Indians trading on reservation
property, not only to members of a recognized tribe.457 Accordingly,
unlike the legislation in Mancari, the classifications upheld in Moe
were race-based. Yet the Court simply never addressed that issue' 458
thus avoiding the need to follow the dictum in Mancari that the Con-
stitution grants Congress the power to single "Indians out as a proper
subject for separate legislation."' 5'
Both Mancari and Moe involved federal policies benefiting Indian
4- 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
455 Id. at 479-80.
4" The immunity of on-reservation Indian property and activities from state taxa-
tion has long been recognized by Congress and the courts. Tax immunity has been
regarded as absolutely necessary to permit Indian tribes to maintain their land base,
and in turn, their sovereignty. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 27, at 46-47.
"57 425 U.S. at 481 n.16.
458 "The State has not challenged this holding, and we therefore do not disturb
it." Id.
459 417 U.S. at 552. Since Moe the Court has begun limiting tax benefits to tribal
members rather than to Indians racially. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). Thus, the Court appears to have recognized
that racial classifications should be avoided in this area, at least.
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tribes and tribal members but disadvantaging non-Indians and non-
members. The Court also applied the Mancari analysis in Fisher v.
District Court,460 a case involving federal policies benefiting Indian
tribes but disadvantaging tribal members. In Fisher, the petitioner, a
member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, had lost custody of her child
in a tribal court. When the child's guardian, also a tribal member,
brought adoption proceedings in state court to gain permanent custody,
the petitioner sought to block the state court form asserting jurisdiction.
The Montana Supreme Court permitted the state court to assert juris-
diction, reasoning that a denial of state jurisdiction would deny Indians
equal protection by depriving an Indian guardian of an advantage
available to non-Indians. 46' In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that
Mancari controlled because the "exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal
Court does not derive from the race of the [guardian] but rather from
the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under fed-
eral law. ' 4 2 Furthermore, the Court stressed that, as in Mancari, the
federal policy was designed to benefit the entire class of which the
guardian was a member "by furthering the congressional policy of In-
dian self-government. ' 463 The occasional detriment to individual mem-
bers, not being race-based, was therefore acceptable.
The analysis in Fisher closely tracked the judicial scrutiny analysis
of Mancari. Rather than simply hypothesizing a purpose, the Court
first emphasized the ample evidence of articulated federal intent to fos-
ter the self-government of Indian tribes. This intent was revealed both
in an agreement and statutes regarding the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
itself and in the Indian Reorganization Act's fundamental policy "to
encourage Indian tribes to revitalize their self-government." 46 Next,
recognizing that a judicial system is a fundamental governmental organ
through which self-government is exercised, the Court found a close
relation between the tribal court system, established under the Indian
Reorganization Act, and the furthering of Indian self-government. The
Court then concluded that permitting individual tribal members to cir-
cumvent the tribal court system would cause a "decline in the authority
of the Tribal Court' 465 and hence in the exercise of tribal self-
government.
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,466 another case ap-
460 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
461 State ex rel. Firecrow v. District Court, 167 Mont. 149, 536 P.2d 190 (1975).
462 424 U.S. at 390.
463 Id. at 391.
4 Id. at 387.
465 Id. at 388.
468 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
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plying the Mancari standard, is distinguishable from Mancari, Moe,
and Fisher. Unlike Mancari and Moe, the controversy in Weeks in-
volved only Indians; but, unlike Fisher, the interests of tribal and non-
tribal members were in conflict. The question in Weeks concerned enti-
tlement to funds appropriated by Congress to fulfill a judgment for the
Delaware Nation rendered against the United States by the Indian
Claims Commission.467 In the distribution scheme, Congress directed
ninety per cent of the judgment to be distributed per capita solely to the
Cherokee and Absentee Delawares.'"e Consequently, the Kansas De-
lawares, members of the Delaware Tribe in 1854 when the treaty was
made, were entitled to no money under the distribution scheme. Repre-
sentatives of the Kansas Delawares obtained an injunction to block dis-
tribution of the funds on the ground that their exclusion violated the
equal protection component of the due process clause. 4 9 The Supreme
Court reversed, applying the Mancari test.
470
While the Court's application of the test was strictly in accordance
with the "tied rationally" language of Mancari, it failed to apply the
somewhat heightened level of scrutiny actually employed in Mancari.
First, the Court turned the Mancari test on its head, citing it not as a
source of limitation of federal power but as an example of the deference
it owed to Congress in determining "the best or most efficient use for
which tribal funds should be employed."'" 1 Second, although in previ-
ous cases the Court had looked for an articulated legislative intent to
further "Congress' unique obligation toward the Indian," in Weeks
even the majority admitted that the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares
was purely an oversight by Congress.47 2 Instead of relying on an articu-
lated legislative intent, the Court conjectured that a possible congres-
sional purpose underlying the discrimination against the Kansas De-
'11 Absentee Delaware Tribe v. United States, 21 Ind. CI. Comm'n 344 (1969).
The Claims Commission awarded the claimants $9,168,171.13. Id. at 369-79.
468 430 U.S. at 80-82.
46 Weeks v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 1309 (W.D. Okla. 4975) (three judge
court).
470 430 U.S. at 85.
471 Id. at 84 (citing Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441, 449 (1914)).
472 Id. at 89. The original distribution act would have provided for per capita
payments to all lineal discendents of the 1854 tribe. During hearings, the Cherokee and
Absentee Delawares expressed concern that such broad language would invite the
Munsee Indians, some of whom lived with the Delaware tribe in 1854, to claim the
right to share in the award. An earlier distribution plan had created just such a diffi-
culty; the resulting claim by the Munsee Indians frustrated carrying out that distribu-
tion plan for years. In response to these concerns, Congress dropped the clause ex-
tending the plan to all lineal descendants. The measure designed to exclude Munsee
Indians, who had not been a part of the 1854 Delaware tribe, excluded the Kansas
Delawares in addition, leaving only the Cherokee and Absentee Delawares entitled. See
430 U.S. at 88-89.
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lawares may have been to promote Indian self-government.""
Moreover, the Court ignored the tenuous link between the ascribed in-
tent and the statutory scheme. Noting that the included groups had
maintained their status as Indian tribes while the Kansas Delawares, in
1866, had elbcted to sever their tribal status and remained unorganized
as a tribe, the Court concluded that the limitation of the judgment fund
to present descendents who, for the most part, maintained tribal ties
bore a reasonable relationship to promoting tribal self-government." 4
This reasoning, however, was unsound, since per capita awards, not
tribal awards, were at issue. Per capita awards, while understandably
popular with individual Indians, undermine tribal governments, which
would be strengthened if the money were distributed to the tribal en-
tity.475 Thus, the decision to award ninety per cent of the judgment to
individual tribal members would have little positive impact on the con-
gressional goal of furthering tribal self-government. Finally, the Court
noted that Congress had deliberately excluded the Kansas Delawares
from an earlier plan distributing money to pay for a judgment rendered
in an earlier case. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress had "his-
torically distinguished [the Kansas Delawares] from the Cherokee De-
lawares.1'' 47 This reliance on a past exclusion of the Kansas Delawares
was specious, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent.47 7 The earlier
exclusion was justified on the basis of a statute explicitly permitting
only members of the Cherokee Tribe to bring a claim.47 8
The legislative history, however, did reveal one articulated pur-
pose: to "avoid undue delay, administrative difficulty, and potentially
unmeritorious claims' 479 by excluding Indians who had not been mem-
bers of the Delaware Nation in 1854. The Court, exercising heightened
judicial scrutiny, normally does not accept administrative convenience
as a justification for discrimination, especially where a more precisely
tailored statute would not unduly burden effectuation of the legislative
scheme. 480 Furthermore, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the Kansas De-
411 See id. at 85-86.
474 Id. at 86.
476 Cf. A. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL AID 145-46 (1971) (dis-
cussing divisive economics and effects of per capita awards).
476 430 U.S. at 87.
47 Id. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
478 Id.
479 Id. at 89.
480 See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980)
(gender discrimination); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (gender); Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115-16 (1976) (alienage); cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 81-82 (1981) (need for military flexibility justified excluding all women from
a draft when only 80,000 women could be employed in noncombat positions).
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lawares had shared in an earlier award with no difficulty.481 Thus,
even accepting the purpose, the means used were unnecessarily broad.
In sum, the Court read Mancari as precedent justifying deference
to congressional power; it speculated regarding congressional motives;
and it required only a rational connection between legislative means
and a hypothesized purpose. Thus, Weeks, while strictly applying the
Mancari language, appears to be a significant retreat from the more
stringent analysis actually applied in Mancari.
Nevertheless, several factors may explain the Court's deference in
Weeks. First, as discussed above, the Court has been most deferential in
cases involving congressional power to manage and distribute Indian
property, land, or money. Second, the statute involved discrimination
within classes of Indians, a point that is key to the majority's attitude
toward this case. Whatever might impel Congress to exclude the Kan-
sas Delawares, it could not have been racial discrimination. 482 Thus,
the case becomes more like those in which the Court has reviewed cate-
gories of welfare aid and has hesitated to second-guess government de-
cisions to draw a line at a particular place. 8 3
Although the deferential stance of Weeks could be limited as sug-
gested above, the Court again deferred to Congress only a few months
later in United States v. Antelope,4 ' a case brought by individual Indi-
ans challenging on equal protection grounds legislation not designed to
benefit Indians.
Ninety years before Antelope, in United States v. Kagama,'48 5 the
Court had upheld the Major Crimes Act, which subjects Indians who
have committed certain crimes against other Indians to federal jurisdic-
tion.8 8 In Kagama, it may be recalled, the constitutional argument
centered mainly on the lack of congressional power to abrogate tribal
481 430 U.S. at 95-96 & n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
482 Id. at 97. Justice Stevens dissented not because the law was discriminatory, but
because it deprived the Kansas Delawares of property without the "'due process of
lawmaking' that the Fifth Amendment guarantees." Id. at 98.
483 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). It must be admitted
that in the welfare context no entitlement exists among any class of recipients, whereas
in the Weeks case the Kansas Delawares, as descendents of the 1854 Delaware Tribe,
were at least as entitled as the other descendents. Nevertheless, whether any of the
descendents of those wronged 100 years ago should be able to reap a windfall from
actions the government took in the past has often troubled members of the Court. See,
e.g., Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 355
(1955) (Jackson, J., concurring) (when wronged generation has gone, the present
descendents might reap a windfall award). Thus, for instance, Justices Blackmun and
Burger, though troubled about some aspects of the majority's analysis, still concurred in
the result because "the argument on each side is not at all strong." 430 U.S. at 91.
4- 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
485 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
488 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
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sovereignty.487 In United States v. Antelope, however, the argument
centered on individual rights. The defendants, tribal members convicted
of murder in federal court under the Major Crimes Act, argued that
the application of the federal felony-murder rule deprived them of
equal protection because white persons committing the same crime at
the same place would be subjected to the state's murder law, which
would have required proof of premeditation." 8 The Supreme Court re-
jected the defendants' constitutional arguments in an opinion ostensibly
relying on Mancari, but in reality substantially undercutting Mancari
as precedent for limiting congressional power.
To begin with, the Court cited Mancari for the proposition that
legislation singling out Indian tribes does not represent a racial classifi-
cation.4 89 The Court did not, however, apply the second part of the
Mancari precedent: its test of the constitutional limits of federal legisla-
tion affecting Indians. Instead, it treated the issue of constitutional
power to regulate tribal members as settled because of the absence of a
racial classification.490 Moreover, the Court frankly acknowledged that
the legislation in Antelope was not designed to further tribal self-
government as was the legislation in the Mancari line of cases. 491 Nev-
ertheless, it found in Mancari support for the broader conclusion that
all federal legislation affecting tribal Indians is "governance" of Indian
tribes492 rather than legislation of a "'racial' group consisting of 'Indi-
ans.'" 493 In other words, the purpose of any legislation singling out
Indian tribes appeared to be irrelevant to the Court, unless, of course,
the legislation could be shown to have an invidious racial purpose.494
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether the statute promoted
interests consistent with the federal guardianship duty. To the contrary,
it viewed all litigation affecting Indian tribes as "a necessary and ap-
propriate consequence of federal guardianship under the
Constitution.
'49 5
Finally, while the Court did focus on tribal status, it managed to
sidestep the serious issues raised by criminal laws, including the Major
Crimes Act, that contain explicit racial classifications. The Antelope de-
487 See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
488 430 U.S. at 643-44.
489 Id. at 645.
490 Id. at 646.
491 Id.
492 Id.
493 Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 430 U.S. at 553 n.24).
494 See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 439 U.S. 463, 499 n.46 (1979).
45 430 U.S. at 641, 647 n.8 (emphasis added).
1984]
280 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fendants were tribal members, so the Court stated that it need not
reach the question whether the Major Crimes Act applied to all Indi-
ans or only to some category of Indians such as tribal members or those
living on a reservation and maintaining a close relationship with the
tribe.4 6 If the Major Crimes Act were interpreted as applying to all
Indians, it would clearly create a race-based classification, not a tribal
status classification as was found in Mancari. Moreover, unlike Moe,
such a classification would possibly result in detrimental treatment of
Indians because of their race. If the Major Crimes Act, so interpreted,
were challenged by an Indian on equal protection grounds, the Court
could hardly avoid, as it did in Moe, the thorny constitutional question
of whether such a race-based classification could survive an equal pro-
tection challenge under strict scrutiny.
In sum, the Antelope Court announced that all legislation regard-
ing tribal Indians had a legitimate governmental purpose: to govern
Indian tribes. Furthermore, under an equal protection challenge, all
such legislation would be permissible if not invidiously motivated and
not irrational.4 97 After Antelope, therefore, it is difficult to conceive of a
federal statute regarding Indian tribes, not motivated by racial discrimi-
nation, that could be found to violate the requirements of equal
protection.
As was true of the earlier cases, however, it is possible to defend
the result in Antelope, if not the reasoning. First, the defendants' argu-
ment raised no issues regarding the lack of governmental power to ab-
rogate tribal sovereignty under the Major Crimes Act. Rather, the only
issue raised was denial of equal protection as compared with similarly
situated nontribal Indian persons-that is, those committing the same
crime against the same victim on the reservation. To the Court, the
defendants had misconceived the class to which they ought to compare
themselves. In the absence of federal legislation, state courts would have
no jurisdiction over the crime involved; tribal courts would have sole
jurisdiction. Thus, "state law does not constitute a meaningful point of
reference for establishing a claim of equal protection. ' 4 98 The Court
488 Id. at 646-47 n.7.
497 Id. at 647 n.8.
488 Id. at 649 n.12. This analysis presents something of a quandary for the defen-
dants since they also could not compare themselves to similarly situated defendants in
tribal court; the Major Crimes Act had removed that jurisdiction in 1885. Although the
legislative history seems to suggest otherwise, lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court have stated that the Major Crimes Act preempts concurrent tribal jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) (dicta);
Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.S.D. 1955), affd, 231
F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). For a review of the legislative history, see M. PRICE & R.
CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 205-07 (1983).
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noted that the proper comparison class for the Indian defendants
charged under the Major Crimes Act is the non-tribal Indian defendant
charged under the criminal laws governing federal enclaves, such as
military reservations. Since the Major Crimes Act incorporated this
federal enclave law as the law to be applied to tribal Indian defen-
dants,499 there was no discrepancy in treatment and hence no equal
protection problem. "Under our federal system, the National Govern-
ment does not violate equal protection when its own body of law is
evenhanded, regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same
subject matter." 500
b. Challenges by Tribes
Mancari, Moe, Fisher, Weeks, and Antelope all involved equal
protection challenges raised by individuals. None, therefore, addressed
the issue of equal protection claims raised by Indian tribes. Such a
claim was presented to the Court in Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation.5°1 The tribes argued
that state legislation extending criminal and civil jurisdiction over In-
dian reservations violated both their due process right to sovereignty
and the equal protection clause. The Court ruled against the tribes on
both claims in a decision marked by deference to congressional judg-
ments regarding the continuing existence of tribal sovereignty. 502
Public Law 280,503 enacted by Congress in 1953, authorized states
to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over the Indian reservations
within their borders, with or without the consent of the tribes involved.
In 1963, the State of Washington assumed full jurisdiction over con-
senting Indian tribes but only partial jurisdiction over nonconsenting
tribes.50 4 The assumption of partial jurisdiction depended on three fac-
tors: the status of the land on which the regulated conduct occurred, the
subject matter of the regulated conduct, and the race of the person in-
volved in the activity, Indian or non-Indian. Full criminal and civil
jurisdiction was extended to all fee land on reservations of nonconsent-
ing tribes and also to all nonfee land "when non-Indians were in-
'" Antelope, 430 U.S. at 648 & n.9.
500 Id. at 649 (footnotes omitted).
501 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
502 Id. at 500-01.
5os Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C. (1976)). For the background and an analysis of Public Law
280, see Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REv. 535 (1975).
5o, WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1974).
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volved." 50' The state disavowed jurisdiction over all other nonfee land
except with regard to eight categories of activity it deemed especially
important: compulsory school attendance, public assistance, domestic
relations, mental illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings,
dependent children, and operation of motor vehicles. " '
The Yakima Indian Nation sought a declaratory judgment that the
Washington statute violated the fourteenth amendment's due process
and equal protection clauses. The district court's denial of declaratory
relief was reversed by the Ninth Circuit,5"' which held that the state
had violated equal protection guarantees.
The Ninth Circuit never cited Mancari and explicitly sought to
avoid the issue whether the tribe's equal protection claim should be
upheld through intermediate or even more exacting judicial scrutiny.
Rather, the court held that "Washington's title-based classification fails
to meet any formulation of the rational basis test."508 Yet, the court's
opinion contained elements of what has come to be known as interme-
diate or middle scrutiny. The most important criterion for assertion of
criminal jurisdiction was the status of title: fee or nonfee. To determine
whether this criterion was "wholly unrelated" 509 to state objectives the
court limited its consideration to those objectives articulated by the state
attorney general. The court, moreover, noted that it "had no reason to
believe the Washington Attorney General . . was 'selecting a conven-
ient, but false post-hoc rationalization,' "510 citing Craig v. Boren,51 a
leading case in the development of intermediate scrutiny for gender
discrimination.
The articulated state purpose for asserting jurisdiction in nonfee
land over only certain subject areas was that these areas were those
"'in which the state has the most fundamental concern for the welfare
of those least able to care for themselves.' "512 The court, focusing
50 439 U.S. at 475. As is the case with many other tribes in the Northwest whose
lands were subdivided during the Allotment Era, the Yakima Indian Nation's reserva-
tion had become a checkerboard, comprising three different types of land tenure: tribal
trust land; individual Indian trust land; and former tribal land owned in fee simple
absolute by Indians or non-Indians. To simplify, the land held in trust is usually called
nonfee land and the land held in fee simple absolute is called fee land.
5" Id. at 475-76.
507 Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington,
552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
500 Id. at 1335.
509 Id.
510 Id. at 1335 n.8.
511 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976). The court also cited Reed v. Reed, the first
gender discrimination case in which the Supreme Court had applied heightened judicial
scrutiny. 552 F.2d at 1335 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
512 552 F.2d at 1335 (quoting Transcript at 586).
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solely on the criminal jurisdiction that would be asserted in these eight
subject areas, stated that there was no rational connection between the
"stated purpose" and the status of land title within the reservation. 513
In effect the court held that the stated purpose was impermissibly un-
derinclusive: "An overriding concern with . . . public order necessarily
embrace[s] both [fee and nonfee land], once the state undertakes to as-
sume any jurisdiction over either." '
In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected both the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the equal protection claim and the Yakima Nation's argu-
ment that the law violated a fundamental right to self-government. As
in Antelope, the Court relied on Mancari only for the proposition that
classifications singling out Indian tribes are not racial and hence not
suspect. 5 5 Similarly, the Court's equal protection analysis did not eval-
uate whether the statute furthered "Congress' unique obligations" to
Indians, but only whether the statute was rationally related to the
state's purpose.516 The Court also dismissed the tribes' fundamental
right theory as "untenable" 1 " because "[ilt is well established that
Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs, may
restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian tribes."5 " Conse-
quently, the legislative classification need only "meet conventional
Equal Protection Clause criteria . . . . [L]egislative classifications are
523 Id.
514 Id. By assuming full criminal jurisdiction over fee land but only partial crimi-
nal jurisdiction over most nonfee land, the state deprived Indians living on non-fee land
of state law enforcement except with regard to the previously noted eight subject areas.
Yet the Court held that "[tihe state's interest in enforcing criminal law is no less 'fun-
damental' . . . on nonfee lands than on fee lands .... [T]he happenstance of title
holding is [not] related in any way to the need by the land occupants for law enforce-
ment." Id.
A careful observer may wonder about the basis of the conflict in this case, for the
tribe could secure full law enforcement from the state throughout the reservation simply
by requesting it. Perhaps the tribe, in fact, desired no state criminal jurisdiction on its
reservation. If protection against incursions on its sovereignty were the tribe's goal, the
Ninth Circuit's opinion helped advance that goal, for it held that the "whole statute
must be rewritten." Id. at 1336. Yet it is doubtful that could be done, since in 1968
Congress amended Public Law 280, prohibiting any additional assertion of state juris-
diction over reservation property without tribal consent. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326
(1976); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (statutes such as Pub. L.
No. 280 were passed for Indians' benefit and are to be narrowly construed, with doubts
to be resolved in favor of Indians).
515 439 U.S. at 500-01. Such reliance was inapposite, however, for the classifica-
tion was racial and not based on tribal status. "State jurisdiction is complete as to all
non-Indians on reservations and is also complete as to Indians on [fee] land." Id. at
498. Thus, on nonfee land, the classification determining jurisdiction was Indian versus
non-Indian. The statute made no reference to tribal status.
516 Id. at 501.
517 Id.
518 Id.
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valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's
objectives." '19
The Yakima Indian Nation case perhaps marks a low point in the
efforts of tribal advocates to convince the Court to apply more than
minimal scrutiny to individual and tribal claims of equal protection vio-
lations. While Mancari could theoretically have served as a shield for
Indian tribes adversely affected by federal legislation, that shield was
transformed in later cases into a judicial sword used to support conclu-
sions that legislation unfavorable to tribes or Indian interests is not
race-based and hence not suspect. The only consistent application of
Mancari to date has been to uphold the exercise of congressional power
and to justify judicial deference to Congress.520 The Plenary Power
Doctrine may have faded as the explicit analytical theory for justifying
the exercise of congressional power, but its doctrinal emanations are
519 Id. Note that the tribe relied on an 1855 treaty promise of self-government. Id.
at 478 n.22. The Court held that Public Law 280 had abrogated any such promise. Id.
Notwithstanding the purported use of "conventional Equal Protection Clause cri-
teria," it could be argued that the Court actually applied something more than rational
basis scrutiny, for it stated that the statute must be rationally related to "'the purpose
identified by the State.'" Id. at 500 (emphasis added) (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)). It thus suggested that it would not
hypothesize a statutory purpose to "save" a statute. Yet this concession to "conven-
tional" rational basis criteria is illusory, for the Court permitted the State Attorney
General to reformulate the state's purpose and select a "convenient. . . post-hoc ra-
tionalization." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 200 n.7. The stated objective before the
Ninth Circuit for limiting criminal jurisdiction over most nonfee land to eight enumer-
ated subject areas was solely "'concern for the welfare of those least able to care for
themselves.'" 552 F.2d at 1335 (quoting trial transcript). Yet, the Supreme Court held
Washington's statutory scheme was "fairly calculated to further the State's interest in
providing protection to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reservation
while at the same time allowing scope for tribal self-government on [nonfee] lands."
439 U.S. at 502. In contrast, in its brief the state did not raise protection for non-
Indian citizens as a major concern, justifying the statute's exclusion of trust land solely
as an accommodation of the value of tribal sovereignty. The extension of jurisdiction
over the eight specific subject areas was justified on the basis of the fundamental nature
of those areas. Brief for State at 37-39, Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). Accordingly, while the means must
be rationally related to the "identified" governmental interest, the Court appeared
ready to permit the government to restate that interest until it finally formulated an
acceptable one. One might fairly conclude that reformulating the reasons for actions,
after a challenge to those actions, creates the suspicion of pretext.
"I See Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 694
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (Indian preference upheld); Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d
1110 (10th Cir.) (Indian preference upheld), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). Dicta
in a recent district court opinion states that only legislation benefiting Indians is enti-
tled to deferential review under Mancari. See St. Paul Intertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reyn-
olds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (D. Minn. 1983). Nevertheless, laws burdening Indian
tribal members have continued to receive deferential treatment. See, e.g., United States
v. Yazzie, 693 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1982) (subjecting Navajo Indians to different state
laws defining incest upheld), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1231 (1983).
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still present. Whatever Congress wants, Congress gets, and Mancari
and its progeny are now increasingly impressed to serve that end.
Mancari's most crushing blow to tribal rights is the creation of an
analytical mechanism to transmute legislative classifications from the
category of suspect race-based into the category of nonsuspect tribe-
based. Such a transmutation is similar to that employed in Geduldig v.
Aiello,5 1 in which the Court held that a state disability insurance pro-
gram discriminating against pregnancy disabilities is not gender-based
discrimination. "The program divides potential recipients into two
groups . . . While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes."522 The premise of Mancari's tribal
status argument (as well as the premise of Geduldig's pregnancy status
argument) is faulty and should not stand unchallenged.
Mancari's premise is best understood when placed in contradis-
tinction with that of cases such as Washington v. Davis,5 23 Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,524 and Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney.5 25 In those cases nonracial and nongender cri-
teria, calculated to be applied to multi-racial and multi-gender groups,
produced racially discriminatory and gender discriminatory outcomes.
Absent proof of a discriminatory purpose, however, the Court refused
to find invidious discrimination. The reason is that a purpose to affect
adversely a racial or gender group is the central evil equal protection
seeks to avoid.52 8 The premise of these cases is that such a purpose
cannot be inferred simply from the language of a facially neutral stat-
ute because nonsuspect criteria, applied to multi-racial and multi-
gender groups, suggest a legitimate purpose sufficient to support a con-
tinuing presumption of constitutionally permissible legislative intent. In
contrast, Mancari would apply the same presumption to legislation that
adversely affects Indians by creating tribal status classifications.527 Such
an application is inapposite since the selection criterion is facially ra-
cial. The triggering mechanism for receiving unfavorable treatment at
the hands of government is the racial status of being an Indian because
only Indians are tribal members within the meaning of these stat-
utes. 28 Through facial evaluation of such statutes one can conclude
521 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
522 Id. at 497 n.20.
52- 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
524 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
525 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
526 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
527 E.g., Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537-38; see also, e.g., Yakima, 439 U.S. at 465-66;
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642-43.
528 See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846). See discus-
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that only Indians will be affected adversely. That assurance of discrimi-
nation based on race should create sufficient suspicion of invidious in-
tent to support strict judicial scrutiny because "[t]he central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause . . is the prevention of official conduct
discriminating on the basis of race."52
3. Future Directions for Tribal Advocates
The discussion of Mancari and the cases following it contribute
significantly to the development of this Article's major themes: the
scope of congressional power over Indian affairs and particularly the
power to substantially invade tribal property and sovereignty rights; the
due process limits on the exercise of that power; and the role of the
Court in accommodating tribal interests with those of the larger politi-
cal community.
Mancari held out initial promise for tribal advocates; that promise
has been dimmed somewhat by subsequent cases that have transformed
Mancari into a statement of deference to congressional power. Advo-
cates must now return to basics and attempt to secure heightened judi-
cial scrutiny by focusing on the values and traditions that underlie judi-
cial protection of discrete and insular minorities and other disfavored
classes. At the very minimum, tribal advocates should analyze legisla-
tion carefully; if, as clearly in Moe,580 seemingly in Yakima,53 1 and po-
tentially in Antelope,532 the legislation classifies in terms of Indian and
non-Indian, rather than in terms of tribal Indian and others, they
should argue that the Mancari tribal status analysis is simply inappli-
cable. Such classifications are race-based, and courts must at least be
presented with that understanding.
Attacks on purely racial statutes are insufficient, however. Tribes
must argue that legislation adversely affecting Indians on the basis of
tribal status is racially discriminatory per se. While Geduldig may be
an overwhelming precedent, advocates can argue that Geduldig was a
gender classification, traditionally not afforded the strictest scrutiny. In-
dian legislation involves racial groupings, an area in which the Court
has traditionally not deferred to congressional judgments and has
strictly scrutinized legislative purpose and means.
In the event tribal advocates are unsuccessful in limiting Geduldig
sion supra text accompanying notes 71-80.
529 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
o See supra notes 454-58 and accompanying text.
53 See supra notes 501-19 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 484-500 and accompanying text.
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to gender classifications, they could distinguish Geduldig by arguing
that the relevant classification under equal protection analysis is "tribal
status" and that the classification of tribal status in and of itself has the
indicia of a suspect or disfavored class."' 3 As argued above, 5" Indian
tribes are a paradigmatic example of minorities vulnerable to and ex-
cluded from the majoritarian political process. The only factor present
in the classification "tribal status," yet not present in classifications af-
forded protection from the majoritarian process by the Court, is that
tribal status is seemingly alterable;5 5 a tribal Indian can sever his or
her connections with the tribe and assimilate into the mainstream of
society. Thus, the classification of tribal status is potentially not as
well-defined or discrete as race or even gender.53 Tribes should
counter this argument, however, by educating the courts to the central
significance of a tribe and tribal membership to a tribal Indian's con-
cept of dignity and personhood 37 Once the importance of this relation-
ship is understood, courts may see that concluding that tribal status is
alterable is akin to arguing that gender is similarly alterable because of
the existence of sex-change operations.
There are other equal protection and due process arguments to be
made that may offer protection to tribal property and sovereignty
rights. Tribes should attempt to build their case for heightened scrutiny
by stressing both the importance of the right affected adversely by fed-
eral legislation and the unique status of Indians as a disfavored class.s
Reference must be made again and again to the central importance of
land and sovereignty to the identity of Indians as a people, to the long
and ignominious history of mistreatment, and to the rights of political
association the Court has protected under the first amendment. The
M But cf. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 501 (classification based on tribal
status not suspect).
See supra notes 282-92 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Court, 450 U.S. 464, 477-78
(1981) ("The Constitution is violated when government ... invidiously classifies simi-
larly situated people on the basis of the immutable characteristics with which they were
born.") (Stewart, J., concurring).
536 Cf. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(per curiam) (older persons not a discrete and insular group because "each of us will
reach [old age]"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-28
(1973) (class of poor persons receiving inferior education due to property tax financing
of school districts is too diverse and amorphous to warrant strict scrutiny).
M3 See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text.
5s San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). The Court employed a sliding scale approach to judicial scrutiny
of legislation in a recent case invalidating a state statute denying access to education, an
important, although not fundamental, right, triggering heightened scrutiny. Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (legislation must further a "substantial goal" of the
state).
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time may not yet be ripe for the courts to accept these arguments, but
tribal advocates must keep them before the courts. Only through persis-
tent efforts and arguments will advocates be able to convince the courts
of the inappropriateness of such total deference to congressional power
as demonstrated in Yakima Indian Nation. Only with repeated re-
minders to the courts of the equal protection and due process argu-
ments at issue can the lingering melody of the plenary power era be
silenced.
